Intimate Subversions: Minority women encountering laws and patriarchy by Das, Joyce Mormita
  
 
Intimate Subversions:  
Minority women encountering laws and patriarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
Joyce Mormita Das 
 
 
 
February 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The 
Australian National University 
 
 
© Copyright by Joyce Mormita Das 2017
  
i 
 
 
 
The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge, my 
own work except as acknowledged in the text. The material has not 
been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any 
other university. 
 
 
 
 
Joyce Mormita Das 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to  
all those women who are speaking  
through this thesis 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgement 
This thesis would not be possible without the sustained mentorship, support, and 
breadth of vision of Dr Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Senior Fellow, Crawford School of 
Public Policy. Throughout my PhD candidature, as my primary Supervisor, Dr 
Lahiri-Dutt has guided me with the vastness of her theoretical and critical grasp 
that pushed me continuously to ask deeper questions and strengthen my 
scholarship. Her vital contributions as a close reader of my work and as an 
intellectual exemplar have enriched this thesis significantly. I owe her many 
intellectual and personal debts. 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the other members of my PhD 
panel — Professor Margaret Thornton, ANU College of Law; Dr Bina D’Costa, 
Fellow, International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs; and Dr 
Lesley Potter, Associate Professor, Crawford School of Public Policy — whose 
advice, support, and incisive comments and suggestions on the thesis chapters 
helped me to strengthen my arguments of this thesis.   
I am thankful to a number of people who made my year-long fieldwork possible 
and fruitful. I am particularly grateful to all the participants in this research who 
shared their stories and experiences with me. Most women, whom I interviewed, 
opened up and trusted me to tell me their stories. Without their participation, 
this research would never be possible at all. Apart from the research participants, 
a number of people and organisations facilitated the fieldwork is various 
capacities.      
Both in Barisal and Gazipur, Antonio Adhikary (whom I call Timu dada) and 
Lenard Gomes and his family respectively, opened their doors to host me during 
my stay in these places. Their hospitality never let me miss my home. 
Throughout my stay, I was treated as part of their families. In my visit to 
Burdwan, West Bengal, Professor Gopa Samanta, Head of Department of 
Geography, Burdwan University, organised my stay at the university guest house 
vi 
 
and introduced me to my research participants. I am also grateful to her. I am 
thankful to the Archivist of the Bishop’s College, Kolkata, who provided me 
access to their archive for data collection.  
In my fieldwork in Dhaka, a number of people and organisations supported me to 
carry out my data collection work. I am thankful to Archbishop Patrick 
D’Rozario, Rev Leor P Sarker, General Secretary, Bangladesh Baptist Church 
Fellowship, Ms Helen Monisha Sarker, National General Secretary, YWCA of 
Bangladesh, Barrister Charles Quiah, High Court lawyer, all the priests and lay 
leaders of the Christian community whom I met and whose names I could not 
mention specifically, Dr Faustina Pereira, Director, Human Rights and Legal Aid 
Services, BRAC, staff members of the Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK), the 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), and Bangladesh Mahila 
Parishad, amongst others who supported and facilitated my fieldwork.  
In ANU, Canberra, I was supported by a number of colleagues and friends 
throughout my candidature. At the professional level, my thesis writing group 
(TWG) acted as a vital pillar to make this thesis stand. The members of the TWG 
were encouraging, energetic, and critical to my writing that challenged me 
enough to be out of my comfort zone. Particularly, Dr Caroline Schuster was an 
amazing convener and mentor for the entire group. I have been fortunate to have 
been a part of this vibrant, compassionate, intellectually stimulating group of 
fellow graduate students, whose scholarship, pedagogy, and focus have always 
motivated me. I thank every one of them for their generosity, energy, and 
comradeship. I am truly grateful to Dr Schuster and my fellow group members 
for their contribution to this thesis.     
I would also like to thank Dr Megan Poore, PhD Academic, and Research Skills 
Advisor, to read my thesis chapters patiently and provide editorial support that 
has improved this thesis significantly. I am also grateful to Ms Tracy McRae, 
Higher Degree Research (PhD) Student Administrative Officer, for her 
continuous support throughout my candidature.  
vii 
 
In my PhD life, I have also been blessed with a number of friends who were 
extraordinarily supportive of making this thesis possible. One such name is 
Rebecca Gidley (Becky), my friend and a fellow PhD candidate at ANU. 
Particularly, the last six months of my thesis writing phase, Becky played the 
most supportive role. Not only had we worked together during both of our last 
six months of thesis writing, but Becky also read my entire thesis and provided 
her useful comments on it. She had been my partner in this journey in every 
single day of this six months. I cannot thank her more for her friendship, 
collegiality, and support.      
My other friends, both in Canberra and Dhaka, played an extremely supportive 
role to write this thesis. I have to mention some names here — Rosita, Fa, Lina, 
Bec, Chris, Khaing, Bruma, Jacklin, amongst many others — I would like to thank 
all of you for your friendship, care, and support and to be there when I needed 
you most. The two other persons who deserve a big thanks are my two fabulous 
office mates — Paul Wyrwoll and Alrick Campbell — who were friendly, 
supportive, and collegial.  
Last but not least, I would like to express gratitude to my family, particularly, my 
father and my partner for believing in me. It is unfortunate that my mother, who 
passed away in 2006, could not see me doing this doctoral research. She would 
have been very proud of me if she was here. But I am grateful to both of my 
parents for their support and understanding that had grown manifold through 
the years and for the life skills of determination, hard work, and integrity they 
have nurtured in me. Finally, I would like to thank the person, Nazrul Islam, my 
partner, who has been the constant source of my courage. I am thankful for his 
partnership, friendship, and love. 
  
ix 
 
Abstract 
This thesis asks:  
How do multiple laws collude with patriarchy to define minority women’s positions in 
the state, society, and the community?  
And 
How do religious minority women in a postcolonial context selectively seek, apply, and 
subvert these multiple laws to achieve their own objectives?  
Broadly speaking, this thesis examines the complex relationship between multiple 
laws and gender in religious minority groups in South Asia. In particular, it examines 
the roles, both constraining and liberating, played by laws, rules, and normative orders 
that together comprise a situation of legal pluralism to show how they affect women in 
the Christian community in Bangladesh. 
In this thesis, I use a feminist standpoint to interrogate the theories of legal pluralism; 
hence, I argue for a feminist theory of legal pluralism. By engaging critically with 
feminist theories, I show that women’s full experience of law cannot be captured if the 
state is considered as the sole source of laws. Instead, other social sources of laws 
should also be considered to understand and capture the complexities of legal and 
social realities that women experience. Therefore, I argue for a shift from the legal 
centralist to a legal pluralist paradigm in order to capture how women experience the 
plurality of laws. The second shift that is required for the same purpose is of the centre 
of analysis of legal pluralism from ‘law’ to ‘women’, by considering women’s 
intersectional subjectivities where women’s identities intersect with their sex, class, 
religion, sexuality, and physical location. 
To illuminate the research questions, I used ethnographic methods in various sites in 
Bangladesh. The methods include in-depth interviews, archival research, participant 
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observation, and content analysis that were applied at multiple scales. First, I examine 
how law and gender interact with each other at the state level. I analyse the situation 
of legal pluralism of religious minority groups in terms of their respective state and 
non-state laws. I also seek a historical route to understanding how religious minority 
communities were created in South Asia; in particular, how the identities of Christians 
were shaped through colonisation, Christianisation, and the law-creation processes, 
and their gendered experiences of these processes.  
At the next scale of analysis, I focus on the Christian community in Bangladesh as they 
construct their group identities, autonomy, and authority to see closely how gender 
intersects with community power, politics, and dynamics. At this scale, I examine the 
effects of the interaction of law with patriarchy by focusing on women’s everyday lives 
in their homes, workplaces, community, churches, and elsewhere.  
At the micro-scale of analysis, I examine, compare, and contrast the gendered 
treatment of multiple laws and normative orders. I do this by investigating three areas 
that are crucial to gender identities: marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Again, a 
feminist theory of legal pluralism helps me to reveal how individual women interpret, 
apply, choose alternative paths, and subvert both state and non-state laws. 
The investigation underlines that complex socio-political context and the historical 
legacy of intimate colonisation by the British have combined to create an impasse, 
where achieving gender equality remains a distant dream for religious minority 
women. Consequently, the research not only converses with the feminist theory of 
legal pluralism but also contributes a legal pluralism angle to the rich and vibrant 
debates on gender and development. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Rebecca Sarker is an educated Bengali woman in her late 20s from the minority 
Christian community in the north-western part of Bangladesh and now works 
in the private sector in Dhaka. When she was eighteen years old, Rebecca had 
a relationship with a Catholic man. Although initially, her family did not 
approve of her relationship, later they decided that she should marry him. So, 
in 2006, when she was only 19, they married in a Baptist church, of which she 
was a member. But her husband’s church did not accept their marriage as it 
did not conform to the Catholic law. So later, to gain their acceptance, Rebecca 
converted to Catholicism and the couple had a second wedding in the Catholic 
Church. However, within a few months, they began to have severe marital 
problems because of her husband’s violence against her and his alcohol and 
drug problems. Rebecca’s in-laws and other relatives asked her to be patient. In 
a few years’ time, she moved out and began to live with her mother. The 
Catholic Church became involved in the matter and called the couple in for 
counselling. Rebecca and her husband had several sessions with the church 
priests, but each time the church conveyed to them that Catholics do not 
divorce. Therefore, the church wanted them to think about how they could live 
within this marriage peacefully.  
After living separately for about two years, both Rebecca and her husband 
decided that they wanted a divorce. Rebeca’s lawyer explained that divorce 
would be difficult for her because of the Christian divorce law of the country. 
He told her that without adultery, divorce is not possible for Christians. 
Moreover, the lawyer explained that adultery alone would not be enough for 
Rebecca; she also would have to bring additional grounds such as cruelty. The 
claim of physical abuse would also have to be proven with evidence. Rebecca 
quickly realised that it would be almost impossible for her to obtain a decent 
and dignified divorce from the court. But later, from another lawyer, she 
discovered that there is an alternative process of ‘mutual divorce’ for 
Christians involving the signing of an affidavit to declare that the couple is 
divorced from now on. She also heard that many Christians were taking this 
path recently in order to avoid the difficulties of legal proceedings in courts 
and social scandal. Many of them who took this path of divorce alternative 
were even remarrying. Rebecca had doubts in this process and knew that there 
must be some gaps in this type of divorce. But in that particular moment, 
getting a divorce by affidavit appeared to be the best option for Rebecca 
without going through the trouble of the court proceedings and to minimise 
any social scandal. Finally, Rebecca and her husband proceeded and signed an 
affidavit in 2011 to declare that they were divorced and they could remarry if 
they wish.  
South Asian women share a common legacy of colonialism that binds them 
together through their respective personal laws, according to their religious 
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affiliation. Similar to other South Asian countries, Bangladesh has different 
personal laws — governing marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody — 
comprising a situation of legal pluralism1 for different religious groups, such as 
Muslims, Hindus, and Christians. These religion-specific personal laws, which are 
civil laws in nature, originated from British colonisation. Many provisions under 
these personal laws are highly gender-discriminatory, particularly for minority 
communities, and they have not been amended for more than a century. For 
example, Bangladesh still upholds personal laws for its Christian populations. The 
Christian Marriage Act, 1872, and the Divorce Act, 1869, have been enforced since 
colonial times and have not been amended. Moreover, the content of these laws 
does not necessarily reflect religious texts or practices, yet the personal laws and 
religions are firmly bound with each other even today.   
Rebecca’s interaction with laws as a religious minority woman accentuates the 
complexity of her situation. For South Asia, the issue of minorities sits at the 
heart of its political problems. The Partition of India in 1947 completely reframed 
the issue of minorities in this region. The Partition was carried out from a 
distance, hurriedly, by using only the censuses of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ 
populations (Khan 2007, 3). Therefore, these postcolonial states inherited 
minority problems at their creation. Due to Partition, Muslims in India and 
Hindus in East Pakistan, along with other religious groups such as Christians and 
Buddhists, became ‘Partition’s orphans’, with a minority identity.  
Minorities are treated by the majority groups as proxy citizens of the country 
where they are a majority rather than as full citizens of their own country of 
origin (Chowdhury 2010). For example, Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh are 
not just minorities but are looked upon as proxy Indians and imagined as a threat 
or an enemy. Similarly, Muslims in India have to struggle to prove that they are 
                                                 
1 Generally, legal pluralism is defined as a situation where multiple legal systems co-exist within a 
broader legal context. The essential elements that commonly exist in order to create a situation of 
legal pluralism are multiple legal systems that contain law or other normative orders, a broader 
context where these legal systems cohabit, and all these laws and normative orders are active or 
interplay at the same time. 
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loyal citizens of India, their homeland, and that they are not pro-Pakistani or 
worse, proxy citizens of the neighbour and enemy.  
In Bangladesh, minorities became the subject of violence by majority groups. 
Killing minorities and looting their properties and possessions are everyday 
events even today. For example, there has been systematic looting and grabbing 
of Hindu property by all the powerful political parties. A study of communal 
relationships in Bangladesh showed that during the period between October 2001 
and February 2002, minorities were forced to move out of their houses, 
agricultural land, and business enterprises (shops) because of their minority 
identity from 797 villages in 137 sub-districts throughout the country; that they 
faced looting both in their houses and business enterprises in 588 villages in 128 
sub-districts; and that their property, such as houses and business enterprises, 
were destroyed in 850 villages in 162 sub-districts (Rafi 2005). Violence against 
minorities by majority groups is, therefore, pervasive in Bangladesh.    
In such a situation where the everyday lives of minorities encounter 
discrimination and violence from the majority groups, Rebecca, introduced in the 
anecdote, stands at a critical point wherein a postcolonial context, her minority 
identity intersects with gender and multiple laws. In order to receive a remedy of 
divorce, she needed to prove at least one of the eight conditions, such as cruelty, 
incest, bigamy, sodomy, and bestiality amongst other conditions, in addition to 
her husband’s adultery; whereas it was enough for her husband to divorce her by 
bringing a single charge of adultery against her.2 But Rebecca’s story exposes us to 
a range of other issues beyond the boundaries of personal laws. For example, the 
church and the community became active players in her divorce process. Being a 
Catholic woman, her marriage was indissoluble and was considered a sacrament 
according to the Code of Canon Law. Moreover, the alternative form of divorce, 
which she and her husband mutually agreed on, was not a legal form although 
both parties regarded it as having the same consequences as a legal divorce. 
Additionally, society imposed patriarchal ideologies on her and told her to 
                                                 
2 According to Section 10, the Divorce Act, 1869. 
4 
 
endure her husband’s abuse. The church could not offer her remedy by approving 
a divorce, and neither did the personal law provided her with a hassle-free, 
dignified remedy of divorce; consequently, Rebecca finally chose an alternative 
process, by bypassing the state and the church law that gave her what she 
wanted. 
Rebecca’s story illustrates multiple complexities that minority women face when 
laws intersect with patriarchy. Her story poses some important questions: In a 
postcolonial context, how do multiple laws collude with patriarchy to define 
minority women’s positions in the state, society, and the community?  How do 
religious minority women in this context selectively seek, apply, and subvert the 
plurality of laws available to them to achieve their own objectives? This thesis 
aims to answer these questions by examining the everyday lives of women of the 
minority Christian community in Bangladesh.   
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equality as a fundamental right 
(Articles 27 and 28) and specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
religious affiliation and gender (Article 28). However, this equality remains only 
at a theoretical level as different religious family laws continue to discriminate 
against women (Parashar 1992). Rebecca represents about 16 million3 women in 
Bangladesh belonging to religious minority groups who not only encounter a lack 
of decent remedies for marital and other familial issues offered by laws but are 
also often subject to child marriage, adultery, domestic violence, substance 
abuse, restriction of freedom of movement and profession, parallel relationships 
and habitation with another person outside of marriage, no formal separation or 
divorce, no effective help from the churches or other religious institutions, and 
may even be prevented from meeting with their children.  
A similar situation exists in other South Asian countries. Like Bangladesh, in 
India and Pakistan, for example, the state did not adopt consistent policies in 
reforming the personal and family laws for minority groups. In most cases, the 
                                                 
3 The total population of Bangladesh is 158.96 million (BBS 2015). Muslim: 90%, Hindu: 9%, 
Buddhist: 0.6%, Christian: 0.3%, Others: 0.1% (BBS 2011). 
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state only reformed laws for the majority religious group, such as Muslims in 
Pakistan and Hindus in India, where the personal laws for minority communities 
being “left virtually untouched” (Parashar 1992, 18), which is true even today. For 
instance, the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act, 1974, in 
Bangladesh and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in India and the recent initiative of 
another reform of the Hindu law through the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 
2010, reflect such initiatives by the state. However, it is worth noting that 
although such reforms took place among the majority communities, women in 
these communities did not “get formal equality in all aspects of family law” 
(Parashar 1992, 19). However, the state’s focus on the majority groups’ personal 
law reform provided women in these groups with some rights.  
The state has taken a little initiative to reform the minority laws, particularly 
because of the reluctance of minority communities to reform these laws, claiming 
that their family laws are inviolate (Parashar 1992, 18-19). For example, in 
Bangladesh, no Christian personal laws have been amended since the Partition 
until now. The Hindu community also had been governed by the century-old 
personal laws until recently. It was only in 2012, the state enacted the Hindu 
Marriage (Registration) Act, 2012, to ensure marriage registration for the Hindu 
population. The relationship and interaction between law, minority groups, and 
gender can be better understood by positioning minority women under the 
situation of legal pluralism and patriarchy.  
Situating the problem: Religious minority women under legal 
pluralism and patriarchy 
In a postcolonial setting, religion-based minority communities are viewed in the 
political sense as separate and isolated from the mainstream and as averse to 
change because the minority communities believe that such isolation would 
protect their interest and identity. Minority groups act somewhat similar to 
families, in which the members are closely tied, while simultaneously the groups 
also act as a nation, in which they are culturally united, centred on, and led by 
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men. So the question arises: What does it mean to be a woman in a religious 
minority community in a postcolonial setting? In other words: How and where 
are women within these communities situated or positioned? In responding to 
these questions, Rajan (2003) in her work on women, law, and citizenship in 
postcolonial India argues that women are neither excluded nor marginalised; 
instead, they take centre stage in identity politics. She further argues that it is 
also important to keep in mind that unlike men, these women are not seen as 
‘constituting’ the communities; instead, they are described as ‘belonging’ to them 
and become “symbolic figures” for communities (Rajan 2003, 163-164). In this 
way, women become an instrument for the community to create and protect its 
identities.  
Women’s position or belonging within a religious minority community in a 
postcolonial context such as South Asia becomes more complicated under a 
situation of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism in this region took the current shape 
because of the colonial encounters with the legal systems. A pluralistic legal 
context came to exist in the Indian subcontinent through the colonial encounters 
between the 18th and the 20th century. Pre-colonial India was ruled first by the 
Hindu kings and then by the Mughals, who were Muslims. There had already 
been pre-existing legal systems and institutions when the British arrived (Panday 
and Hossain Mollah 2011). Although the British initially entered India through a 
royally chartered private corporation, the East India Company, they gradually 
began to intervene in the country’s governance and laws.  During the 19th century, 
the British had legislated a significant number of laws, particularly in relation to 
trade, which reflects their primary aim of economic rather than territorial or 
religious expansions (Chatterjee 2010). The colonial intervention increased the 
complexity of the legal system of the region. 
Tamanaha (2008, 383) spoke about three strategies that the British deployed to 
incorporate customary or religious laws in pre-partitioned India: “the codification 
of customary or religious law; the application by state courts of unwritten 
customary or religious law in a fashion analogous to the common law; and the 
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creation or recognitions of informal or ‘customary’ courts run by local leaders”. 
Although these laws were labelled as ‘customary’ or ‘religious’ laws, they did not 
necessarily match many existing customs or social norms, neither were many 
parts of them were based on religious text. Moreover, these laws were formulated 
in English, a language that the majority of ‘natives’ did not speak. It is no doubt 
that many of these laws remained “distant from the local law … [and] its effective 
reach limited to urban areas where the institutionalised presence of the state 
legal system was strongest” (Tamanaha 2008, 384). 
While legislating the state laws, the colonial rulers incorporated the local law and 
hence the legal system became a mixed system, with partly indigenous and partly 
foreign laws.  The British were careful to govern Indians in accordance with their 
existing practices and traditions from the beginning of British rule (Newbigin 
2009). Since the main objective of the British was profit-making through trade, 
they did not want to disturb religion-based legal practices. They legislated the 
Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muslim laws by hiring interlocutors to interpret pre-
colonial local Hindu and Muslim practices and customs (Mitra and Fischer 2002, 
Mallampalli 2010). These Anglo-Hindu and Anglo-Muslim laws provided the pre-
colonial practices with a legal status in a modern sense. 
State, society, and gender 
For most South Asian women, family relations are seen as one of the most 
important aspects of their lives. Women’s (and men’s) familial relations are 
governed by personal laws in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
adoption, and maintenance, based on women’s respective religious affiliations. In 
this way, state personal laws, as well as community norms and practices, become 
vital aspects of women’s lives. As Parashar (1992, 17) argues, although law acts as 
an important institution in regulating, controlling, and pervading the everyday 
lives of people in most contemporary societies, it holds a “double significance” in 
women’s live in maintaining discrimination or mitigating that discrimination.   
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At the centre of minority issues, there is a conflict between the “state’s sensitivity 
on non-interference and territorial integrity” and minority autonomy 
(Manchanda 2009, 4). The situation of legal pluralism amalgamates with minority 
issues and creates a struggle and competition between the state and minority 
communities around the issue of regulating the family. In postcolonial countries 
that are multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and culturally plural, states and religious 
groups compete and struggle on the issue of governing and regulating the family. 
On the other hand, postcolonial states continue their efforts towards nation-
building projects (Heuer 2005, Loos 2006), which require balancing economic 
development, social cohesion, and political stability, as well as creating national 
consciousness, by outlining shared meanings among their citizens through 
legislation, adjudication, and the enforcement of laws (Solanki 2011). With this 
aim, the states, therefore, seek to modernise key institutions, such as family and 
marriage, and shape ethnic, religious, sexual, and gender identities through law.  
Within the struggle between the state and minority groups on the issue of 
governing the family, proponents of state-centric regulation of family argue that 
the state should be the locus of governance for families and the difference should 
be only recognised in the private sphere. For example, Rawls (1996) argues that 
diverse conflicting doctrines should be located within a single political 
conception in order to serve justice in the public domain of culturally or 
religiously plural societies. In other words, state-centric regulation should not 
recognise the difference in the public realm; difference should only be a matter of 
the private realm. Similarly, Sangari (1995) asks if gender justice should be sought 
within the framework of separate personal laws when it is desired both by state 
and community. Many feminists have relied on the similar argument to advocate 
for a uniform family code (Parashar and Dhanda 2008, Pereira 2002).   
Among various religious and cultural groups, minorities especially show a sense 
of solidarity towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language at 
the subjective level (Mishra and Singh 2002). In this process, religious and 
cultural groups identify their respective customary laws as markers of their group 
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identities and hence promote self-autonomy (Woods 2004). Therefore, 
postcolonial states are confronted with such diverse societal groups, who seek 
autonomy over the governance of families through their customary laws. The 
state, as part of its strategy, accommodates peoples’ aspirations for ‘self-rule’ by 
allowing them autonomy. Such accommodation of self-rule is used as a tool to 
allow minority groups “to exercise direct control over affairs”, directly of interest 
to them while allowing the majority “to exercise those powers that govern 
common interests” (Manchanda 2009, 20). As a result, the state and religious or 
cultural groups engage in an on-going process of negotiation over personal laws 
and the extent to which these groups enjoy autonomy in the governance of their 
respective families. As Rajan (2003, 148) argues, “Personal law, since it is 
envisaged as a means of securing community identity and respecting religious 
difference …. Any proposed reform or removal of personal laws becomes a fraught 
issue and is perceived as a threat to community identity and/or traditional 
patriarchal arrangements”. The threat perceived by the minority communities 
around the issue of reform or removal of personal law also creates a form of 
resistance to state’s intervention for law reform. 
The tensions between the state and the community are not confined within the 
boundaries of the state or the community. Such tension is widespread in the 
international arena of feminism and international law. For example, on the one 
hand, there is a pressure on national governments to conform to international 
laws related to the protection of the cultural rights of minorities. On the other 
hand, some feminists continue to advocate for a unified code of family law, 
whereas progressive nationalist or religious reformist groups promote multiple 
reformed family laws that conform to different cultural or religious values. A 
conflict becomes apparent between international community pressure and 
‘autonomous’ feminists and finally, nationalist or religious reformist groups.  
In the process of the struggle around the issue of who should govern the family 
between the state and the community, patriarchy plays a vital role. Although 
patriarchy flourished as a feminist concept in the late 1960s as a powerful way of 
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seeing the world (Millet 1970), it was heavily criticised by feminists who labelled 
the conception of patriarchy as one-dimensional, crude, and incapable of 
providing an accurate view of the world (Rowbotham 1982). However, I am in 
agreement with Walby (1990), who shows the importance of patriarchy as a 
concept or a theory and argues that an understanding of patriarchy is essential 
for an analysis of gender inequality. It is indispensable if we are to “capture the 
depth, pervasiveness and interconnectedness of different aspects of women’s 
subordination” (Walby 1990, 2). After Walby (1990), Bryson (1999) also revived 
the concept of patriarchy and argued that it was still politically useful for 
feminism; but at the same time acknowledged that it could not reduce all 
women’s experiences into a single category by showing all women as victims and 
all men as perpetrators. Bryson’s (1999) concept of patriarchy rejects other 
interpretations where patriarchy is seen as a system of oppression equivalent to 
capitalism.  
Researchers have linked law and women with patriarchy. For example, Haksar 
and Singh (1986) examined in the Indian context the ways in which law reflects 
patriarchal oppression by connecting laws and their judicial interpretations to 
patriarchal social relations, which is the primary site of women’s oppression.  A 
few years later, Gonsalves (1993, xiii) also showed by focusing on the enforcement 
(or lack of it) of laws that are intended to benefit women that laws continue to 
discriminate between men and women and “unconsciously tend to reflect 
traditional and rigid attitudes towards women”.  
Patriarchy is one phenomenon that links the state, the community, and women 
both in private and public spheres. In order to ensure the groups’ autonomy, a 
situation of legal pluralism is essential in which multiple legal orders co-exist. 
However, in reality, neither the state nor the community plays a neutral role; 
instead, both involve themselves in ethnic competition and struggles. As a result, 
women from minority groups often have to fight patriarchy within their own 
communities along with tackling the patriarchy of the larger community. 
According to Sangari (1995), when the community is put in opposition to the 
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state around the issue of governing families, although women are the ones who 
remain as the ‘object’ of legislation for both, the community becomes a more 
intimate legislator among the two. In this process, both state and community 
become the agents of patriarchy. Sangari (1995) problematises both state and 
community involvement in governing women: 
For women, community jurisdiction is as problematic as the state … The 
former … intensifies the difficulty of daily, local, interpersonal 
relationships, making it difficult to claim democratic rights contravened 
by personal law … The latter involves problem of implementation, 
functions through a self-contradicting, increasing delegitimised, often 
coercive and patriarchal state machinery. (Sangari 1995, 3297)       
To Sangari (1995), the relationship between the state and women is patriarchal. 
Women are persistently defined by the state in relation to men. The state plays a 
role that is undemocratic and class-differentiated, where it perpetuates the 
invisibility of domestic labour, governs both land relations and distribution of 
resources, enforces the rule of property in ways that treat women in an unjust 
way, and creates class and gender inequalities by reproducing women’s economic 
dependence (Sangari 1995). The state colludes with local and community 
patriarchies and, therefore, a triangular relation is developed between personal 
laws, community and state representatives. In other words, “The coding of 
patriarchy as religion by community spokesmen has been and is by and large 
shared by the state” (Sangari 1995, 3295). Therefore, the agenda of regulating 
family by the state or community concentrates around a patriarchal agenda of 
governing women. For women, no matter who governs the family — be it state or 
community — they have to encounter patriarchy, as both the state and the 
community hold patriarchal agendas.  
Group rights through personal law pose major challenges for realising women’s 
rights. In South Asia, the dilemma of religious or cultural group rights versus 
women’s rights is played out in the everyday lives of many women — through the 
denial of their rights of inheritance, divorce (or sometimes they are easily 
divorced), maintenance, and child custody, which appear to be a direct violation 
of the Article 16 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Violence Against 
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Women (CEDAW) that provides them with equal rights within a marital 
relationship, to which many South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, are 
signatories. 
Feminists, therefore, resist the idea of such group autonomy, particularly on 
family matters. They argue that groups tend to form their values and norms 
based on patriarchal ideologies that do not provide women with their full human 
rights. This mismatch between group autonomy and women’s rights made many 
feminists criticise states’ choices to adopt multiple laws to recognise cultural and 
religious pluralism over ensuring women’s rights in their families (Cook 1994, 
Kukathas 1992, Mahajan 2005, Moghadam 1994, Okin 1997, 2005, Parashar 1992). 
According to Sangari (1995), 
Community identities can be as much punitive as protective for 
patriarchal and proprietorial assumptions. If, as the more extreme 
arguments for reform of personal laws from ‘within’ seem to desire, 
communities were to legally govern, reform and adjudicate themselves, 
taking full responsibility for being either agents of change or protectors of 
the status quo, what will prevent them from trying to be self-legislating 
patriarchies; from strengthening local, interpersonal patriarchal control; 
and from continuing to hand power over to mullas, priests, pandits or 
other chosen interpreters? There is little evidence to show that 
communities are committed to internal democratisation of gender 
differences. (Sangari 1995, 3293) 
In order to achieve both (group autonomy and women’s rights) for minority 
communities, some scholars have attempted to find a balance by distributing 
autonomy between groups and states. For example, Kymlicka (1995) argues that 
minority groups should be enabled with three sets of group rights: special 
representation rights, self-governing rights, and polyethnic rights. Similarly, 
Young (1989) argues for special group rights for minority cultural communities. 
According to her, the public sphere created by liberalism is abstract, 
homogeneous and falsely universal, which usually excludes the experiences, 
voices, and perspective of these groups (Young 1989, 1990).  
Recently, in the South African context, where Muslim personal law has not yet 
been recognised by the state, a particular form of secularism has been promoted 
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by the state that highlights the collaboration between the state and religion. 
Amien (2010) suggests that the state respects minority community’s freedom to 
apply their respective personal laws without affecting much on women’s equal 
rights; she explores three particular ways through which this collaboration takes 
place — assimilation, accommodation, and integration. However, she 
problematises these three approaches by arguing that they do not facilitate 
sufficient gender equality. Instead, Amien (2010) introduces an alternative model, 
which she calls the Gender-Nuanced Integration (GNI) approach that, on the one 
hand, promotes religious personal laws in order to establish legal pluralism in 
multi-religious societies, and on the other, protects gender equality. In other 
words, GNI approach promotes religious freedom only to the extent that it does 
not impact on gender equality negatively.  
In her later work, Amien (2016, 53) traces the “creative ways” in which the 
judiciary enables Muslim women to access women’s Islamic law rights in South 
Africa. One such creative way is to recognise the Muslim marriage as a contract 
that allows the judiciary to legally enforce the terms and customs that arise from 
this contract (Amien 2016). However, although different initiatives in different 
contexts have been taken in order to balance between group autonomy and 
gender equality, there have always been tensions between the two (group 
autonomy and gender equality). Shachar (1998, 299) advocates for “joint 
governance”, a framework in which the state and cultural or religious groups 
divide juridical authority in the governance of family laws.  
Along with a similar line, Solanki (2011), in her ethnographic account in Mumbai, 
India, examines the ‘shared adjudication model’ that India as a state has adopted, 
where the state shares adjudicative authority with religious communities, by 
recognising customary laws and regulations, in governing the family. In defence 
of the Indian situation of legal pluralism in the areas of marriage and divorce 
among Hindus and Muslims, Solanki (2011) argues that such a model is capable of 
facilitating both cultural diversity and women’s rights. She argues that the ‘shared 
adjudication model’, founded on values of both state and customary laws, enables 
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state-society interactions in order to resolve marriage and divorce conflicts. 
Under this model, reforms that are initiated by the state from above, travel into 
and “cross-fertilize” with reforms led by society from below (Solanki 2011, xxiii). 
Under this process, according to her, cultural pluralism and gender equality can 
be harmonised.  
Methodologically, Solanki’s (2011) work captures the everyday experiences of 120 
female litigants in Mumbai by situating them in a complex setting of laws (both 
state and customary law) negotiated by many legal actors such as lawyers, 
notaries, clergy, family members, and politicians. Within these negotiations, 
Solanki (2011) brings out the story of women’s everyday routines and resistance. 
Solanki (2011) does this within the boundary of legal institutes — both formal and 
informal legal forums (state and non-state institutes). In other words, by locating 
herself in state-run family courts, in different panchayats (caste councils), 
community courts, sect councils, and other informal legal forums, she examined 
women’s everyday experiences in specific locations where law and gender 
intersect.  
This thesis extends the work carried out by Solanki (2011) in three ways. First, it 
focuses on a religious minority community in a postcolonial setting — 
particularly, on a Christian community in Bangladesh — and its creation and 
identity construction through the Christianisation and law-making processes 
during the colonial period. Second, it examines the effects of the interaction of 
law with patriarchy by focusing on women’s everyday lives in their homes, 
workplaces, community, churches, and elsewhere. Finally, it analyses women’s 
current gendered experiences of marriage, divorce, and inheritance practices by 
using a feminist theory of legal pluralism to reveal their interpretation, 
application, and subversion of these laws.  
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Feminist theory of legal pluralism 
In this thesis, I argue for a feminist theory of legal pluralism and I examine the 
research questions through this theoretical framework by taking a feminist lens4. 
While acknowledging the contributions that legal feminists have made in the last 
four decades, I also critically engage with their theories. I argue that most legal 
feminists have interacted only with the state law and have virtually overlooked 
the other sources of law that are vital to understanding women’s experiences. 
Women’s full experience of law cannot be captured only by engaging with the 
state law. In order to capture women’s full experiences and interactions with law, 
we need to expand the horizon of law. Instead of seeing the state as the sole 
source of laws, we need to consider other social sources of laws in addition to the 
state law. Hence feminists should engage with a feminist theory of legal pluralism 
to understand and capture the complexities of legal and social realities that 
women experience.  
Epistemologically, legal feminism has been engaged with the question of 
women’s experience of law (Rhode 1989). Mainstream feminist legal theories are 
mostly situated within the legal centralist paradigm, where the state is seen as 
the primary locus of law (Gilissen 1971, Mehta 1987, Venkataramiah 1987, 
Jethmalani 1986, Fineman 2005, MacKinnon 1979). Some scholars have critiqued 
this legal centralist paradigm and argued that such a model is not adequate to 
fully capture women’s experience of law and hence proposed to broaden the 
horizons of law (Kapur 1996, Parashar 1996).  
By creating conflicts among laws and other normative orders, legal pluralism 
creates opportunities for individual beings, particularly for women, who can 
opportunistically choose from co-existing laws or normative orders to advance 
their goals. However, I argue that capturing women’s full experience of law can 
be achieved by making a shift of the centre of analysis of legal pluralism from 
‘law’ to ‘women’, by considering their intersectional subjectivity, which cuts 
                                                 
4 I will lay out the feminist theory of legal pluralism in detail in Chapter Two. 
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across race, caste, class, religion, gender, sexuality, amongst other factors. When 
the notion of intersectionality is linked with the concept of legal pluralism, it 
becomes clear why such a shift is necessary. Here, I must clarify that the 
proposed shift does not necessarily renounce the analysis of law (more 
specifically state law), but for the feminist purpose, such an analysis must be 
woman-centred.  
Selection of the study area 
The case of Bangladesh depicts a paradox between women’s economic and social 
progress and the flourishing development sector and human rights movements 
on the one hand and the increased radicalisation of Islam on the other. One 
aspect of the paradox is the improvement of women’s socio-economic status 
through the enrolment in female primary and secondary school in Bangladesh 
that increased significantly since the 1990s. According to the Bangladesh Bureau 
of Educational Information and Statistics (BANBEIS), during the period from 
1990 to 2000, Bangladesh achieved a sharp rise in girls’ gross primary enrolment 
ratio from 64% to 98% (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009). Similar progress has 
also been recorded in secondary schooling. The female-to-male ratio in secondary 
school enrollment experienced a significant increase from 62% in 1992 to 114% in 
2005. Therefore, the proportion of females of total enrolment is now close to 55%, 
compared to less than 40% in the early 1990s (Asadullah and Chaudhury 2009).  
In Bangladesh, there have also been phenomenal improvements in women’s 
economic status through microcredit programmes and the ready-made garment 
sector (Kabeer 2011, 1997, Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley 1996, Pitt, Khandker, and 
Cartwright 2006, Bhattacharya, Rahman, and Raihan 2002, Amin and Becker 
1998). Enormous development initiatives have been taken to increase women’s 
participation towards their empowerment from national to local levels by the 
government, NGOs, and feminist activism, which have made positive impacts on 
the gender situation in the country (Khan and Ara 2006, Kabeer 1999). Moreover, 
Bangladesh has thrived as the ‘breeding ground’ for various development and 
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humanitarian initiatives through an enormous number of international and 
national NGOs and civil society organisations, many of which mobilise resources 
for women empowerment (Lam 2006, Rahman 2006, Buckland 1998). 
The other aspect of the paradox is Bangladesh’s experiences of radical 
Islamisation. Dastagir (2013) argues that during the military regimes (1975–1990) 
of General Ziaur Rahman and of H. M. Ershad, Islam had been instrumentalised 
by these rulers in order to increase their own legitimacy. An intensified 
Islamisation process took place during this period along with the construction of 
nationalist identity. During this period a state-run Islamic University was 
founded, Islamic studies were made mandatory for Muslim students in primary 
and secondary schools, and thousands of madrasahs and mosques were 
established across the country, many of which were funded by Saudi donors and 
NGOs. A number of Islamic schools, colleges, and universities (both public and 
private), Islamic hospitals and health clinics, Islamic banks, insurance companies, 
and other enterprises have been set up all over the country (Dastagir 2013).  
The politicisation of Islam in Bangladesh gave rise to Islamic militarism. In the 
early 2000s, there were frequent attacks by bombs and grenades, supposedly 
executed by so-called banned militant Islamist groups, including Ḥarakat ul-Jihād 
al-Islāmī Bangladesh (HUJI) and Jamā‘ah ul-Mujāhidīn Bangladesh (JMB). These 
groups attacked a number of religious and cultural institutes, including Sūfi 
shrines, the Ahmadiyyah Muslim community, temples and churches, liberal 
intellectuals, Bengali cultural festivals, civil judges, cinema halls, theatres, and 
musical programmes (Dastagir 2013). In broad daylight on 17th August 2005, over 
500 small bombs were exploded simultaneously in 300 locations in almost all 63 
districts, killing three people and wounding over a hundred (Dastagir 2013). Even 
today attacks from radical Islamist groups are still taking place. For example, on 
1st July 2016, a group of Islamist militants took hostages and opened fire on the 
Holey Artisan Bakery in the diplomatic zone in Dhaka and 29 people were killed, 
including 18 foreigners (Marszal and Graham 2016). In November 2016, multiple 
crowds of Muslims in an organised way attacked 15 Hindu temples and 100 homes 
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in the eastern part of the country (Manik and Barry 2016). Such a contrasting 
scenario between remarkable improvement in human development indicators 
and gender equality initiatives on the one hand and radicalisation of Islam on the 
other makes Bangladesh an interesting location to study minority women. 
Minorities-within-minority studies  
Religion-based minority studies in South Asia have concentrated on two 
particular areas. Most studies in the Bangladeshi context address the Hindu 
community and in the Indian context the Muslim community (Migheli , Majid 
2015, Narain 2001). For example, Goswami and Nasreen (2003) focused on Hindu 
minority people in the context of Bangladesh while studying discourses that 
majority groups use for minority representation and how the minority groups 
prevail against these discourses by applying strategies and coping mechanisms. 
While conducting a policy analysis of the socio-political status of minority 
communities of Bangladesh, Mundhe (2016) also focused on the Hindu 
community. Similarly, much earlier, Menski and Rahman (1988) considered the 
Hindu laws in their study while analysing minority laws in Bangladesh.   
On the other hand, Muslims occupy most of the discussions around minority 
issues in India. For example, Narain’s (2001) work on gender and community in 
India examined the case of Muslim women and how they relate to religious 
freedom, minority rights, and state policy. While examining secularism in India, 
Majid (2015, 107) also founded his work on the Muslim community. He showed 
how almost all minorities (especially Muslims) “recall with despair and 
despondence how it has been constitutionally pushed to the wall”. Similarly, 
Migheli (2016), linked the individual religiosity with life satisfaction among 
minority religious groups in the Indian context by considering the Muslim 
community. 
In this way, Hindus in Bangladesh and Muslims in India have been 
overrepresented in studies of religious minority communities in these two 
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countries. In both cases, the Christian community as a religious minority group 
becomes invisible in the politics of minority. As a result, a homogenisation of the 
category of religious minority communities took place. This research is 
positioned within the conceptual framework of intersectionality that challenges 
such homogenisation by focusing on Christians and problematising the 
dichotomy of defining religious minority community as Hindus of Bangladesh 
and Muslims of India.  
This research also challenges the notion of women as a homogeneous and 
oppressed group, a notion that produces the image of the “average third world 
woman”, as Mohanty (1988, 337) points out. Such homogeneity in the image of 
‘Third World’ women presents women as victims of violence, as universally 
dependent, as existing within familial relations and systems in which they are 
powerless (Mohanty 1988) and “as an object of study or a subject to be rescued 
and rehabilitated by the feminist mission” (Kapur 2005, 4). This research engages 
with the “politics of positionality” (Kapur 2005, 3-4) and is concerned with 
questions such as who speaks for whom, how do they speak, where do they 
speak, who listens, and so on as parts of this politics (Kapur 2005, Rajan 1997).   
 So far, only scant attention has been paid by scholars to Christians in Bangladesh 
(or in fact in rest of the region). Some took a historical path in researching 
Christians in the Indian sub-continent and often linked their studies with 
imperialism. For example, Webster (2012) provided a historiography of 
Christianity in the Indian subcontinent. Burton (1990), on the other hand, 
showed how middle-class British women treated Indian women and considered 
them as ‘unfortunates’ who needed their help to overcome their misery.  
Other researchers wrote about the history of the church and Christianity in 
Bengal. For example, Datta (1992) provides an account of how Christianity came 
to India, the roles of Portuguese traders in India and Bengal, missionaries in 
Mughal courts and in Bengal, and Protestant churches in Bengal. Sarker (2002) 
also provides a comprehensive historical account of Christianity in Bengal during 
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the period from 1576–1960. D'Costa (1988), on the other hand, focuses on the 
history of the Catholic Church since the 1500s.  
Other scholars focus on the Christian identity creation of Anglo-Indians. In her 
work on Anglo-Indians in Kolkata, Andrews (2013) challenges stereotypes 
regarding how Anglo-Indians are viewed by and represented in the media and the 
broader community. Andrews (2013) focuses on the origins and characteristics of 
Anglo-Indian identity, their faith, and practice of Christianity, education, and 
their community care, and draws a newer picture of the Anglo-Indian community 
in Kolkata. More than a decade earlier, Lahiri-Dutt (1990) showed how, being 
marginalised both by British rulers in the colonial period and by ‘native’ Indians, 
in order to assert their identity, the Anglo-Indian community began searching for 
a homeland and settled in Lapra, near Ranchi, India, for a few years until the 
settlement began to decline.  
Although some scholars have provided historical accounts of Christianity and the 
development of the churches in Bangladesh, and although others have examined 
and explored Christian identity and their marginality, important areas such as 
gender within the Bangladeshi Christian community have seen significantly 
under-researched. Very few scholars have specifically researched gender in the 
Bangladeshi Christian community. One such scholar is Rozario (1992), whose 
work focuses on the changing role of women in the processes of socioeconomic 
developments in the village in a Christian community in a Bangladeshi village 
called Doria. She also shows how the ideologies of purity, honour, and purdah 
(veiling) determine and legitimise the hierarchical relationships between men 
and women and between different communities. In one of her earlier works 
among Bangladeshi Christian women, Rozario (1986) explores how mature, 
unmarried women within the community became the target of ‘ensuring purity’ 
by initiating a ‘women’s movement’ within Christian society that maintains the 
boundary between the Christian unmarried women and non-Christian men and 
restricts women’s sexuality. 
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The Bengali Christian minorities in Bangladesh have yet to be comprehensively 
researched, particularly in relation to gender and law linking to patriarchy. 
However, Pereira (2002) in her research provides a comparative gender analysis 
of different personal laws for Muslims, Hindus, and Christians and makes a case 
for a uniform family code. Elsewhere, she analysed Christian personal law and its 
reform processes and the roles that the churches and the church institutes play 
with respect to this reform (Pereira 2011). The purpose of Pereira’s (2011) research 
is to show the need for reform as well as identify the areas of required reforms to 
achieve gender equality. Her work is one of the very few pieces of research 
conducted on Christian personal law in the Bangladeshi context and provides a 
foundation for this thesis.     
In this research, I examine the issues of minority community by linking it with 
gender, law, and patriarchy. I examine the issue from a different entry point with 
a particular focus on neglected areas of scholarship on religious minority’s 
personal law and gender. I use the feminist theory of legal pluralism as the 
analytical framework through which I examine law interacting with patriarchy in 
the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance practices through the everyday 
lives of Bangladeshi Christians.   
Research sites 
The research took a multi-sited approach, engaging with both Catholic and 
Protestant (particularly Baptist) denominations of the Christian community in 
Bangladesh. During the year 2013–2014, for the major part of the research, I was 
located in the capital, Dhaka city, but I also conducted a significant amount of 
fieldwork time in Barisal, a southern district, and Gazipur, adjacent to Dhaka city, 
and West Bengal, India.  
During my fieldwork, one of the important reasons for choosing Dhaka was 
because, as the capital of Bangladesh, it gathers Christian populations from every 
corner of the country from all denominations, social, and economic backgrounds. 
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Most of the Christian religious organisations, the headquarters of the churches, 
women’s movements, and human rights groups, active in legal and social 
reforms, are concentrated in Dhaka city. Moreover, the state courts, as well as the 
government offices, are also situated there. Because Dhaka was the second largest 
(after Kolkata) centre of trade and commerce during the colonial times, the city 
has historical significance. Basing myself in Dhaka city for the majority of time 
enabled me to access more women, and religious and community leaders, 
lawyers, and women’s rights activists. 
In Dhaka, I lived in the Farmgate area, which is one of the central hubs of the city 
both for commercial as well as transportation purposes. Choosing to live in 
Farmgate provided me with the advantage of being close to one of the largest and 
oldest Catholic churches, the Holy Rosari Church, which is commonly known as 
the Tejgaon Church. A significant Christian population resides close to this 
church. A few Baptist churches are also situated in this area and therefore not 
only Catholics but also a large proportion of Baptist population live in this area. 
As I was located in such a close proximity, I had easy access to women’s homes, 
workplaces, and churches.  
In Barisal, I spent more than two months in collecting data. I located myself in a 
village named Kathira in Gournadi Upazila (sub-district) of the Barisal district. In 
Barisal region, Christianity was introduced in 1764 by Portuguese missionaries 
(Adhikary 2012). Later, the Anglican missionaries from the Church of England 
also established their church in 1845 (Adhikary 2012). Much later, the Baptist 
Church was established in 1905 (Adhikary 2012). Therefore, Barisal has a rich 
history of Christianity of about two and a half centuries. The population of 
Kathira village is comprised of both Hindus and Christians and is still devoid of 
any Muslim population. The majority of Christians are Baptists. In this village, 
both Hindu and Christians live peacefully and participate in each other’s religious 
and social events.  
In Gazipur, a large part of my fieldwork was carried out in Nagori village, about 
25 kilometres northeast of Dhaka city.  Nagori is known for the Church of St. 
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Nicholas of Tolentino, a Catholic church that was constructed in 1695 by 
Portuguese missionaries. Due to the Catholic Church’s presence, a large number 
of local people have been converted to Catholicism in Nagori and surrounding 
villages since the 1600s. Unlike urban Christians from Dhaka city, these 
Christians possess some specific characteristics, where many of the adult males 
work as chefs or cooks in Middle Eastern countries as part of labour migration 
and the households in these villages are generally run by the remittances sent by 
these men. Many households are women-headed and most people are much 
attached to church activities. While conducting the fieldwork in these areas, I 
located myself in women’s homes, workplaces, churches, church organisations, 
human rights organisations, women’s movements, and lawyer’s offices to collect 
data.  
I also conducted archival research in order to collect historical data at the archive 
of the Bishop’s College in Kolkata. The Bishop’s College was founded in 1820 by 
the first Anglican Bishop of Calcutta. The archive holds important records 
relating to the Anglican Church in South Asia and to the Church of Scotland’s 
mission work. In West Bengal, I also visited Burdwan, a medium-sized urban 
centre of India, in order to have a comparative perspective of minority issues in 
the West Bengal area. I have conducted participant observation and in-depth 
interviews while locating myself in the Christ Church, a 200-year old Anglican 
church, and the Burdwan University.  
Methods 
This research draws from the theories of feminist studies and anthropology in 
order to examine how law and patriarchy interact with each other and affect 
women’s lives, and how these women subvert law and patriarchy, by analysing 
the situation as seen through the lens of gendered Bangladeshi life. The feminist 
lens is used to scrutinise women’s lives, activities, and experiences by 
emphasising the interplay between gender and other forms of power and 
difference (Buch and Staller 2007, 190). The ethnographic approach I take allows 
24 
 
me to make sense of the lifeworld of others through the holistic study of lived 
experiences, daily activities, and social interactions in everyday life from the 
perspective of the people being studied. In order to study women’s everyday life, I 
conducted the research in the natural environment of social life and was part of 
that environment for an extended period of time (Buch and Staller 2007).  One 
can say that knowledge has been co-created in this research, both by me, as the 
researcher, and the researched through an interactive process that provided thick 
descriptions of the accounts of women’s everyday lives. The research used the 
following data collection methods. 
In-depth interviews 
I used semi-structured in-depth interviews as one of the primary methods for this 
research. These interviews were comprised of open-ended questions. The 
majority of the interviews were conducted with Christian women, both from 
Catholic and Protestant churches. The other participants undertaking in-depth 
interviews were men from different denominations, lawyers, women activists, 
religious leaders, community leaders, and women from other communities 
(Hindu and Muslim). Pseudonyms have been used to maintain the confidentiality 
of participants’ identity, and for the same reason certain aspects of their 
situations have been omitted and altered. 
Archival research 
By conducting archival research, I collected data to better understand the 
colonial law-making processes and the negotiations between the law-makers and 
local Christians in the colonial times. The archival research took place in the 
archive of the Bishop’s College, Kolkata. 
Participant observation 
By conducting participant observation, I actively engaged myself in studying the 
lived experiences, daily activities, and social interactions in everyday life from the 
perspective of Bangladeshi Christians as well as their social dynamics and 
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patterns. While conducting participant observation, I located myself in women’s 
homes, social events (weddings, birthday parties, etc.), cultural events, churches 
(during church services), meetings of women’s groups in churches and elsewhere, 
women’s movements, legal aid organisations, amongst other locations. These 
locations facilitated the observation of women’s and men’s lived experiences in 
their everyday lives and their respective social settings, which helped me to 
understand gender and other social relations in the families, in churches, and 
elsewhere.  
Content analysis 
Another method of data collection for this research is content analysis. By using 
this method, I systematically studied the texts, such as magazines, newspapers, 
journals, reports, and documents and other cultural products, such as audio-
visual materials produced by the Christian community and by the broader 
society. By keeping myself within the feminist realm, I often undertook textual 
analysis by deconstructing the text to analyse not only what is in there but also 
what is missing, silenced, or absent.  
Sampling and data collection 
As the research is qualitative in nature, I worked with a small sample size in order 
to develop an in-depth understanding of the issue and the data. As with other 
qualitative researchers, I have also used purposive or judgmental samples and 
selected women for interviews who have gone through family disputes, 
particularly in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. As part of the 
research ethics, I sought informed consent from the interviewees before 
conducting the interviews. I took a snowball sampling approach in order to 
identify my informants. In this way, I succeeded in increasing a sample of 
participants by asking for recommendations from the initial pool. I conducted 76 
in-depth interviews with Christian women and men, religious and community 
leaders, lawyers, and women leaders. 
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The researcher’s subjectivity 
This research has allowed me to enter and roam around a familiar social and 
cultural landscape. As a Bangladeshi Christian woman, I am fairly familiar with 
the churches, their institutes and governance, the roles of the religious and 
community leaders, and how gender works in this setting. Both of my parents 
were prominent Christian leaders who served the church most of their lives. 
Since my teenage, I also became involved with church activities. Moreover, in my 
personal life, I experienced the process that women go through during the 
dissolution of their marriage and witnessed through my own experience how 
receiving a remedy of divorce as a Christian woman can be difficult legally and 
scandalous socially in Bangladesh. I could divorce my ex-husband only when I 
left Bangladesh and came to Australia for my studies, where my divorce was 
treated under Australian divorce law. I took this path as in Bangladesh being a 
woman leader of the community going to court for a divorce is significantly 
scandalous. In addition, the Christian divorce law holds the provisions that 
mentioned earlier makes it difficult for women to initiate a divorce.   
Additionally, my own feminist deliberation through my work and education also 
made me comfortable to work on this topic. I was the National General Secretary 
of YWCA of Bangladesh, the only Christian women’s movement in Bangladesh, 
prior to conducting this research. I was also an active member of several national 
feminist movements, particularly in the areas of law reform and women’s rights. 
Moreover, I actively served as a member of the national network that advocated 
for and later served on the committee that drafted the Domestic Violence 
(Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010. I was also extensively involved with the 
on-going advocacy work of the reform of Christian personal law and represented 
the YWCA in the drafting committee. Besides, my education in gender and 
development made me familiar with the feminist debates and scholarship. My 
background as a women’s rights activist as well as my personal experience of the 
process of divorce helped me to develop a keen interest in working with the 
Christian community for this research.  
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Although my background and education provided me with knowledge of gender 
issues within the Christian community, I consciously repeatedly revisited my 
previous assumptions and ideologies during my fieldwork as I interacted with my 
research participants through interviews and regular conversations. I also found 
that many of these conversations challenged my previous assumptions and 
understanding of issues. The theoretical framework that I have used that broaden 
the notion of law helped me to understand my participants’ worldviews. 
Therefore, being a Bangladeshi Christian woman, in this research, I considered 
myself as an insider in the community, but the journey of revisiting of 
assumptions made me think like an outsider at the same time.   
Moreover, I was aware of the possible influence that my class, gender, or social 
status, and particularly, my previous position as the National General Secretary of 
the YWCA of Bangladesh might have on the information-gathering processes, as 
Buch and Staller (2007) suggest. I minimised such influences through reflexivity 
and positionality (Haraway 1988, Harding 1987, Hawkesworth 1990) among a web 
of power relations constituting the research process (England 1994, Moss 2005). I 
continuously engaged with interpretive acts or analysis, as Moss and Dyck (2002) 
suggest, which helped me to contextualise my own social positioning vis-à-vis the 
position of research participants and the issues they identify.  
Being an insider in the community helped me to gain significant access to the 
churches, church leaders, and women, which would have been difficult 
otherwise. As I dealt with sensitive matters, such as marriage break-ups and 
divorce, which the community still view conservatively, data collection certainly 
would have been disrupted if the researcher was from another community. 
Additionally, my previous position as a woman activist provided me with access 
to other women activists easily.   
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Organisation of the thesis 
 The thesis is organised into nine chapters. After giving a background, 
introducing the research problem, context, and methodology in the first chapter, 
Chapter Two, titled “Theoretical framework: In search of a feminist theory of 
legal pluralism”, provides the theoretical framework of this thesis and argues for a 
feminist theory of legal pluralism. The next chapter, Chapter Three, titled “The 
situation of legal pluralism in Bangladesh” helps to understand the legal context 
of Bangladesh by analysing the plural legal systems and their gendered 
characteristics, including multiple personal laws and various non-state legal 
forums available to Christians through state courts, churches and church 
institutes, and non-state and non-religious forums such as women’s movements 
and human rights organisations. 
Chapter Four, titled “Intimate colonisation and resilient patriarchy: 
Christianisation and law creation”, takes a historical path to show how Christian 
identity in British India was created through colonisation, Christianisation, and 
personal law creation processes. Based on archival material, in this chapter, I 
present the case of a debate and negotiation between a colonial church body and 
‘native’ Christians on the issue of marrying one’s deceased wife’s sister to show 
how colonisation was more intimate for the local Christians than for other 
religious groups and how, through these processes, patriarchy was reproduced 
and reinforced.  
Chapter Five is called “Constructing minorityness: The raising of a mission-
compound patriarchy” that situates the Christian community in the present time 
and analyses how their ‘minorityness’ has been created through its 
governmentality. The chapter also explores how the community is positioned as a 
minority group within the broader society in relation to the majority groups, 
which created a specific type of patriarchy, which I call the ‘mission-compound 
patriarchy’. The next chapter, Chapter Six, titled “Minority anxieties over 
marriages: Creating mutuality to accommodate difference”, examines kinship, 
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marriage, and gender by examining ‘unequal marriages’ or inter-religious 
marriages to see how the community actively creates and defines boundaries 
through marriage practices, while simultaneously accommodating differences 
and creating mutuality.  
Chapter Seven, which is called “End of marriage: Bargaining with patriarchy in 
search of alternatives”, provides a closer look at the issue of divorce and its 
alternatives. By examining laws, social and gender ideologies, and practices 
around divorce, this chapter argues that although the community actively 
prohibits and discourages divorce, people, particularly women, are using 
alternative paths seeking divorce alternatives to exit their marriage. This chapter 
further argues that within the process of choosing a specific path of divorce or 
alternatives to divorce, women make strategic choices based on their own 
individual intersectional subjectivity and situations. The chapter is founded on a 
specific theory of legal pluralism called ‘forum shopping’ and ‘shopping forums’ 
and a feminist theory called ‘patriarchal bargaining’. The chapter shows how 
Christian women make conscious strategic choices, based on their subjective 
positions, of alternative paths bypassing the state as well as community laws to 
get a divorce or its alternatives, and how different institutions actively influence 
and shape their choices. The chapter also shows how they engage in bargaining 
with patriarchy in this process.  
Chapter Eight, titled “Good laws, bad outcomes: Women’s inheritance rights and 
practices”, examines women’s land rights and inheritance practices among 
Bangladeshi Christians and shows how women have been deprived of their land 
rights in order to create and protect community identity, and how women, on the 
other hand, in order to reclaim their rights have to compromise and negotiate 
with patriarchal ideologies and continuously balance between the ‘good woman’ 
image that society puts on their shoulders and realising their legal rights. The 
chapter ends by showing how such unequal practices have inter-generational 
consequences and how women’s rights are being instrumentalised, which 
exacerbates the majority-minority group relations.  The thesis ends with a 
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conclusion in Chapter Nine. The concluding chapter reprises the theory-ideas 
and pulls the themes together that have been discussed in various chapters of 
this thesis, grounded in the research findings. The chapter highlights the 
achievements of this research and the contributions it makes to the scholarly 
debates, including directions of future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical framework: In search of a feminist theory of 
legal pluralism 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework of this thesis through which I 
analyse and answer the research questions I posed earlier in the introductory 
chapter. Here I argue for a feminist theory of legal pluralism and show its 
importance as an analytical framework for feminist research. I also show that, 
while legal feminists have contributed significantly to the scholarship of gender 
and law, they have mostly interacted with laws that are associated with the state, 
and confined themselves within the legal centralist paradigm by leaving non-
state laws out of their enquiries. Although many legal feminists are interested in 
how women experience law, the exclusive nature of their engagement to the state 
legal framework fails to capture women’s full experience of law. Therefore, in 
order to capture women’s full experiences and their interface with law, the 
boundaries of law (under legal centralist paradigm) need to expand. This 
expansion of the scope of law is possible when feminism interacts with legal 
pluralism. Thus this chapter argues for such interaction between feminism and 
legal pluralism that considers both the state and non-state laws while analysing 
women’s encounters with law.   
Generally, legal pluralism is defined as a situation where multiple legal systems 
co-exist within a broader legal context. By taking a specific path, according to the 
following steps, I proceed towards a feminist theory of legal pluralism. In the first 
step, I discuss different waves of legal feminism and critically analyse them to 
show how legal feminists have been entangled with a paradigm that puts the 
state law at the centre of analysis of gender and law. In other words, in this step, I 
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demonstrate that while scholars have made phenomenal contributions towards 
feminist legal theories, they have largely restricted themselves to the legal 
centralist paradigm. In this step, I also show how the confinement within this 
legal centralist paradigm disables legal feminism from being able to capture 
women’s full experience of law.  
In the second step, I argue that a shift from a legal centralist paradigm to a legal 
pluralist paradigm that recognises the co-existence of multiple legal systems 
(both the state and non-state) will enable feminism to resolve the issue of 
feminists’ confinement within the legal centralist paradigm. Feminism’s critical 
engagement with the legal pluralism scholarship can facilitate the shift from a 
legal centralist to a legal pluralist paradigm. Therefore, in the following step, in 
order to understand the legal pluralism scholarship, I analyse the theoretical 
debates of legal pluralism and identify a niche where feminism can anchor itself. 
In the final step, I bring feminism and legal pluralism together and show how 
they can combine their theories in particular ways. By using the theory of 
intersectionality, I argue that a feminist theory of legal pluralism should make 
this analytical shift by taking into account women’s intersectional position and 
subjectivity.               
Feminism and the legal centralist paradigm 
Feminists have a long association with the epistemological question of women’s 
experiences and their subjugated knowledge both of which have been historically 
excluded from the mainstream knowledge creation processes. With respect to 
feminists’ engagement with the politics of knowledge creation, Harding (1987, 3) 
argues that an epistemology provides the answers to crucial questions, such as, 
“who can be a ‘knower’ (can women?); what tests beliefs must pass in order to be 
legitimated as knowledge (only tests against men’s experiences and 
observations?); what kinds of things can be known (can ‘subjective truths’ count 
as knowledge?), and so forth”. She also provides an account of how feminists 
  
33 
 
have criticised traditional epistemologies that systematically excluded women as 
legitimate “knowers” or “agents of knowledge” by claiming that science, history or 
traditional sociology mostly carry men’s (of the dominant race and class) voices, 
are written from their point of view, in which men have always taken the 
subjective positions (Harding 1987, 3). However, feminist epistemology makes 
critiques of this ‘objective’ knowledge, which is claimed to be situated outside the 
knower, reflecting an independent external world, be tested and validated, and 
be universal in nature. By challenging such ‘objective’ knowledge, feminist 
epistemology proposes an alternative to the traditional epistemology that 
legitimises women as knowers. By this, feminist research considers women’s 
experiences as an important indicator of the reality.    
Feminism’s epistemological engagement with legitimising women’s subjugated 
knowledge has also impacted in the field of legal feminism. This engagement has 
brought legal feminists to focus on the question of women’s experience of law. 
There is no doubt that feminist legal theories have contributed significantly 
towards promoting the feminist agenda. Rhode (1989) views these contributions 
on three different levels. First, at a political level, these theories actively seek to 
promote gender equality; second, at a substantive level, by making gender their 
focus of analysis, feminist legal theories aim to reshape legal practices by bringing 
women’s experiences and concerns into the scholarship that have been excluded 
or devaluated historically; and third, at a methodological level, they aspire to a 
worldview that corresponds to women’s experience. 
However, the mainstream feminist legal theories tend to be situated within the 
legal centralist paradigm, where the state is seen as the primary locus of law. 
While researching women’s experience of law in post-colonial Africa, Manji 
(1999) argues that feminists’ theoretical work that privileges the state law is only 
capable of capturing partial accounts of women’s experiences of law and 
reproduces the male view. While feminists have been engaged in “an anti-sexist 
project, which involves challenging and deconstructing phallocentric discourses” 
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(Grosz 2013, 190), Manji (1999, 436) argues that “the phallocentric theoretical 
system of legal centralism — and its privileging of the state law — has been left 
untouched”. Through this process, feminism has conformed to legal monism by 
endorsing the idea that the state is the only source of law. 
The first wave of feminist legal scholars focused on a feminist political agenda, 
with the mantra “the personal is the political”, and were interested in law reform 
towards a more gender-equal society (Fineman 2005, 15). Founded on an equality 
model, the early legal feminists made critiques of male-biased treatment of law 
that disallowed women to have equal opportunities and challenged such 
discriminatory law (Mehta 1987, Venkataramiah 1987, Jethmalani 1986). By 
attacking gender differences codified in law and the stereotypes that justified 
them, feminists arguments mostly relied on the doctrine, inspired by liberal 
feminism that asserts that law has exacerbated women’s oppression by 
discriminatory treatment (Kapur and Cossman 1996) and hence women and men 
should be treated equally by law (MacKinnon 1979). Fineman (2005, 16) argues 
that these early legal feminists believed that any provision for “special treatment” 
in recognition of difference would disadvantage women. However, the first wave 
legal feminists tended to rely entirely on the legal centralist paradigm. In their 
arguments, they deconstructed the male-biased treatment of law without 
challenging the state as the only source of law. Instead, they remained within the 
framework of positivist law while advocating law reform towards gender equality.  
Another group of legal feminists made critiques of the equality model and argued 
that gender inequality is not produced by exclusion and discriminatory treatment 
alone, but can be created by law that appears ‘neutral’. However, they still did not 
challenge the centralist view of law. Bounded by the perimeter of the state law, 
this group of feminists argued that formal equal treatment by law can merely 
address the ideological and structural inequalities that women face. So they 
attempted to develop their theories based on the concept of gender ‘difference’ 
(MacKinnon 1979). These scholars have emphasised that since women are 
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‘naturally weaker’ than men, they should be ‘protected’ by law (read the state 
law) (Anthony 1985, Deshpande 1984, Kapur and Cossman 1996). Fineman (2005) 
analyses this group of feminists’ work and argues that they demanded differential 
treatment for men and women as their respective social circumstances are very 
different. Women are situated in an inferior position in the society compared to 
their male counterparts, which requires ‘special’ concerns (MacKinnon 1979). 
Such an approach does not simply accept the traditional and patriarchal 
discourses and portray the role of law to be protecting women but also conforms 
to the centralist view of law.   
Under the ‘difference’ paradigm, existing law was critiqued as male-biased and 
some scholars went so far as identifying law as male (Gilligan 1993). However, 
they did not challenge the positivist characteristics of law and its sole association 
with the state. For example, Stubbs (1991, 267) shows in her research on battered 
woman syndrome in Australia how law and the legal system is “poorly equipped 
to deal with the experiences of women … where male standards of reasonableness 
or other legal tests apply”. A decade earlier than Stubbs (1991), in the American 
context, Russell’s (1982, 44-48) research found that many rape victims or victims 
of sexual assault by acquaintances often respond to the question, “Have you ever 
been raped?” with expressions such as, “Well … not exactly”. According to Russell 
(1982), the pause between ‘well’ and ‘not exactly’ indicates the gap between legal 
interpretation or understanding of rape and how women actually experience it in 
their lives and the ways information or data on such phenomenon are 
constructed and collected.  
This traditional, male-vision, legal paradigm keeps women’s experiences “hidden” 
and according to Wishik (1985, 68) it is feminists’ role to uncover this hidden 
experience. However, as Wishik (1985) also argues that such scholarship neither 
questions patriarchy, its assumptions, and categories, nor does it clarify the 
definitions of experiences. Recently, a similar concern was also raised by Williams 
(2013, 81): “Asking how women are different from men focuses attention on 
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women’s characteristics rather than on the ways in which institutions … privilege 
certain people … at the expense of others”. Instead, it simply considers women’s 
exclusion as “an error” (Wishik 1985, 68) and provides the “solution” suggesting 
to “add-women-and-stir” (Boxer 1982, 682). Moreover, within the difference 
model, feminists focused on how women’s perspectives and experiences differ 
from those of men, in which again “men have remained the unstated standard of 
analysis” (Rhode 1989, 618). It is obvious that by challenging law (the state law) as 
being male-biased, these scholars have contributed significantly to the feminist 
agenda, but at the same time, by not disrupting legal centralism, and by not 
acknowledging law beyond the state and its institutions, they addressed the 
problem partially. 
In the global south, feminists have engaged with the state law and its reform 
based on their belief that the state institutions can improve women’s position in 
society. Feminists’ such belief is evident in their engagement with the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 1979 or the UN’s Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325). 
Moreover, feminists’ engagement in advocating for a uniform civil code also 
indicates their reliance and trust on the state law, which they see as the most 
effective way to achieve gender equality, as discussed in the introductory chapter.  
Manji (1999) identifies two main reasons for such over-reliance on the state and 
its law by feminist groups. First, during the 1990s, an increasing number of NGOs 
working on gender issues have been in operation in the developing countries. 
According to Manji (1999, 440), these NGOs function as “foreign-funded 
watchdogs on behalf of the international community”. As a result, a state-centred 
ideology is promulgated from developed countries to developing countries 
through the development sector as well as in the feminist realm. Second, in 
developing countries legal practitioners and other professionals working on 
women’s issues are members of the “post-colonial bourgeoisie” or in other words, 
“state bureaucratic elites” (Manji 1999, 440). Therefore, the NGOs’ close 
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association with the state also influences their approaches, which results in 
“endeavours to ameliorate the position of women remain within the magnetic 
field of the state law and within the dominant paradigm of legal centralism” 
(Manji 1999, 440). In this way, the analysis of the relationships between women 
and law remains within the periphery of the state law.   
Proponents of both the equality and difference models described earlier do not 
challenge the state-centric legal systems. Instead, they seek women’s experience 
of law within the centralist paradigm. Legal feminists contributed significantly to 
advancing legal theories by incorporating women’s voices, experiences, and 
concerns, which have become a rich resource for legal innovation and reform 
(Schneider 1986, Minow 1989). Soon legal feminists encountered a problem: 
Which women’s voices and experience would feminists take into account? 
Feminists’ attention on the recognition of ‘difference’ between men and women 
focused on the ‘differences’ within women as a category, their intersectional 
subjectivity. As women are not homogeneous, their race, class, age, religion, 
along with other intersectional positions, produce different experiences of 
women and, therefore, there can only be women’s experiences in the plural form 
and not woman’s experience (Harding 1987). Under this paradigm, legal feminism 
encountered the critique of focusing solely on white, middle-class, able-bodied, 
heterosexual women (Becker 1989, Crenshaw 1989, Rhode 1988, Hooks 2000). 
According to Minow (1989), by recognising women’s intersectional identities that 
cut across class, race, sexuality, age, amongst other factors, feminism recognises 
the multiplicity of women’s experiences. This recognition would alter the 
construction of the “person” imagined by the legal doctrines and institutions 
(Minow 1989, 130). Therefore, recognition of intersectionality challenges the 
positivist view of law that holds “one truth or one reality” (Minow 1989, 132) and 
enables legal doctrines to capture multiple truths and realities.  
Parashar (1996) argues that although intersectionality has taken an important 
position in feminist legal theory by addressing race, it still centred on North 
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American concerns. Therefore, if women’s experience is recognised as a valid 
source of knowledge, then feminism must incorporate the experience of non-
Western women as well (Parashar 1996). She further argues that, “While it is 
difficult to determine when distinct voice exists, the challenge for legal feminism 
is to consider how to recognise the plural voices of women without losing the 
analytical category of woman” (Parashar 1996, 37). However, again the advocates 
of intersectionality argue in favour of the plurality of women’s subjective 
positions and multiple experiences. However, feminists arguing for 
intersectionality do not challenge the plurality of law in their respective legal 
world; instead, they remain within the trajectory of the state law.  
From legal centralism to pluralism 
The legal centralist paradigm provides us with a partial picture of women’s 
encounters with law, as under this paradigm, law is only associated with the state 
and, in the process, other sources of law are not acknowledged. Recognising such 
shortcoming of legal centralist paradigm, some scholars argue for decentring and 
broadening the horizons of law. For example, Kapur (1996) challenges the 
traditional boundaries of law by examining women’s broader social, political, 
cultural, and historical contexts within which law operates. She argues that it is 
necessary “to decentre law”, which means “to make law but one area of inquiry 
into the multiple ways in which women are subordinated and oppressed” (Kapur 
1996, 2). By decentring law, she attempts to challenge the positivist claim of law 
as an objective, neutral, and a singular truth and aims “to create a dissonance 
within the terrain of law that disrupts the universal script and permits multiple 
truths and narratives to emerge” (Kapur 1996, 2). In the same volume, Parashar 
(1996) argues how legal feminism should broaden its horizon and go further, 
beyond the debates on essentialism. However, although both Kapur (1996) and 
Parashar (1996) call for feminism to broaden its boundaries by moving law from 
the centre of analysis to the periphery, along with other factors such as contexts, 
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they do not challenge the positivist view of law, embedded in the legal centralism 
paradigm. Instead, they attempt to reduce the weight that has been traditionally 
assigned to law and incorporate contexts as part of the analysis of the relation 
between gender and law. Therefore, in such a situation, law has shifted from the 
centre of analysis to the periphery, but its association with the state has not been 
specifically challenged.  
Other legal scholars also critiqued law’s association solely with the state. For 
example, Ost and Van de Kerchove (2002) advocate for a paradigm change from 
the notion in which law is seen as a pyramid to the idea in which law is viewed as 
a network. Tuori (2002, 121-146) highlights the significance of both normative and 
practical “faces” of law. Before these scholars, Lacey (1998, 157) argues for 
revaluing “the horizontal without obscuring the vertical”. By using a similar 
spatial metaphor to Lacey (1998), a decade later, Davies (2008, 282) outlines two 
modalities of law, vertical and horizontal, where the vertical is exclusively 
associated with the nation state and the horizontal is situated within the 
“relationships of actual proximity or contiguity”. According to her, the vertical 
law, originating from a single authoritative centre, is understood as a “positivist 
superstructure”, modelled upon the state (Davies 2008, 284). According to Davies 
(2008, 285), “The state provides the conceptual perimeter, the source, the 
territory, and ultimately the identity of law”.     
While Davies (2008) believes that for feminism it is still important to engage with 
the vertical law, particularly as regards promoting women’s new rights, gender 
mainstreaming in projects and institutions and anti-discrimination initiatives at a 
formal level, feminists need to go beyond this framework. In order to broaden the 
sphere of law, Davies’ (2008) notion of horizontal law is useful. According to 
Davies (2008), horizontal law replaces the hierarchical, positivist, and superior 
view of law by mutable relationships created between people and their 
communities. She writes, “[M]y intention is to build upon ‘alternative’ practices 
of law, ‘alternative’ knowledge about law, ‘alternative’ localities in which law 
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exists, and ‘alternative’ legal subjectivities” (emphasised in the original text). In 
my opinion, this approach has a political dimension as far as feminism is 
concerned. As long as we use the term alternative, we are again falling into the 
trap of acknowledging the state law as mainstream, primary, and pure, and the 
‘other’ is an ‘alternative’ form of the mainstream. However, if we remove the term 
‘alternative’, then Davies’ (2008) horizontal law theory becomes a cornerstone for 
legal feminism.  
Similar to the notion of flat law, legal pluralism is also seen by some scholars as a 
path to exit the orbit of the legal centralist paradigm. Manji (1999) argues along 
this line and advocates that feminists should engage with legal pluralism. In 
modern society, law is “plural rather than monolithic, that it is private as well as 
public in character and that the national (public, official) legal system is often a 
secondary rather than primary locus of regulation” (Galanter 1981, 20). Based on 
this, Manji (1999) argues that it is particularly true for women whose legal world 
does not entirely depend on the state legal system but instead, depends on other 
systems. Therefore, by using the legal pluralism framework we would be able to 
obtain a more accurate picture of how law interplays with gender within a 
society.  
While advocating that feminists should make a shift in analysis from the legal 
centralist paradigm to the legal pluralist paradigm in order to have a more 
accurate picture of women’s experiences of law, Manji (1999) does not provide 
insights into how legal pluralism scholarship should be applied for this purpose. I 
argue that a simple ‘shift’ from a legal centralist to a legal pluralist paradigm, 
which is prescribed by Manji (1999), is not enough to understand women’s full 
experience of law. Therefore, in order to have a successful conversation with legal 
pluralism, feminists must understand the scholarship better and find their niche 
within the scholarship.  
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During the 1970s, at the time when feminism drew significant attention of 
scholars, the concept of legal pluralism also emerged as a distinct but highly 
contested analytical concept in the fields of sociology and anthropology. Since 
then scholars such as Griffiths (1986), Moore (1973), Merry (1988), Pospisil (1978), 
von Benda-Beckmann (1979), von Benda-Beckmann (1981), Tamanaha (1993), 
Woodman (1998), Kleinhans and Macdonald (1997), and many others have 
critically engaged in the legal pluralism discourse and contributed to its rich 
debates in a robust way. Although all these prominent legal pluralists treat the 
notion of legal pluralism differently, there are a few essential elements that 
commonly exist in order to create a situation of legal pluralism: multiple legal 
systems that contain law or other normative orders1, a broader context where 
these legal systems cohabit, and all these laws and normative order are active or 
interplay at the same time.  
The concept of legal pluralism as an analytical category emerged with a critique 
of a situation of legal centralism, in which law belongs to the state, is uniform for 
all, and is exclusively administered by the state institutions. Under the situation 
of legal centralism, other normative orders, such as religious, familial, or 
community orders, are subordinated to law and institutions of the state. 
According to this notion, the conception of law is as a single, unified, codified 
and exclusive hierarchical normative order and the state, being the fundamental 
unit of political organisation, is the only entity authorised to govern law. 
However, the lens of legal centralism has a chronic inability to see that the legal 
reality is not a tidy, consistent, organised, and ideal identification of law and legal 
system. The reality is rather an unsystematic collage of inconsistent and 
overlapping parts with no easy legal interpretation and that is incomprehensible 
in its complexity (Griffiths 1986, Merry 1988). As a critique of legal centralism, the 
concept of legal pluralism emerged that recognises that law, as a system, is not 
                                                 
1 Normative orders are — the rules, regulations, customs, norms — other forms of orders, which 
we do not consider as ‘legal’ per se, but they have significant influence in people’s lives in terms of 
regulation. 
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single or unified; instead, it is a plural, multiple, and complex collection of 
systems that includes law as a formal system as well as other forms of normative 
orders.  
Different scholars treated legal pluralism in different ways and attempted to 
define it. A significant approach to legal pluralism is the “semi-autonomous social 
field”, a term coined by Moore (1973, 721) to describe multiple systems of orders. 
According to Moore (1973), small fields that can be seen are semi-autonomous in 
nature and are capable of creating rules and customs within the particular 
system, while at the same time, these fields are also subject to the rules and 
customs of the larger field where they are situated. Griffiths (1986), one of the 
most authoritative scholars of legal pluralism, defines legal pluralism by 
extending Moore’s (1973) notion of ‘semi-autonomous social field’ in the 
following manner: “‘Legal pluralism’ refers to the normative heterogeneity 
attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a context of 
multiple, overlapping ‘semi-autonomous social fields’, which, it may be added, is 
in practice a dynamic condition” (Griffiths 1986, 38-39). 
Tamanaha (2008) states that legal pluralism includes multiple uncoordinated, co-
existing or developing but diverse bodies of law that exist everywhere from the 
local to a global level and can impose conflicting demands and/or norms and 
hence can create uncertainty for individuals or groups. On the other hand, Merry 
(1988, 886) treats the concept of legal pluralism in a more anthropological way, 
where she understands law as “a system of symbols, of meanings”. According to 
Merry (1988, 886), legal pluralism should be studied as “a system of meanings, a 
cultural code for interpreting the world”. 
A number of scholars conducting research on gender have used the legal 
pluralism paradigm in their work. For example, Sezgin (2011) explores how the 
personal law affects women’s rights and their freedoms in postcolonial settings in 
Egypt and India and how women claim their rights in contexts that mostly deny 
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their rights. By using the legal pluralism framework, Sezgin (2011) finds 
astonishing similarity in women’s experiences in these two completely different 
contexts, particularly around the gender-unequal divorce law and maintenance, 
where Egypt is a Muslim-majority, authoritarian state led by Sharia law and India 
is a Hindu-dominated state with a secular and democratic regime. By tracing the 
women-led reform movements since the 1990s in these both settings, Sezgin 
(2011) also finds that there is a steady but silent revolution taking place.     
Another example of examining gender through a legal pluralism lens is 
conducted by Basu (2006) in her ethnographic work in family courts and 
Women’s Grievance Cells of the Police in Kolkata, India. She presents cases of 
domestic violence allegations to problematise the categorisations of family 
violence and marks violence as a strategy of negotiation of economic and other 
kinship needs within marriage (Basu 2006). In a different study in Indonesia, 
Irianto (2004) examines the competition and interpenetration among different 
legal systems in the courtroom through which Batak women engage in 
negotiating their entitlement to inherit. The study shows how women become 
the subject of multiple laws and normative orders in a dispute and choose a 
specific legal mechanism in order to access their inheritance rights (Irianto 2004). 
In Botswana, Griffiths (1998) explores African women’s access to law in a 
situation of legal pluralism, focusing on how familial and sexual relationships and 
marital status affect women’s compensation for pregnancy, maintenance, and 
property rights claims (social and legal).   
Understanding the theoretical debates of legal pluralism  
Although many scholars have engaged with the concept of legal pluralism, its 
journey has not been a smooth one. The discourses of legal pluralism took the 
position of the “central theme in the re-conceptualization of the law/society 
relation” (Merry 1988, 869) as a field of study. But there has always been “deep 
conceptual confusion and unusually heated disagreement” around the discourse 
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of legal pluralism (Tamanaha 2008, 390). One reason for this conceptual 
confusion is that legal pluralists come to this field from various disciplines, from 
international law to legal anthropology or from human rights to feminists studies 
(Tamanaha 2008), which makes legal pluralism a multi-disciplinary scholarship. 
Such multi-disciplinary nature of this scholarship brings in different 
interpretations of legal pluralism, which is clearly capable of creating conceptual 
confusions. The other reason for the conceptual confusion is the continuous 
debates among the legal pluralists on the definition of law. This latter reason is 
important to understand as long as feminism is concerned.  
The concept of law and how it interacts within a society has been an area of 
interest for most legal pluralists. In fact, the discussion on law has become a 
major part of legal pluralism theories. By positioning law at the centre of their 
analysis, the legal pluralists often push people, individual beings who use and 
apply law, away from the centre of analysis towards the periphery. In other 
words, in most legal pluralism theories, law is considered as the primary 
analytical category and people are seen as subjects of law, a secondary category. 
This approach of analysis, where law is positioned in the primary category, is 
clear in a major part of the debates around legal pluralism.  
One such example of this debate is the notorious contestation of what can be 
labelled as law and what cannot. In other words, it is the on-going never-ending 
debate: Can non-state normative orders be considered law? What is law and what 
is not law? These questions sit at the heart of the legal pluralism debates. One of 
the earliest scholars of law and society is Ehrlich (1936), who introduced for the 
first time the concept of socially-oriented legal pluralism in an era when different 
colonising powers occupying various parts of the world were putting their efforts 
into codifying the state law as part of their ‘civilizing mission’.  Ehrlich (1936) 
argues that such codification of law creates ‘rules of decision’ that clearly ignore 
the ‘living law’, which is also known as, ‘rules of conduct’. Law consists of rules 
for decision, where law is defined from the point of view of a state official and 
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they must decide the legal disputes according to those laws (Ehrlich 1936). Law or 
the rules of decision serves the purpose of resolving disputes. However,  
according to Ehrlich (1936), the rules of conduct (living law) regulate the social 
relations that discourage women and men not to go to the state law for remedy; 
instead, the living law provides women and men with more flexible and 
acceptable ways to resolve disputes. He states that all of us live in some form of 
‘social association’ that recognises certain rules of conduct, which regulates our 
conducts and actions through a wide range of rules such as the rules of law, of 
morals, of religion, of ethical custom, of honour, of decorum, and so on. Ehrlich 
(1936) was probably the first scholar to differentiate lawyers’ law from the 
everyday law, which is the cornerstone of legal pluralism. This differentiation 
between lawyers’ law and the everyday law is of particular importance for 
feminist researchers as women’s lives are often governed by everyday law as 
opposed to formal state law.    
According to Griffiths (1986), legal pluralism is so pervasive in every society in the 
world that the concept of legal centralism does not even exist in reality. But the 
ideology of legal centralism is so strong that it creates a disguised picture of the 
legal world, which has become the foundation of social and legal theory. Thus 
Griffiths (1986) took a destructive motive to break the idea that law is a single, 
unified and exclusive hierarchical normative orders subordinated by the state 
power (Griffiths 1986). However,  later Tamanaha (1993) dismissed Griffiths’ 
(1986) scientific pretensions to reconceptualise law by calling it the folly of the 
social scientific concept of legal pluralism. Tamanaha (1993) claims that law 
should be empirically and analytically distinct from other normative orders and 
there is an ontological distinction between the state law and other normative 
orders, and the term law must be under the custody of the state only. Otherwise, 
law becomes synonymous with normative order, which Tamanaha (1993) 
problematises as in such a case, the term law would lose its distinctive meaning. 
In a similar line, Moore (2001) criticised the legal pluralists who combine the 
state law with other forms of normative orders and label them as law; instead, 
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Moore (2001) shows the importance of distinguishing law from other normative 
orders for analytical and policy purposes.  
How far can the concept of law be taken? In other words, should non-legal 
normative orders or social norms or customs, which are not considered as law per 
se, be included within the conception of law? These are some of the important 
questions asked by scholars such as von Benda-Beckmann (2002). For most 
lawyers and legal practitioners, the concept of law is mainly associated with the 
state recognition. However, for anthropologists, conceptualising law by 
dissociating law from the state becomes more useful (von Benda-Beckmann 1983, 
1986, 2002). By dissociating law from the state, one can broaden the horizon of 
law.   
To define law as an analytical concept, some scholars take a different route. 
Pospisil (1971a) is one of them who states, 
Law as a theoretical and analytical device is a concept which embraces a 
category of phenomena (ethnographic facts) selected according to the 
criteria the concept specifies. Although it is composed of a set of 
individual phenomena, the category itself is not a phenomenon — it does 
not exist in the outer world. The term ‘law’ consequently is applied to a 
construct of the human mind for the sake of convenience. The justification 
of a concept does not reside in its existence outside the human mind, but 
in its value as an analytical, heuristic device. (Pospisil 1971a, 39) 
For Pospisil (1971b), legal pluralism is a cognitive phenomenon. However, von 
Benda-Beckmann (1979) advances Pospisil’s (1971b) conceptualisation of law from 
this point: “Law is a dimension of the cognitive and normative conceptions 
through which society’s members’ autonomy to behave and to construct their 
own cognitive and normative conceptions is restricted and recognized” (von 
Benda-Beckmann 1979, 27). Von Benda-Beckmann (1979) considers law as a part 
of the social organisation as opposed to a specific domain.  
When the concept of law embraces normative orders and social norms by 
including them under the same umbrella of law, other scholars argue that such 
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process would consider ‘anything’ and ‘everything’ as law (Merry 1988) and 
essential differences between legal systems would “melt down” (Moore 1978).  
However, much later von Benda-Beckmann (2002) argues that although 
conceptualising law in light of legal pluralism  
widens the range of legal phenomena, … an analytical concept of law does 
not mean that crucial differences between legal phenomena or systems 
would be ‘melted down’, that ‘anything’ would be law, or that anything 
called law would be ‘the same’. On the contrary, it is the strength of an 
analytical concept that it provides a starting point for looking at 
similarities and differences in several dimensions of variation in a 
consistent way, and therefore provides a much better perspective on 
differences in form and function than the state-connected concept. (von 
Benda-Beckmann 2002, 56) 
The formulation of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ is seen by Galanter (1981) as 
useful in the study of the lesser normative orders as parts of a larger, complex 
legal order, with which they interact. Galanter (1981) shows that although the two 
distinct sets of normative orders, namely law and customs, are parallel to each 
other, they also create a notion of hierarchy between them. In most cases, the 
state law takes up a higher position than do the other form of normative orders:  
One of the striking features of the modern world has been the emergence 
of those institutional-intellectual complexes that we identify as national 
legal systems. Such a system consists of institutions, connected to the 
state, guided by and propounding a body of normative learning, 
purporting to encompass and control all the other institutions in the 
society and to subject them to a regime of general rules… These complexes 
consolidated and displaced the earlier diverse array of normative orderings 
in society, reducing them to a subordinate and interstitial status. (Galanter 
1981, 19) 
This hierarchy among the state law and other forms of normative orders is also 
observed by other scholars. Merry (1988) and then later Woodman (1998) 
observed similarly where the studies of legal pluralism mostly focused on the 
coincidence of the state law and then compared it with other non-state laws or 
normative orders. So in this way, the state law always becomes absolute and 
constant against which other normative orders are compared or contrasted.  
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Even after four decades of on-going debates on legal pluralism, particularly 
around the concept of law, the struggle is not yet over. Even after many efforts, 
the question ‘what is law?’ has not been resolved, partly because of adopting 
different definitions of law and their inability to distinguish law from other forms 
of normative orders (Tamanaha 2008). It is evident how the difficulty of defining 
law under a situation of legal pluralism remains at the heart of the debates 
around the subject. Although scholars have not yet been able to reach an agreed 
version of the definition of law, they have agreed on one thing for sure: the 
conceptual problem of law is “insoluble” (Tamanaha 2008, 376).  
The ‘insoluble’ debate on what is law puts the notion of legal pluralism in 
question. Can legal pluralism be a robust analytical category when the concept of 
law has no agreed platform? Similar questions are also asked by scholars. For 
example, Tamanaha (1993) argues that in order to have an effective concept of 
legal pluralism, it is essential that legal orders or legal systems are identified 
clearly and therefore it is necessary to define law specifically. As the problem of 
having an agreed definition of law is virtually impossible, many scholars, who in 
fact contributed most to legal pluralism theory, are the ones now dismissing it 
(Tamanaha 2008) and according to them, legal pluralism can no longer be 
considered a useful concept (Woodman 1998). In continuation of the discussion 
on the question of whether legal pluralism is a useful category of analysis or not, 
in the next section, I will show how some scholars suggest a shift from law to 
people in order to make the notion of legal pluralism effective and robust.  
However, this is an important place in which feminism’s engagement is needed. 
Legal feminism aims at to capture women’s experience of law, which the legal 
centralist paradigm fails to do so. Under legal pluralism scholarship, if the major 
debates revolve around what is law and what is not, then the purpose of shifting 
from a legal centralism to a legal pluralism paradigm does not harvest the 
expected results, which is to understand women’s experience of law. At this level, 
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legal pluralism does not appear to be a robust framework for understanding 
women’s experience of law. 
Feminism and legal pluralism2 
Legal pluralism is valuable not because of its capability to accommodate multiple 
laws and other normative orders but because it can create conflicting claims, 
norms and demands that challenge the legal authorities and their claims 
(Tamanaha 2008). For feminism, by creating conflicts among laws and other 
normative orders, legal pluralism also creates opportunities for individual beings, 
particularly for women, as well as groups within society that can opportunistically 
choose from co-existing laws or normative orders to advance their goals. 
However, such usefulness of legal pluralism as an analytical category has not 
come into play so far because of the scholarship’s consistent engagement with the 
debate on defining law. In my view, there are two reasons for such failure. The 
first reason is that legal pluralism is such a vast and complex field of study that it 
cannot be reduced into a single analytical category. This is coupled with another 
reason, which involves the centre of analysis. So far we have seen that women — 
an important factor for analysing legal pluralism using a feminist lens — have 
often been overlooked by scholars and most of these scholars focused on law in 
their analyses. Whilst some scholars have hinted at this problem, very few have 
gone deeper to unpack it.  
As discussed in the previous section, the notorious debate around the definition 
of law, under the situation of legal pluralism, has almost made the concept 
unusable and has thrown it into a vicious circle. In particular, scholars such as 
Griffiths (2005), who played an outstanding role in developing and advocating 
                                                 
2 Part of this section has been published in the Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (Das 
2016). For details, see: Das, J. (2016). Good laws, bad outcomes: land rights and inheritance 
practices for Christian women in Bangladesh. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
48(2), 159-185. 
  
50 
 
the concept of legal pluralism, makes “a stunning series of assertions”, as 
Tamanaha (2008, 395) puts it, a decade after he made his confident argument for 
the concept of legal pluralism. Griffiths (2005) states, 
In the intervening years, further reflection on the concept of law has led 
me to the conclusion that the word ‘law’ could be better be abandoned 
altogether for purposes of theory formation in sociology of law… It also 
follows from the above considerations that the expression of ‘legal 
pluralism’ can and should be reconceptualized as ‘normative pluralism’ or 
‘pluralism in social control’. (Griffiths 2005, 63-64) 
According to Tamanaha (2008, 395), by making these statements, Griffiths (2005) 
admits his “mistake” about the conceptualisation of legal pluralism and confirms 
that it is “impossible to adequately conceptualise law for social scientific 
purposes”. Instead, Tamanaha (2008, 396) argues that, “Law is a ‘folk concept’, 
that is, law is what people within social groups have come to see and label as 
‘law’... [So] legal pluralism exists whenever social actors identify more than one 
source of ‘law’ within a social arena”. Similarly, Merry (2000, 8) argues while 
examining the colonisation of Hawai'i, that, "This is law at its bottom fringes, 
where it intersects the social life of ordinary people rather than where legal 
doctrines are created". Therefore, for feminists, it would be a mistake to attempt 
to reduce law to a single scientific category.  
In a situation when the original concept of legal pluralism has failed to keep the 
promises it made, it is now clear that in order to conduct an effective study of 
legal pluralism using a feminist lens, or broadly of women and law, one has to 
make a shift of the centre of analysis from law to women. In 1926, pioneer 
anthropologist Malinowski ([1926] 2013, 6, 12) in his prolific work among the 
Trobriand of Melanesia argues that law cannot be found in “central authority, 
codes, courts, and constables”, but rather “in all social relations … legal 
mechanism can be traced”. Along with a similar line, Pospisil (1971b) argues that 
“every functioning subgroup of a society has its own legal system which is 
necessarily different in some respects from those of the other subgroups” 
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(Pospisil 1958). However, Pospisil (1978, 2) does not view law as “an autonomous 
institution but rather an integral part of a culture” and makes a deliberate effort 
to study individuals instead of the group. Therefore, instead of treating law as a 
distinct phenomenon than other normative orders or customs, Pospisil (1978) 
views it as part of culture. By taking the above views, legal feminists should look 
for law in women’s everyday lives.  
Merry (1988) also talks about such a shift. According to her, legal pluralism should 
be studied as “a system of meanings, a cultural code for interpreting the world” 
(Merry 1988, 886). She suggests that one should view the plural legal 
phenomenon in its historical context, rather than in a conceptual manner, and 
study legal pluralism that leads to an examination of cultural or ideological 
characteristics of law and normative orders (Merry 1988). Another pioneer 
scholar, Vanderlinden (1989, 151-152), argues how “sujet de droit” or the ‘subject of 
law’ (in our case, women) becomes a subject of a “dialectical process” as members 
of multiple networks and/or forums with competing laws or regulatory orders, 
which is considered as a situation of legal pluralism. In this situation ‘sujet de 
droit’ takes the primary subjective position and not law. So Vanderlinden’s (1989) 
argues that “an approach to legal pluralism centred upon legal systems is fairly 
pointless, while one centred upon the ‘sujet de droit’ can be far more fruitful”. For 
feminism, Vanderlinden’s (1989) following statement is valid: 
Thus instead of looking at the legal pyramid from the top, from the 
centres of decision, from the standpoint of power, one is brought to 
contemplate it at the level of ordinary men [and women] in their daily 
activities … [Legal] pluralism is essentially a condition, thus a way of being, 
of existing. It is the condition of the person who, in his [and her] daily life, 
is confronted in his behaviour with various, possibly conflicting, 
regulatory orders, be they legal or non-legal, emanating from the various 
social networks of which he [and she] is, voluntarily or not, a member. 
(Vanderlinden 1989, 153-154) 
Human-focused engagement with legal pluralism, which is crucial for feminist 
research, has also been examined by Kleinhans and Macdonald (1997), which they 
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called a critical legal pluralism, by linking the notion of legal pluralism with 
human agency. These scholars put people at the centre of their analysis. 
Kleinhans and Macdonald (1997) argue that a critical legal pluralism anchors on 
the understanding that legal subjects possess transformative capacity through 
which they produce legal knowledge, create realities, and hence constitute their 
legal subjectivity in multiple ways. According to them, 
Social-scientific legal pluralism rests on an image of law as an external 
object of knowledge … Legal subjects are exclusively constituted by law … 
A critical legal pluralism, by contrast, rests on the insight that it is 
knowledge that maintains and creates realities. Legal subjects are not 
wholly determined; they possess a transformative capacity that enables 
them to produce legal knowledge and to fashion the very structures of law 
that contribute to constituting their legal subjectivity. (Kleinhans and 
Macdonald 1997, 37-38) 
Instead of looking at law as the primary focus of their analysis, these scholars 
critically look at people and their actions. Macdonald (2011, 310) elsewhere argues 
that “a critical legal pluralism begins the quest for law elsewhere”. Under the 
notion of critical legal pluralism, legal subjects are law-inventing rather than law-
abiding entities (Kleinhans and Macdonald 1997). Such an idea of legal pluralism 
transcends the traditional explanation of legal pluralism that generally sees 
people as passive, law-abiding agents. But Macdonald and Kleinhans’ (1997) 
approach to legal pluralism treats people as active agents and focuses not only on 
how societies and subjects are treated by law but also examines how these 
subjects actively treat, interpret, and apply law. Such an approach explores not 
only the question, “How are legal subjects seen in any given normative order?”, 
where the citizens — in particular women, as far as feminism is concerned — are 
viewed primarily as passive, but also, “What do legal subjects see in any given 
normative order?”, where the citizens are active with some form of agency in 
shaping their own lives (Kleinhans and Macdonald 1997, 46). In such a situation, 
every being, including a woman, becomes both a “law-maker” and a “law-applier”, 
hence a “legal agent” (Macdonald 2011, 310).  
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In order to capture women’s full experience of law, therefore, I argue that a 
complete shift of the centre of analysis of legal pluralism from law to women is 
necessary. Such a shift from law to women, or what Kleinhans and Macdonald 
(1997) call ‘legal agents’, refocuses concentration from the state law or other 
forms of normative orders to women and their everyday lives.  The primary 
reason for this shift lies in the fact that every woman is positioned in some kind 
of intersection of race, caste, class, religion, gender, sexuality, and so on. In 
reality, there is no one woman without an intersectional position and the factors 
of this intersection become the factors of discrimination in many instances. I 
have already critically dealt with this particular issue of intersectionality3 
substantially in an earlier section. But linking the notion of intersectionality with 
the concept of legal pluralism clearly suggests an analytical shift from the law to 
women as legal agents who hold such intersectional positions and subjectivities.  
Conclusion 
When legal pluralism talks about different groups having different laws and other 
normative orders, it does not necessarily address the intersection within that 
specific group or community. Communities, no matter how small, are not a 
homogeneous category. Although superficially a community may look 
homogeneous, in reality even within that supposedly homogeneous community, 
factors such as gender, sexuality, class, amongst other factors play significant 
roles that often lead to substantial discrimination. So neither law applied to a 
particular community treats everyone equally, nor can every legal agent (in our 
case women) of that community interpret and apply law in a similar manner. 
More specifically, as the same law can treat men and women in two different 
                                                 
3 Intersectionality if defined as “the notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing 
vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality, has emerged as the primary theoretical tool designed 
to combat feminist hierarchy, hegemony, and exclusivity” (Nash 2008, 2) 
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ways, the same law can be interpreted and applied differently by different 
women.  
Therefore, one needs to go even further than just positioning woman at the 
centre of analysis within the legal pluralist framework in order to capture their 
experiences of law. We need to position women or the legal agents in their own 
social and gendered positions. In particular, we need to position them according 
to their own subjectivity and power structure, where their identity and 
intersectionality, two important dimensions of their lives situate them in the 
social (and/or legal) context.   
One can question that when the centre of analysis is shifted from law to women, 
does the analysis of law hold no importance? In other words, would the analysis 
of law be excluded as a result of such shift? I must clarify here that the proposed 
shift does not necessarily exclude the analysis of law (more specifically the state 
law), but such analysis must be woman-centred. In other words, feminist theory 
of legal pluralism must analyse law by positioning women according to their 
context and subjective position to get a sense of their experiences of law.  
Building on both feminist and legal pluralism theories, I have presented a 
feminist theory of legal pluralism in this chapter. I have argued for a feminist 
theory of legal pluralism by critically engaging with these two sets of scholarships 
and suggesting that, for feminism, in order to capture women’s full experience of 
law, feminists should interact with legal pluralism and should exit the periphery 
of the state law and enter into a broader arena of law that includes the non-state 
laws. In order to shift from a legal centralism to a legal pluralism paradigm, 
feminists also should focus on a specific niche of the scholarship of legal 
pluralism that searches for law in people’s everyday lives. For this purpose, an 
analytical shift from law to women is necessary for feminist analysis. I use this 
theoretical lens to explain the empirical findings in the rest of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three 
The situation of legal pluralism in Bangladesh 
Introduction  
Bangladesh, amongst other postcolonial countries in South Asia, exists within a 
situation of legal pluralism in which multiple legal systems co-exist within a 
broader legal landscape. This chapter helps to understand the state of legal 
pluralism in Bangladesh by analysing the state and non-state laws and their 
gendered characteristics, which serves as the context of legal pluralism for the 
rest of the thesis. This chapter also outlines the legal processes and important 
provisions of these state and non-state laws that touch upon gender and the legal 
forums available for Christian women through state mechanisms, human rights 
organisations, women’s movements, and churches and church institutions. 
Analysing the legal context is important to have a better understanding of the 
complexities caused by plural legal systems. In this chapter, I argue that when the 
state law amalgamates with non-state laws and other forms of normative orders 
(such as rules, customs, and norms), the legal realities of concerned people, 
particularly women, takes a complex shape.  
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides a bird’s-eye 
view of the state legal system of Bangladesh. This section analyses the 
Constitution of Bangladesh through a gender lens, introduces the state’s legal 
system and the personal laws for different religious communities, and presents 
other civil laws that intend to protect women’s rights. The second section 
conducts a comparative gender analysis of Muslim, Hindu, and Christian 
personal laws, particularly in the areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
guardianship and custody, and adoption. This section compares different 
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provisions and treatments of different personal laws that directly affect Muslim, 
Hindu, and Christian women in these areas. The following section conducts a 
deeper examination of the Christian personal laws that are applicable to the 
Christian community of Bangladesh. This section specifically covers the state 
laws for Christian marriage, divorce, and inheritance and conducts a gender 
analysis of these laws. The fourth section analyses non-state laws, particularly the 
Code of Canon Law that is applicable to the Catholic community. The final 
section lays out the various non-state forums available for Christian women that 
assist women with both state and non-state legal matters. Some of these forums 
are secular in nature, such as legal aid organisations, human rights organisations, 
and women’s movements, whereas some are purely church-based, such as the 
Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal and church council, amongst others.        
A bird’s-eye view of the Bangladeshi legal systems 
The Constitution of Bangladesh  
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equality as a fundamental right and 
specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religious affiliation and 
gender. Part III of the Constitution, titled “Fundamental Rights”, holds different 
provisions and elements of equality between women and men as well as of non-
discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, and so on. In particular, 
Article 27 states, “All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal 
protection of law”.1 Therefore, at the constitutional level, women and men are 
considered equal as part of their fundamental rights. The constitutions of other 
South Asian countries, particularly India and Pakistan, also provide the citizens 
with equal rights and prohibit gender discrimination.2       
                                                 
1 See Appendix A. 
2 Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and Section 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. 
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The Constitution of Bangladesh recognises women’s lower status in society while 
providing equal fundamental rights to them. Comparing Article 28(2) with Article 
28(4), Pereira (2002) notes that, on the one hand, the Constitution guarantees 
equal rights between women and men (Article 28(2)), but on the other hand, it 
provides the state with the right to make special provisions in favour of women 
(Article 28(4)). Therefore, in this way, the Constitution recognises that women in 
Bangladesh have a lower and more vulnerable status than that of men and hence 
reserves the right “to protect women as within the same category as the 
‘backward section of citizens’” (Article 29(3a)). According to Pereira (2002, 8), 
such “prejudicially protective, paternalistic attitude” of the Constitution flows 
down and is reflected in major laws and procedures. The reflection of the 
Constitution’s paternalistic attitude can also be seen within the realm of personal 
laws. 
One striking observation in the Constitution is how the state treats the public 
and private realms while addressing women’s equal rights. Article 28(2) ensures 
equal treatment of women “in all spheres of the State and of public life”. In this 
way, the state guarantees gender equality. However, in this Article, the 
Constitution comment only on women’s public life and remains silent about their 
private life, the realm where many women face discrimination and domination. It 
is evident that the state does not explicitly guarantee full equality for women in 
every aspect of their lives, public or private. Instead, the state creates a notion of 
equal citizenship that is only applicable to the public spheres and not to the 
private spheres.  
The mismatch between the guarantee of equality in the public and private 
spheres complicates the state’s relationship with individual citizens, particularly 
women. According to Pereira (2002), an ambiguous relationship between the 
state and its citizens is created as a result of the lack of affirmation of equality in 
the personal sphere on the one hand, and a clear provision of equality in the 
public sphere on the other. Such a mismatch between equal rights in the public 
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and the private spheres begs the question: Why does the state create divisions 
between the public and the private on such a straightforward issue of women’s 
equal rights? Pereira (2002, xix), while responding to this question, states that, 
“On a critical appraisal, however, it will be seen that the attitude behind, and the 
impact around, discriminatory treatment of women in Bangladesh are results of 
systemic and complex contexts and that they are subject to several levels of 
inquiry”. Therefore, the state’s differential treatment of the public and the private 
realms around women’s equal rights is a reflection of the contexts that are 
comprised of the systems and ideologies that society is founded upon. Society’s 
contexts not only impacted the constitutional principles of fundamental rights 
but also trickled down in the country’s legal system, which I will address later in 
this chapter.    
In addition to impacting women’s lives, the Constitution also plays a role in 
multiple ways in creating minorities. For example, by declaring itself to be a 
unitary and culturally homogeneous nation (Article 6 and 9), Bangladesh, as a 
state, excluded non-Bengalis such as Chakmas, Marmas, Garos, and Tripuras 
amongst others. According to Article 6, the citizens of Bangladesh were to be 
known as Bangalees (otherwise known as Bengalis), converting the non-Bengali 
population into an ethnic minority. Similarly, by adopting Bengali as the state 
language (Article 3), it turned the non-Bengali-speaking population into 
linguistic minorities. Finally, by making Islam the state religion (Article 2A) it 
excluded Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and animists and transformed them 
into religious minorities.  According to Manchanda (2009), although the 
Constitution guarantees equality, in cases of communal tension, the state often 
dismisses the need to protect minorities separately and assumes that it should 
play a neutral role to protect every citizen. 
The Constitution’s role in creating minorities also trickles down to its other 
machineries, particularly the legal system. For example, Khan (2001) argues that 
the proclamation of the expression “Bismillah-ir-Rahman-ir-Rahim” (in the name 
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of Allah, the merciful and compassionate) before the preamble of the 
Constitution, which was added through the Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977, is 
one of the bases of biased treatment in family courts. Khan (2001) shows that 
there are documented incidences where judges did not accept cases filed by 
Hindu or Christian women based on the arguments made by judges that state 
that the family court is only for Muslims. In this way, constitutional promises of 
‘equality’ for both women and minority groups only remain in theory.  
The state legal system of Bangladesh  
Bangladesh inherited a vast body of laws from pre-colonial India, British 
colonisation, and later the Pakistan period. After independence in 1971, these pre-
existing laws were adopted into the legal system through the Bangladesh 
(Adaptation of Existing Laws) Order, 1972 (President’s Order No. 48 of 1972) and 
became applicable in independent Bangladesh. While explaining the legal system 
of Bangladesh, Hoque (1980) mentions two branches of the Bangladeshi legal 
system: constitutional law and general law. Since the Constitution is considered 
to contain the supreme laws of the country, the general laws must conform to the 
Constitution, otherwise, they can be voided. 
The General Law is comprised of the civil and the criminal laws. The civil and the 
criminal laws originated from the Civil Court Act of 1887 and the Criminal 
Procedure Code of 1898 respectively (Halim 2008). The judicial system of 
Bangladesh is comprised of a Supreme Court, a High Court Division (HCD), an 
Appellate Division (AD), and subordinate courts and tribunals (Panday and 
Hossain Mollah 2011). The Supreme Court is the apex court of the country and 
other courts and tribunals are subordinate to it.3  
There is a number of subordinate courts and tribunals with special jurisdictions, 
which is where the family courts are located, established under the Family Courts 
                                                 
3 See Appendix B for the entire structure of the judiciary system of Bangladesh. 
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Ordinance 1985 (Panday and Hossain Mollah 2011). The jurisdiction of the family 
courts covers any suit in relation to the dissolution of marriage, restitution of 
conjugal rights, dower, maintenance and guardianship, and custody of children 
(Halim 2008). However, not all issues in relation to these suits come under the 
jurisdiction of the family court. For example, Christian divorce suits go to either 
the District Court or directly to the High Court Division (The Divorce Act 1869). 
It is up to the petitioner (either husband or wife) to choose between the District 
Court of the High Court Division to present their petition (Section 10). The laws 
governing the tribal and indigenous groups were codified under a different 
category from the above-mentioned laws. The tribal and indigenous people of 
Bangladesh are subject to a different set of laws based on their customs and 
practices.4  
Personal laws  
Personal laws that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, and 
guardianship fall under the civil law category. Although the entire judicial system 
of Bangladesh, including the constitutional, criminal, and most of the civil 
procedures, are uniform, the personal laws, which govern the areas of family 
relations and personal lives, are compartmentalised on the basis of one’s religious 
affiliation. Familial matters are governed by a specific set of civil laws applicable 
to one’s religious identity (Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and Parsis). These 
personal laws typically co-exist with the general territorial law in criminal, 
administrative, and commercial legislations (Galanter and Krishnan 2000). In 
Bangladesh, three religious groups — Muslims, Hindus, and Christians — have 
specific sets of personal laws.5  
                                                 
4 Although other scholars, such as Chowdhury (2006), Mannan (1997), Muhammed et al. (2011), 
Riley (2004), and Roy (2006) amongst others, have focused their research in the area of tribal and 
indigenous groups in Bangladesh, I am not addressing issues in relation to these groups as it is 
not within the scope of this particular research. 
5 See Appendix C for the list of the personal laws for three religious groups (Muslims, Hindus, and 
Christians) of Bangladesh. 
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It is important to note that Buddhists, the second largest religious minority group 
in Bangladesh, do not have a distinct set of personal law, and their familial and 
personal issues are governed by the Hindu personal law. It should also be 
clarified that the personal laws are applicable anywhere within the country, with 
no territorial limitations. Galanter (1997) argues that in reality, religious identity 
is a description of civil status rather than of religious beliefs or practices. 
Likewise, a person will be considered Muslim by birth if their father is Muslim 
unless they explicitly renounce their faith (Fyzee 1999). For judicial 
consideration, a person must have a religious identity in order to establish one’s 
rights within the relevant laws. Even if a person does not practise or believe in 
any religion, for the purpose of accessing legal matters, they have to possess a 
religious identity. Therefore, in such cases, religious identity becomes one’s legal 
identity and these two become synonymous with one another. 
Non-religion-based civil laws protecting women’s rights 
Apart from the religion-based personal laws governing marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and custody, a number of laws have been created to protect women 
from various forms of discrimination. These laws are applicable to all citizens 
uniformly, irrespective of their religion, caste, or creed. However, many of these 
laws do touch upon women’s as well as men’s private spheres, such as in areas of 
domestic violence or dowry.6  
The passing of these laws enabled Bangladesh to achieve a number of milestones 
towards initiatives of safeguarding women’s rights and social status legally. Many 
of these laws are the outcomes of the continuous activism of women’s and human 
rights movements within the country. One example of such a milestone is that of 
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980, prohibits any person from giving or receiving 
dowry (Section 3), which was a result of advocacy work carried out by various 
women’s and human rights movements. Another example is that the notion of 
                                                 
6 See Appendix D for the list of uniform laws for protecting women. 
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‘rape’ was broadened considerably for the first time in legal text and issues such 
as ‘sexual assault’ and ‘sexual harassment’ were included in the Nari-o-Shishu 
Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2000 (Law on the Suppression of Violence Against Women 
and Children, 2000) (Section 9 & 10).  
Another significant milestone is the Domestic Violence (Prevention and 
Protection) Act 2010. This law has brought significant initiatives towards 
protecting women’s rights, particularly in the private realm, their own house. 
Under this Act, the definition of ‘domestic violence’ has been expanded 
significantly. The scope of the term ‘domestic violence’ includes, apart from 
physical and sexual violence, economic torture or violence, mental torture, verbal 
torture, threatening, and even interfering or disrupting one’s own personal 
freedom of movement, and to maintain contact or communication with others.  
A comparative analysis of Muslim, Hindu, and Christian personal 
laws 
Although all the progressive laws mentioned in the previous section were passed 
to protect women’s rights, important areas of women’s lives, such as marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance amongst others, are still governed by the personal laws. 
These are the areas where women’s rights are violated on a large scale. Pereira 
(2002) argues that when it comes to governing personal and/or familial relations 
and personal space, Bangladeshi women are burdened doubly: first on the basis 
of gender and then on the basis of religion. Moreover, different religious family 
laws are highly discriminatory towards women. In this section, I provide a 
comparative analysis of different personal laws for different religious 
communities and address a few areas in which laws discriminate against women. 
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Marriage 
The concept of marriage in Islam is a legal contract whereas, in Hinduism and 
Christianity, it is a sacrament and seen as a holy union. Some crucial areas under 
marriage are the age of marriage, marriage registration, dowry, polygamy, and 
inter-religious marriage. Apart from the religious personal laws that are specific 
to different religious groups, the state laws that are uniform in nature and are 
applied to every citizen irrespective of their religious affiliations, address some 
aspects of marriage.     
Under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, any marriage before 21 years for 
men and 18 years for women is considered illegal. However, both the Muslim and 
Hindu laws allow the marriage of minors, but these marriages are usually 
consummated after the bride reaches puberty. The Christian Marriage Act, 1872, 
does not necessarily mention any specific minimum age of marriage. However, 
according to the Code of Canon Law (Can. 1083), the minimum age of marriage is 
considered 16 for men and 14 for women, which is considered the minimum age 
for Catholic marriages. 
A particular piece of legislation, which is uniform in nature, entitled the Births, 
Deaths and Marriages Registration Act, 1886, is applicable to all citizens of the 
country irrespective of their religious affiliation. Although marriage registration 
has been made mandatory for Muslim marriages through the Muslim Marriages 
and Divorces (Registration) Act, 1974, and Christian marriages through the 
Christian Marriage Act, 1872, until recently, marriage registrations for Hindu 
marriages were not required. In 2012, the Parliament passed the Hindu Marriage 
(Registration) Act, 2012, through which Hindu marriage registration was made 
mandatory. 
Similar to the minimum age of marriage and marriage registration, Bangladesh 
has legislated the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980, that made any act of giving or 
receiving dowry illegal and punishable. However, for both the Muslim and Hindu 
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communities, dowry is a socially sanctioned practice. For Muslims, dowry is not a 
requirement of the religion but often practised. Under the Hindu law, sometimes 
dowry is considered as part of the marriage ceremony. Under the Christian law, 
dowry is not applicable. However, in recent times some instances of dowry have 
been observed within the Christian community.  
Another critical matter that is often discussed under the broader issue of 
marriage is polygamy. Polygamy is punishable under Section 494 of the Penal 
Code, 1860 (Act no. XLV of 1860). Under the Muslim law, polygyny7 is legal but 
polyandry8 is illegal. Polygyny can be legally sanctioned if there is prior 
permission of an Arbitration Council before the husband takes more than one 
wife. Polygyny also requires the first wife’s permission. Similarly, under the 
Hindu law, polyandry is illegal but polygyny is legal. But the Christian law made 
both polygyny and polyandry illegal.  
With regard to inter-religious marriages, the Special Marriage Act, 1872, enables 
civil marriages between people from different religions, in which both parties 
have to renounce their respective faiths. In such cases, a Muslim woman (who 
renounces her faith) loses her inheritance rights, her dower and her religious 
identity (Khan 2001).  Under the Muslim law, a woman cannot marry a non-
Muslim man, but men can marry women from all religions. Under the Muslim 
law, a Muslim man can marry a woman from kitabiya9, which is considered fully 
valid. On the contrary, if a Muslim man marries a non-kitabiya woman, then the 
marriage will be irregular (Khan 2001). However, in both cases, these marriages 
will be legal marriages.  
Under the Hindu law, marriages with non-Hindu men or women are prohibited. 
Under the Christian law (the Christian Marriage Act, 1872) inter-religious 
                                                 
7 A form of polygamy in which a man has more than one wife. 
8 Another form of polygamy in which a woman has more than one husband. 
9 A kitabiya refers to the followers of the religion brought by David, Moses, of Jesus who are referred 
to as ‘people of the book’ (Jones, Leng, and Mohamad 2009). 
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marriages are not prohibited. According to Section 4 of the Act, marriages 
between persons can be solemnised when “one or both of whom is or are a 
Christian or Christians” (Section 4). Therefore, in order to marry under this Act, 
only one party must be Christian. No specific clause has been provided about the 
other party’s religious affiliation. Within the Christian community, the Catholic 
denominations allow marriages with non-Catholics, i.e., both non-Christians and 
Protestants. In both cases, they consider these types of marriages to be ‘mixed 
marriages’. However, Protestants do not allow mixed marriages (except with 
Catholics). According to the Protestant churches, only persons who practised 
Christianity and have been baptised are eligible for Christian marriages.10  
Divorce/dissolution of marriage  
Under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, women do not have equal rights 
to initiate a divorce. Women’s rights are limited by certain conditions. A Muslim 
wife can only initiate a divorce if she has been delegated power to divorce in the 
kabin (marriage contract) during the marriage, whereas a Muslim husband can 
divorce his wife in his own right (Section 8). A specific form of Muslim divorce is 
called khula, in which a wife can initiate a divorce herself that does not require 
court intervention. However, under this type of divorce, the wife must be willing 
to give up or revoke her claims on her dower.  
Under the Hindu law, there is no legal recognition of divorce, either by men or 
women. For Christians, under the Divorce Act, 1869, the right to divorce is 
bounded by conditions. Women and men have to fill different levels of 
conditions to initiate a divorce. For example, men can initiate a divorce only 
based on the ground of adultery of their wives. But for women to initiate a 
divorce, adultery alone is not sufficient. In the case of women, adultery has to be 
                                                 
10 I will discuss issues of Christian marriage in Chapter Six. 
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coupled with other grounds, such as cruelty, incest, bigamy, sodomy, or 
bestiality.11  
Inheritance 
According to the Muslim law, women inherit half of what men inherit. For 
example, a wife inherits one-eighth of her husband’s estate, whereas a husband 
inherits one-fourth of his wife’s estate. A daughter inherits half of what a son 
inherits. In the case where there is no son, then a single daughter inherits only 
half of the estate.  
According to Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, a 
Hindu widow is entitled to inherit an equal share of the property with her son(s). 
However, she is not entitled to receive any agricultural property as her share of 
inheritance; instead, she is only entitled to receive maintenance from it. Once a 
Hindu widow remarries, she loses all her inheritance from her deceased husband. 
A Hindu daughter cannot inherit if her mother is alive, and moreover, unmarried 
daughters will be prioritised over married daughters. Hindu married daughters 
with only daughters or without children who have past their child-bearing age 
and who became widows without sons are completely excluded from the 
inheritance. The Christian law of inheritance, the Succession Act, 1925, provides 
both men and women with equal inheritance rights from their parents and 
spouses.12  
Guardianship and custody 
Under the Muslim law, a mother can never be a legal guardian. She can claim 
custodianship under limited circumstances. Both the Hindu and the Christian 
laws state that the mother’s right is secondary to the father’s right of 
                                                 
11 I will discuss issues of Christian divorce in Chapter Seven. 
12 I will discuss issues of Christian inheritance in Chapter Eight. 
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guardianship. In fact, under the Christian law, the mother’s rights become 
tertiary if the father appoints a legal guardian during his absence. 
Adoption 
The Muslim law does not recognise the practice of adoption and hence it is 
prohibited. Under the Hindu law, only men have the right to adopt a male child. 
Women have no right to adopt. Moreover, female children cannot be adopted. 
However, the Christian law recognises the right to adopt and encourages it 
(Pereira 2002). 
The state laws for Christians: personal laws 
The Christian community in Bangladesh is still governed by the personal laws 
that were created by the British colonisers during the pre-partition period. 
However, since the end of colonisation, the laws for Christians have never been 
amended either by the Pakistan government (during the Pakistan period) or by 
the Bangladesh government (after Independence). Although the personal laws for 
Muslims and Hindus have been amended to some extent, the Christian law is still 
virtually untouched. 
In other countries of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, the same 
personal laws for Christian marriage, divorce, and inheritance that originated 
from British colonisation still mostly govern Christian communities in these 
countries. For example, in Pakistan, Christian marriage, divorce, and inheritance 
are governed by the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, the Christian Divorce Act, 1869, 
and the Succession Act, 1925, respectively, which are the same personal laws that 
govern Bangladeshi Christians today (Aqeel 2016). In India, it was only in the 
beginning of the 21st century when the Parliament passed the Indian Divorce 
(Amendment) Act, 2001. However, until now, Christian marriage and inheritance 
are governed by the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, and the Indian 
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Succession Act, 1925, respectively, which are also applicable for Bangladeshi 
Christians.    
Christian marriage 
As mentioned before, in Bangladesh, Christian marriages are governed by the 
Christian Marriage Act, 1872. While the Protestant community, which is half the 
size of the whole Christian population in Bangladesh, is entirely governed by this 
particular state law for their marriages, the Catholic community, which is the 
other half of the Christian population, is governed both by the Christian Marriage 
Act, 1872, as well as the Code of Canon Law. 
The Christian Marriage Act, 1872 does not have a minimum age of marriage. 
However, Section 19 of the Act states that the father (or in his absence, the 
guardian) of a minor can consent to the minor’s marriage. Therefore, the 
Christian law allows the marriage of minors. Usually, the minimum age of 
marriage is considered to follow the Canon Law: 16 for men and 14 for women.  
However, with regard to consenting to the marriage of a minor, significant 
gender discrimination exists. According to Section 19 of the Christian Marriage 
Act, 1872, “The father, if living, of any minor, or, if the father be dead, the 
guardian of the person of such minor, and, in case there be no such guardian, 
then the mother of such minor, may consent to the minor's marriage …”. 
Therefore, the father has the sole legal guardianship. When the father is present, 
he has exclusive rights to consent or not to his minor child’s marriage. The 
mother, on the other hand, has absolutely no right to consent to the same. If the 
father is dead or absent, only then is the mother’s right to consent created. But 
even this right will only apply if the father had not appointed a third party as the 
minor’s legal guardian before his death. So, technically, a father can in fact 
completely exclude the mother from any guardianship rights by appointing a 
third party as a legal guardian of the minor.  
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Christian divorce and/or dissolution of marriage 
The divorce law for Christians, the Divorce Act, 1869, contains provisions that 
discriminate against women on the grounds for initiating a divorce.13 A man can 
initiate a divorce based simply on the grounds of his wife’s adultery, whereas a 
woman needs additional grounds apart from her husband’s adultery to initiate a 
divorce (Section 10). According to Section 11, when the husband is the petitioner, 
the person who has been accused of committing adultery with the wife shall be 
made a co-respondent in the divorce suit. However, such provision is only 
available for the husband and not the wife. Moreover, according to Section 34, 
the husband can claim damages from the person who committed adultery with 
the wife. The wife does not have the right to claim such damages. 
Christian inheritance 
Under the Succession Act, 1925, applicable to Bangladeshi Christians, a woman 
possesses significant rights to her deceased husband’s estate as well as rights to 
her deceased father’s and mother’s property equal to her brother(s), in contrast to 
Hindu and Muslim inheritance practices. The law specifies that one-third of the 
deceased man’s property should go to his widow, and equal shares of the 
remainder (two-thirds) to his daughters and sons (Section 33).  
The non-state law: The Code of Canon Law 
The Code of Canon Law, which is non-state in nature, is applicable to the Catholic 
community. The main area of the Code of Canon Law, which conflicts with the 
state law, is divorce or dissolution of marriage. For Catholics, marriage is a 
sacrament and according to the Code of Canon Law, divorce is not allowed for 
Catholics. Although the Divorce Act, 1869, provides them with a civil remedy, 
                                                 
13 For relevant sections of the Divorce Act, 1869, see Appendix E. 
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divorce under this Act is not accepted by the Catholic Church.  According to the 
Code of Canon Law, annulment of a marriage is permitted.  
However, significant differences between divorce and annulment exist and these 
two concepts are not interchangeable. In the Catholic Church, a valid marriage is 
indissoluble. A few elements have to be fulfilled to call a marriage valid: first, it 
has to be contracted by two baptised (in a Catholic Church) parties; and second 
the union has to be ratified and consummated (Can. 1061). Any ratified and 
consummated marriage is absolutely indissoluble even the church has no power 
to break this bond. According to Colaco (2008), in one single circumstance, a 
marriage can be dissolved by the Roman Pontiff, where the marriage has not been 
consummated (Can. 1142).   
Unlike divorce or the dissolution of a marriage, where a valid marriage is 
dissolved, an annulment brings in a different meaning and action, where the 
marriage is declared to be legally null and void. In other words, in the case of 
annulment, the church “declares that there no marriage existed between the 
parties concerned” (Appathurai 2012, 74). Although it might appear to the world 
that divorce or dissolution of marriage and annulment have similar consequences 
in the everyday lives of the concerned parties, legally this is not the case. 
In the case of the nullity of a marriage, the civil law (The Divorce Act, 1869) and 
the Canon Law have somewhat similar grounds. According to the Divorce Act, 
1869 (Section 19), the grounds on which the decree of the nullity of a marriage 
can be made are: first, if the respondent was impotent at the time of marriage; 
second, the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity; 
third, either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of marriage; and fourth, the 
former husband or wife of either party was living and their previous marriage was 
in force at the time of the marriage. However, the Act states that “Nothing in this 
section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court Division to make decrees of 
nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained 
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by force or fraud” (Section 19). Therefore, the Divorce Act. 1869, is significant as 
regards the consent of marriage from either party. 
Similarly, under the Canon Law, a marriage can be declared null because of 
diriment impediments (Cans. 1083-1094), due to the absence of canonical form 
(Cans. 1108), or due to defect or lack of consent (Cans. 1095-1103). According to 
Colaco (2008, 38), “Diriment impediments are of Divine right and are those which 
the supreme authority in the church authentically declares when the divine law 
prohibits or invalidates a marriage (Can. 1075-1)”. Diriment impediments deal 
with the minimum age of marriage, impotence, a person bounded by a previous 
marriage, persons related within prohibited degrees of consanguinity, affinity or 
adoption, among other things. A defect or lack of adequate consent includes lack 
of capacity, i.e., lack of sufficient use of reason, lack of due discretion and inability 
to assume essential obligations of marriage (Can. 1095); lack of knowledge, i.e., 
ignorance (Can. 1096), defect in knowledge, i.e., error (Can. 1097 & 1099), and 
fraud (Can. 1098); and defect of will, i.e., simulation (Can. 1101), conditional 
consent (Can. 1102), and force and grave fear (Can. 1103). The process of 
annulment is conducted by an Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal14, which I 
discuss below. 
Available non-state forums for Christian women 
Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal  
In the Catholic Church, the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal is the forum 
where Catholic marriages may go through an annulment process and can be 
declared null and void. However, to reach this forum, the parties have to go 
through a number of mechanisms and forums within the Catholic Church. 
According to the Catholic Church, no matter how serious the marital problems 
are, there is plenty of guidance available in the church in order to repair and deal 
                                                 
14 I will also call it ‘the Tribunal’ interchangeably.  
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with issues (Palma 2009). One such path is forgiveness that is capable of 
restoring a healthy conjugal life in the church’s view. In the Catholic Church, 
marriage cannot be broken at any cost. So, there should be no thoughts beyond 
reunion and reconciliation (Palma 2009).   
As part of the annulment process, the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal 
accepts only those cases that provide enough indication that they possess 
adequate grounds for annulment. One of the common qualifiers for a case to 
enter into the annulment process of the Tribunal is defective consent of the 
marriage. If the Tribunal can find that before the marriage the consent of either 
party was defective, the Tribunal may declare the marriage null and void.  
During fieldwork, I found two Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunals operate in 
Bangladesh: One is the Dhaka Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal, which is 
comprised of Dhaka, Chittagong, Mymensingh, and Sylhet Dioceses, and the 
other is the Rajshahi Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal, which is comprised of 
Rajshahi, Dinajpur, and Khulna Dioceses. The Archbishop is the Moderator of the 
Dhaka Tribunal. There is a Judicial Vicar, who has four other Judges under him 
(all of them priests) and there are two more defenders of the bond, who protect 
and attempt to reconcile the marital bond.  Once the decision of annulment is 
made, then the Tribunal sends the verdict to the other Tribunal for ratification, 
which works as the Appellate Tribunal for that case. The whole process takes 
between one and a half to two years.  
Before being accepting by the Tribunal, a case has to be forwarded by the 
respective paal purohit (parish priest) after an identification and certification 
processes at the parish level. If the paal purohit finds that the marriage is broken 
and there is no scope for reconciliation, only then he will forward the case to the 
Tribunal. But if reconciliation is possible then he attempts to achieve it. But if the 
case cannot be reconciled, then the paal purohit examines the merits of that 
particular case, determining if the issues will fall under the Canon law.  
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After a case is being accepted by the Tribunal for trial, the members of the 
Tribunal collect as much background information as they can from and about 
both parties. If they see that the case is genuine and has merits, then they ask the 
party to apply to the Tribunal and provide the relevant documentation. Also, the 
Tribunal examines the marriage consent papers of both parties from their 
respective dharmapalli (parish). After all these, the Tribunal examines the merits 
of the case and makes the final decision as to whether the application of 
annulment should be accepted or not. If the couple has any children from this 
void marriage, they (the couple) are advised by the Tribunal to go to the civil law 
for the custody settlement.  
Counselling centre 
The other mechanism that the Catholic Church actively deploys in order to 
address marital issues is counselling. Since the beginning of the 2010s, a 
dedicated counselling centre has been launched in Dhaka city. Before the 
counselling centre was established, the parish priests provided counselling to 
their respective church members. The counselling centre works to make 
marriages last and to help the Catholic community to hold its families together. 
The centre is run under the directorial leadership of the Judicial Vicar of the 
Tribunal of Dhaka. In the counselling centre, six couples work as counsellor 
couples. As this is the only counselling centre in Bangladesh for Catholics, 
Catholic men and women from all over the country come here for their services. 
Within the Protestant churches, counselling is not conducted as formally as in 
the Catholic Church. However, informal pastoral counselling is conducted by 
most of the priests and/or their wives when needed.  
Church councils and committees   
Every Catholic Church in Bangladesh has a committee on family issues and the 
local church members go to their respective priests in their dharmapalli (parish) 
with their issues. The priest sometimes takes the cases of the church members to 
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these committees or directly sends them to the counselling centre or to the 
Tribunal.  
Although the Catholic Church has established functionaries and mechanisms to 
deal with marital disputes, the Protestant churches do not have any uniform 
system in place to address similar issues. In most cases, the church councils deal 
with marital disputes and their related matters. Often ad hoc committees are 
formed in these churches in order to address such issues. During fieldwork, I 
found that recently a national church body had taken the initiative to create 
concrete rules and regulations with regard to marriage and its dissolution within 
the Protestant churches in order to have uniform policies or guidelines that the 
church body believes would help the local churches.  
The Christian personal law reform committee 
A committee, led by the National Council of Churches of Bangladesh (NCCB), 
working on the Christian personal law reform, has been active since 2003. 
According to a report by the General Secretary of NCCB, the organizations and 
individuals in Bangladesh, who worked in the area of the reform of religion-based 
personal laws, have made in-depth studies of the laws relating to the various 
religious communities of Bangladesh including minority Hindu, Christian, and 
Buddhist laws (NCCB 2011). The committee was divided into four groups to study 
the existing Christian civil laws: the Marriage Act, 1872, the Divorce Act, 1869, the 
Succession Act, 1925, and the Adoption Acts of other religious groups were 
thoroughly examined. The committee also consulted with the process that was 
followed in Sri Lanka and India to reform their Christian personal laws. 
Currently, the committee has submitted drafts of amendments to three laws: The 
Marriage Act, 1872, the Divorce Act, 1869, the Succession Act, 1925 to the 
Bangladesh government’s Law Commission. Moreover, a proposed draft of a new 
bill of the Christian Adoption and Maintenance Act has also been submitted to 
government’s Law Commission by this committee.  
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Mediation and Legal Aid Organisations 
There is a number of national human rights- and women’s rights-based 
mediation and legal aid organisations in Bangladesh that are functioning as non-
state forums for promoting women’s legal rights. Feminist and human rights 
movements in Bangladesh go back to the country’s inception as a nation-state. 
According to Kabeer (1988), the first feminist consciousness in newly-born 
Bangladesh began its journey by working on the issues of the rape and torture of 
women from all classes both by the Pakistani military during the Liberation War 
and then by the home-grown paramilitary force called Rakkhi Bahini (Kabeer 
1988). Even today, one of the top priorities of feminist groups and human rights 
organisations is to eradicate violence against women. But these movements also 
expanded their work towards other vital areas of women’s lives, such as the legal 
realm.  
The national human rights- and women’s rights-based organisations provide 
women with mediation services and legal aid. These organisations are secular in 
nature and provide their services to all women, including Christian women in 
Bangladesh. They facilitate a number of legal interventions, including shalish 
(mediation) and provide legal aid services. One of these organisations is 
Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP). BMP is a right-based activist voluntary 
women’s organization with more than 135,000 general members, which was 
established in 1970. BMP, currently operating through 61 district branches around 
the country with 2278 local units at the grassroots level, has been playing an 
important role in providing legal assistance and training to women since the 
1980s.  
Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) is another pioneer national legal aid and human rights 
organisation that provides legal and social support to the disempowered, 
particularly women. Among many other activities to promote human rights, ASK 
lawyers resolve disputes through mediation or litigation in ten legal aid clinics in 
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Dhaka, as well as in another seven districts in partnership with seven local NGOs. 
Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) is one of the leading legal 
services organizations, currently operating in 19 districts across the country, and 
is the only one that provides access to legal aid across the spectrum from the 
frontlines of the formal justice system to the apex court. Alongside individual 
legal aid, BLAST undertakes strategic litigation, or public interest litigation, as a 
key part of its advocacy for law and policy reforms to ensure the effective legal 
protection of rights. The Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association 
(BNWLA), established in 1979, aims to promote the rights and status of women 
lawyers alongside fighting for access to justice for all women and children, 
particularly for the most disadvantaged women and children in Bangladesh.  
The only faith-based Christian women’s movement in the country is the Young 
Women’s Christian Association (YWCA). With an affiliation with the World 
YWCA, the movement has developed in Bangladesh as a non-profit voluntary 
women’s organization since 1961. Since then it has been working for the 
empowerment and development of the lives of women, girls, and children 
irrespective of their religious backgrounds. The YWCA also provides some legal 
support for women. For Christian women in Bangladesh, the above organisations 
and movements are available as non-state and non-religious forums where they 
can seek support in relation to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody.   
Conclusion 
The complexities that arise with the conflicting laws, including conflicts between 
state laws, non-state laws and various forums available to women, are many. 
Clearly, these multiple complexities are created as a result of the co-existence of 
the state and non-state laws, the church, and secular forums, such as women’s 
and human rights movements. The legal context of Bangladesh, including the 
Constitution, the legal system, and then the personal laws are gendered. The 
comparative analysis of three different personal laws — Muslim, Hindu, and 
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Christian — that I have presented shows how women are discriminated against in 
all three laws. However, further complications arise when non-state laws, such as 
the Code of Canon Law for Christians, come into play. The Catholic community is 
specifically subject to the Code of Canon Law under the Catholic Church, which 
has conflicting provisions compared to the Christian personal law of the state. At 
the same time, women also have access to various forums, both church-based and 
secular, apart from the courts of the state, where they can seek various legal 
remedies. Such co-existence of multiple laws and forums available for women 
accentuates the complexities of a situation of legal pluralism in a postcolonial 
state such as Bangladesh. This analysis will provide a background for the rest of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter Four 
Intimate colonisation and resilient patriarchy: 
Christianisation and law creation 
Introduction 
Colonisation of the Indian subcontinent has impacted most people in many ways. 
My family was also one of those that was impacted by colonisation through 
conversion. In the beginning of the 20th century, my borobaba (great-grandfather) 
Dr Srimanta Das and his wife converted to Christianity after being inspired by Ms 
A. Arnold, a missionary of the Australian Baptist Mission, who had training in 
medical science and was running her clinic in Ataikula, Pabna. Dr Das was also a 
medical doctor, originally from a Hindu family of Dhaka, but he later settled in 
Sujanagar, Pabna. Dr Das and his wife, my boromaa (great-grandmother), came 
in contact of Ms Arnold when he took his wife to Ms Arnold for delivering their 
first child. Ms Arnold’s teaching attracted both my borobaba and his wife and 
they converted to Christianity. But the other high caste Hindu leaders of 
Sujanagar could not accept their conversion and they made efforts to kill him (Dr 
Das). So Dr Das had to flee from Sujanagar and travelled by ship working as a 
doctor for a year before he could come back to Sujanagar after his brother-in-law 
used his influence to settle the matter with the local Hindu leaders.   
Similar to many other colonisations worldwide, the British colonisation of the 
Indian subcontinent also perpetuated the idea that ‘native’ Indians were inferior, 
backward, and barbaric, who needed to be ‘improved’, ‘developed’, and hence 
‘civilized’. It was almost a ‘self-justified duty’ of British rulers, who had the 
burden to ‘civilize’ the ‘natives’ (Mann 2004b). Therefore, as part of bearing such 
‘duty’, the Indian population was situated in variations of master-servant, 
teacher-pupil, parent-child, or as Nandy (1983) calls it, a husband-wife 
relationship that explained the imposition of discipline, education, and 
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upbringing. This relationship between the coloniser and the colonised was the 
essence of the ‘civilizing mission’ of British rulers (Mann 2004b). It became 
logical for the British to reform administration as well as to establish legal 
institutions and to formulate legislation. In other words, as Mann (2004b) argues, 
civilization was replaced with the terms rule of law and good governance. 
In this chapter, I show how the ‘native’ Christian identity in British India was 
shaped through colonisation, Christianisation, and the personal law creation 
processes. The chapter is based on historical accounts of the Christianisation 
processes during British colonisation and my archival research in the Bishop’s 
College in Kolkata. In this chapter, I argue that the Bengali, as well as other 
Christians in undivided India, including pre-British converts, became the subject 
of a civilizing mission in a more intimate way than other religious groups, such as 
Hindus and Muslims. I call it an ‘intimate colonisation’, where ‘native’ Christians 
encountered a specific kind of colonisation that changed their everyday lives in a 
two-fold process, through Christianisation, and through law creation. In such 
processes of intimate colonisation, local Christians became intimate targets of 
colonisation. Through their civilising mission, British rulers attempted to ‘rescue’ 
the Indian Christians1 from their situation, whom British rulers thought 
uncivilised. First, the British did so by conversion, as the anecdote exemplifies, 
then, by an inculturation process through which they attempted to change 
‘native’ Christians’ traditional practices and lifestyles, and finally, by creating 
personal laws for them that govern marriage, divorce, inheritance, and 
guardianship.  
I argue that ‘native’ Christians were the only group on which the colonial powers 
acted directly to craft and mould their lives and provided the group a new 
identity. But such identity creation was not a one-way process of intimate 
colonisation of the local Christian community by the British; instead, a range of 
negotiations between ‘native’ Christians and colonial rulers took place 
throughout history that made the identity of the colonised a ‘negotiated identity’. 
                                                 
1 By the term ‘Indian Christians’, I mean ‘native’ Christians in pre-partitioned India.  
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This chapter shows the intimate colonisation processes and the negotiation of 
identity creation through three major sections. In the first section, I show how 
the Christianisation processes led by the colonial rulers modified the traditions, 
customs, and lifestyle of ‘native’ Christians and how these processes made them 
intimately colonised. The second section deals with the processes of law creation, 
particularly with regard to inheritance, marriage, and divorce that reinforced the 
intimate colonisation processes. In this section, I critically analyse the history of 
personal law creation processes that was highly contested and negotiated. This 
law creation and negotiation processes were not gender-neutral; instead, it was 
highly gendered. The negotiation processes implicitly restored, reinforced, and 
reproduced patriarchy.  
It is important to note, however, that I do not seek the usual interpretation of 
Bengalis or Indians as colonial subjects of oppression and their resistance, but 
emphasise the negotiation processes to establish their claims from the state 
(Mann 2004a). Colonised subjects were not passive, but instead, they operated as 
active agents to negotiate the law-making processes in order to reinstate 
patriarchy. Women, on the other hand, became subjects of colonisation by the 
British while remaining subjects of patriarchy by their own men. In this way, 
colonisation has multifaceted complexity. The British created personal law, ‘in 
the image’ of their own laws, in order to create ‘civilised’ subjects of the colonies 
in South Asia. But at the same time, these rulers were bargaining with patriarchal 
agents and accommodating patriarchal values. Thus women from minority 
communities were being doubly jeopardised: by the external, as well as the 
internal ‘rulers’.  
In this chapter, I portray a case that deals with the contestation, negotiation, and 
resistance between a church body and ‘native’ Christians with regard to the issue 
of marrying one’s deceased wife’s sister. For more than a quarter of a century, 
‘native’ Christians struggled to regain their right, which they had before the 
creation of personal laws, for a man to marry his deceased wife’s sister. These 
marriages were common within broader Indian society. By analysing the case, I 
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show that on the one hand, the negotiations aimed to restore the long-term 
practice that was culturally appropriate and accepted by the society, and on the 
other, the negotiations restored and reproduced patriarchy and hence increased 
the resilience of patriarchy. I use the term ‘resilience’ in order to show that 
patriarchy as a system holds the power or ability to return to the original form 
and position after being bent or compressed. In the case of marriage with one’s 
deceased wife’s sister, I argue that patriarchy, as an active system, negotiates 
through ‘native’ Christians to be restored and reproduced and become resilient.  
Intimate colonisation through Christianisation processes 
The processes of Christianisation and the creation of the Christian community in 
Bengal is not a detached event; instead, it is intertwined with all Indian history of 
Christianity. Although many people associate Christianity and Christianisation 
processes in India with its colonial history, India had indeed a long history of 
Christianity since its pre-colonial time. In pre-partitioned India, Christianity 
existed for nearly 20 centuries, long before it was introduced in many European 
countries (Fernando and Gispert-Sauch 2004). Although the early Christians in 
undivided India were well-integrated with Hindu society, the integration broke 
down with the intervention of Portuguese traders, followed by the British Raj, 
which provided both Christianisation processes and Christian identity a new 
form, with a colonial packaging. The earliest form of Christianity in India grew 
naturally as part of the broader society. However, later, when India was 
colonised, Christianity was alienated from the broader society and Christian 
identity took a hybrid form with a blend of both colonial and ‘native’ Christian 
practices. I argue that such a hybrid Christian identity enabled the colonisers to 
intimately colonise ‘native’ Christians. In the processes of intimate colonisation, 
how were women situated and positioned?  How did women negotiate their 
colonised subjectivity along with that of their male counterparts? This section 
addresses these questions.   
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Pre-colonial Christianity in India 
The Apostle St. Thomas, one of the twelve disciples of Christ, arrived in India to 
preach Christianity a few years after Christ’s crucifixion (Fernando and Gispert-
Sauch 2004). During that period many Jewish traders were already living 
permanently for their commerce and trade in Punjab and Sindh Province in the 
western part of pre-partitioned India as well as in the coastal areas of Konkan and 
Malabar in the south-western region. As Sarker (2002) describes, in the first 
century, the Raja (King) of Punjab, Gondophares, sent a Jewish trader to 
Palestine to bring a few skilled carpenters to ornate his capital Taxila. When the 
Jewish trader arrived in Palestine, he converted to Christianity after being 
touched by the appealing speech of St. Paul and while coming back to India, he 
brought St. Thomas with him. Soon after St. Thomas arrived in the Malabar 
region in India, he began preaching among the Jews. He baptised many 
Namboodiri Brahmins in two villages (Fernando and Gispert-Sauch 2004). The 
impact of these conversions quickly spread all over the Malabar region and many 
people were converted by him. Gradually St. Thomas established seven churches 
in the Malabar region by 52 CE (Sarker 2002). Therefore, fundamentally, 
Christianity in India is an ancient heritage religion of about two thousand years. 
As soon as St. Thomas arrived in India, he integrated himself into the society and 
culture of India. His lifestyle became similar to an Indian shannyashi (monk). 
Therefore, he was often called ‘Thomas Shannyashi’ by common people, 
irrespective of whether they were Hindus or Christians (Sarker 2002). Hindus 
converted to Christianity by Thomas Shannyashi kept their original Hindu 
names. Thomas did not interfere in the caste system of the Hindu community. 
Therefore, the convert Christians in India remained within the sphere of the 
Hindu caste system by recreating the castes Brahmin Christians and non-
Brahmin Christians, and their eating, drinking, clothing, manners, and everyday 
lifestyle went on according to Hinduism.  
The seven churches built by St. Thomas resembled Hindu temples (Sarker 2002). 
Many similarities between performing rituals in those churches in Malabar and in 
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Indian temples remained. For example, washing the hands and face before going 
to the church, entering the church bare-footed, bowing by shastanga2, 
worshiping with incense, and so on were practised both in Hinduism and 
Christianity. During this period, the Churches and their rituals and worship took 
the form of the Syrian rite or liturgy. Hence these churches are known as Syrian 
churches (Fernando and Gispert-Sauch 2004). In this way, Christians in Malabar 
became a separate caste in the Hindu caste system with a different religion from 
Hinduism. Non-Christians in these areas did not consider Christianity to be a 
foreign religion, and Christianity grew naturally for about 15 centuries. The main 
reasons for this natural growth are that Christianity flourished during this early 
period without disturbing the existing social fabric, and by finding a space within 
the existing cultural system.  
Re-arrival of Christianity with Portuguese traders 
The Portuguese, who were mostly Roman Catholics, came to India in 1498 for 
trade and conquest, with an initial intention of trading spices from India by using 
local Christians as intermediaries (Fernando and Gispert-Sauch 2004). However, 
the Portuguese traders found that Christianity took a different form in India from 
their own practices with a high prevalence of Hindu culture. They were 
astonished to see weddings without wedding-ring but instead, with a mangal 
sutra, where the groom ties a small cord round the bride’s neck. Moreover, they 
were astounded to see that churches resembled temples and not the structure of 
churches in Portugal and that priests were allowed to get married.  
In seeing all these, the Portuguese decided to bring these Indian Christians to the 
“right path” — “the Latin way!” (Fernando and Gispert-Sauch 2004, 76). As a 
result, Portuguese missionaries began to come to India and through the 
Padroado Portuguese3 contract, Christianity re-arrived in India, protected by the 
                                                 
2 A form of respectful salutation by touching the ground with six body parts such as forehead, 
toes, knees, hands, chin, and nose. 
3 The Pope Leo X signed a contract with the Portuguese King, which is commonly known as the 
Padroado Portuguese (Sarker 2002). According to this contract the Portuguese King will preserve 
all the power to establish new Christian missions and Diocese and administer them. The contract 
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Portuguese crown. As part of their Christianisation project, the Portuguese 
devoted themselves to creating a similar (but not equal) Christian community to 
theirs. In this way, the Portuguese missionaries introduced the Latin liturgy in 
their churches in India, without considering the fact that Indian tradition and 
culture was completely different. Instead, they imposed the Christianity that was 
formed in the mould of European culture and cult practices on ‘native’ Christians. 
The missionaries were cautious to exclude the caste system of Hindu society. 
They took several measures so that the caste system was not reproduced within 
the new Christian community. As a result, they attempted to uproot these new 
converts socially from the broader Hindu society. 
Sarker (2002) has described the efforts of deleting the traces of Hinduism in 
detail. He shows, in Bengal, how the missionaries attempted to erase ‘native’ 
Christians’ original Bengali names that represent their caste and replaced them 
with a new Portuguese name and a surname, often the missionary’s own 
surname. Until today, many Bengali Catholics use these Portuguese surnames, 
such as Gomes, Gonsalves, Rozario, D’Rozario, D’Cruze, Costa, D’Costa, and 
many more. Moreover, they forced the Bengali Christians to eat beef and pork 
and drink alcohol, which was never part of their diet as Hindus. They also 
attempted to change their clothing to Western clothing. They instructed them to 
boycott every social norm and custom that came from Hinduism, including 
attending any Hindu puja, or festival, or reading Hindu scripture.  
By interfering with day-to-day life, the Christianisation project of the Portuguese 
created a new identity that did not exist earlier. Bengali Christian women were 
prohibited from wearing shakha-sidoor4. The new kin terms that were introduced 
to replace the Bangla words. For instance, they replaced dharma baba (godfather) 
with padu, dharma maa (godmother) with madi, kaka (uncle) with putu, dada 
                                                 
also says that without the approval of the Portuguese King, even Pope cannot give any order 
anywhere in India and all the missionaries can only travel India by Portuguese ships (Sarker 
2002).  
4 Shakha are white bangles of conch-shell and sindoor (also called sidur) is vermilion, which is 
applied on the parting of the hair, which are considered the signs of married women and they no 
longer can wear shakha-sidur when they become widow (Bhattacharyya 2011). 
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(elder brother) with nanu, didi (elder sister) with mana, and so on, which are still 
common among Catholics in some parts of Bangladesh (Sarker 2002). Such 
processes alienated the local Christians from their parent broader Hindu society 
and made them outcasts. It was absolutely unimaginable for non-Christians to 
see Christians worshiping in the church whilst wearing shoes, sitting on chairs or 
benches. The beauty of the church, the soothing tune of the organ, and the 
Gregorian chants also astonished them. Therefore, during the Portuguese period, 
in the eyes of the non-Christians of India, Christianity became shaheber dhormo, 
the religion of white people, and the Indian Christians became kala firingi, the 
black foreigner. 
Moreover, patriarchal rules dominated the Portuguese era. For example, the 
general Portuguese soldiers, who had been coming to India since Vasco da 
Gama’s5 time, did not have permission to bring their wives and families from 
home. They were also not allowed to marry Indian women and, moreover, no 
ordinary Portuguese women were allowed to come to India. These restrictions 
resulted in the continuous oppression of Indian women by Portuguese soldiers. 
However, later at one point, the Portuguese King declared that Portuguese men 
were allowed to marry Indian women. After the declaration, as Fernando and 
Gispert-Sauch (2004) shows, many Portuguese soldiers married Indian women 
and settled in India permanently.  
Colonised Christianisation during the British Raj 
After the Portuguese, in the beginning of the 17th century, the East India 
Company came to India. In 1757, the Polashir Juddho, the Battle of Plassey, was a 
decisive victory of the British East India Company over the Nawab6 of Bengal and 
his French allies and slowly they took over the governing power to rule Bengal 
(Marshall 1987). The British wanted to make sure that people of Bengal did not go 
against the East India Company. Therefore, in order to keep them content, they 
ensured that ‘natives’ did not face any obstacle in practising their traditional 
                                                 
5 A great Portuguese explorer; the first European to reach India by sea. 
6 A ‘native’ governor during the time of the Mughal Empire. 
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religion and religious rituals and festivals. While doing so, the British patronised 
both Hindu and Muslim communities by allocating funds to repair or re-build 
old temples and mosques. Primarily in Bengal, the East India Company had no 
intention of expanding Christianity; instead, as Marshall (1987) points out, the 
Company’s main agenda was to establish their own position to expand their 
business and earn vast profits.  
British rulers feared that if missionaries arrived in Bengal, while preaching 
Christianity, and somehow they criticized, demeaned, or talked against Hinduism 
and Islam, the common people might become hostile towards the British. Hence, 
they made every effort to prevent the arrival of missionaries in Bengal, along with 
other parts of pre-partitioned India (Jayawardena 1995). But the missionaries, 
particularly from the Protestant groups, began to come to Bengal without the 
government’s approval, and in Jayawardena’s (1995, 22) words, “followed the flag 
and began the task of proselytizing the ‘heathens’”. Later, in 1813, the Charter Act 
of 1813 was approved by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, after which there 
were no restrictions on missionary operation in Bengal (Marshall 1987). As a 
result, a number of churches in different places was formed. Datta (1992) points 
out that after the Charter Act of 1813 was passed, a number of missionary 
societies, such as the Baptist Missionary Society (BMS), Church Missionary 
Society (CMS), London Missionary Society (LMS), and Wesleyan Methodist 
Missionary Society (WMMS) amongst others came to pre-partitioned India.  
The notion of ‘morality’ played a crucial role in conversion. The English 
missionaries had negative ideas about ‘natives’. The negative views and attitudes 
towards ‘natives’ also affected Bengal broadly. Charles Grant, a high-ranking 
official of the East India Company, who was also a Member of Parliament in 
England and an influential leader of the Church Missionary Society, was largely 
responsible for creating this negativity among the English missionaries. He wrote 
in his book titled Observations on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects 
of Great Britain that both Bengali Hindus and Muslims did not have any 
trustworthiness, honesty and there was no trace of faith in their lifestyle (Grant 
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1797). In Grant’s opinion, they were deceptive and dishonest, whereas Muslims 
were bigger traitors than Hindus. According to Grant (1797), only Western 
education could bring drastic changes in such a situation and then the local 
Hindus and Muslims can be converted into Christians.   
Most of the British missionaries were influenced by Grant’s theory and criticized 
Hindus and Muslims as well as ‘native’ Christians, those who were leading their 
lives as Hindus in practising religious rituals. For instance, prominent missionary 
William Carey7 wrote in 1800 as cited by Potts (1967, 6), “It is not to be thought 
that the moral character of people should be better than that of their Gods … the 
Hindoos … are literally sunk into the dregs of vice”. These missionaries strongly 
believed that the native religions were the main causes of backwardness of the 
local population. So in order to build them as a civilized society, first the ‘natives’ 
should be converted to Christianity. These missionaries reported back to England 
about ‘native’ Hindus and Muslims and presented them as uncivilized and semi-
barbarian, so that the missionaries could continue to have help, support, and 
financial contributions from the English (Sarker 2002).   
Conversions to Christianity had a gendered dimension. According to Jayawardena 
(1995), the earliest missionary activities in India began with the conversion of 
boys who were trained to become ‘native’ preachers. Mukerji (2013) also argues in 
a study of the socio-cultural development and growth of educated Bengali 
Christian community in colonial Bengal that the first converts to the Christian 
missionaries were men, as according to the prevalent social conditions only men 
came into contact with the outside world. Men were dominant figures in every 
household; women sometimes followed in the footsteps of the master of the 
house or the husband or son, who had been baptised. Mukerji (2013) further 
argues that usually the particular male convert of the family was ostracised both 
from the family and from Hindu society. If he was a married man, he would have 
                                                 
7 Rev. William Carey was the first English missionary in Bengal in 1793 and he significantly 
contributed in the development of Bangla literature, including the translation into and printing of 
the Bible in Bangla (Sarker 2002). 
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to forsake his wife who was expected to live the rest of her life as a Hindu widow 
(Mukerji 2013). 
According to Jayawardena (1995), the missionary activities had important 
consequences for local women. Missionaries thought that women were even 
more degraded than men and in need of salvation. As a result, Christianity 
through these missionary activities took over additional roles in challenging and 
changing women’s status and realising their rights. Therefore, from the 1820s 
onward, missionaries established girls’ schools and convents in most of the major 
cities and towns in colonial India, mostly providing primary and in some cases 
secondary education (Jayawardena 1995). The main purpose of educating the girls 
was simply to make the girls educated to become ‘good wives’. For urban girls, 
missionaries educated them by teaching them English so that they could qualify 
to become wives of rich urban people. On the other hand, in rural settings the 
girls were taught how to become wives of farmers by acquiring the skills to 
perform everyday household chores, such as cooking, sewing, taking care of 
children, serving their husbands and the in-laws, amongst other things. Through 
this teaching, the central goals for women were emphasised for their marriage 
and motherhood, where “spinsters were regarded as failures” (Sen 2002, 3). 
However, the higher education of women was discouraged and it was often 
argued that it was harmful to women’s health. However, as Sen (2002, 4) argues, 
women’s labour was only required in the poorly paid employment of governesses, 
teachers, tutors or missionaries, and “insufficiently educated ‘spinsters’” were 
assigned to these roles. Therefore, according to Sen (2002, 4), “[T]he colonies 
which were seen as a source of possible employment and livelihood for men were 
equally viewed as offering ‘spinsters’ opportunities for marriage or for 
employment as governesses or missionaries”.   
Jayawardena (1995) argues that these mission schools challenged tradition and 
local practices as part of their civilising mission and through these processes they 
brought up girls with a sense of cleanliness, modesty in their behaviour and 
dress, who were caring, pious, anxious to keep their children from bad morals 
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and the corruption of the ‘heathens’. But simultaneously in the processes, they 
also created many professional women, female activists, and feminists in South 
Asia. Mukerji (2013) argues that the burgeoning educated Bengali Protestant 
community was a consequence of missionary activities in the 19th century and the 
new trends of thought that the missionaries brought with them affected the 
Bengali concept of patriarchy and the traditional Bengali notions of a woman and 
her social status and responsibilities, which changed considerably among the 
entire educated urban Bengalis.  
Besides education, missionaries also had a large impact on healthcare services in 
India. Mukerji (2013) argues that when the missionaries came to India, healthcare 
facilities were scarce and primitive as compared to their (missionaries) own 
methods. Therefore, it was easy to win over physically distressed people through 
dedicated medical service. Upper-class citizens, who could afford expensive 
medical care, would seek professional help and if they called in a European 
doctor would not entertain religious instruction alongside a diagnosis of 
infirmity. However, Mukerji (2013) further argues that women of the upper 
classes, who remained confined within the four walls of their zenanas8, needed a 
physician to visit them when ailing or in labour. Hence women missionaries with 
medical training were the most appropriate individuals for the propagation of 
Christianity in the zenanas.  
However, even when many activities and strategies were deployed, the 
conversion project of the British was not successful, according to Sarker (2002). 
Missionaries continued their efforts to convert non-Christians to Christianity. But 
the failure of the conversion project complicated the situation of existing ‘native’ 
Christians. I have mentioned earlier that British imperial interests were more 
inclined towards production and exchange relations. In such a context, 
Christianity came with a dual mission: conversion and modernisation 
(Jayawardena 1995). As missionaries did not see much success in converting 
people, they concentrated more on their second role, modernisation, where they 
                                                 
8 The part of a house for the seclusion of women. 
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made enormous efforts to break traditional beliefs and customs by imposing 
Western systems and values on local people. Clearly, when their conversion 
mission failed, missionaries lost their control over non-Christians. So their every 
effort to fulfil their role to modernise the society concentrated on ‘native’ 
Christians — thus making the colonisation more intimate.    
But how did missionaries impose their modernisation efforts on ‘native’ 
Christians? The British missionaries attempted to alter the converts’ everyday 
lives and make them European-like. Eating beef, drinking alcohol, wearing 
Western clothing such as trousers, shirts, and suits, and eating with ceramic 
crockery by using cutlery on a dining table were introduced to the ‘natives’ 
(Sarker 2002). Even the clothing of Christian women was influenced by Victorian 
fashion. Moreover, following Western practices, they also began to use curtains 
in their homes, wear shoes inside their houses, and so on. Wedding ceremonies 
began to take place in the church. The dress of the groom became coat and 
trousers and that of the bride became a white saree or gown, gloves on the hands 
and a white veil on the head. Wedding ceremonies began to be conducted in 
English in many churches (Sarker 2002). The missionaries ensured that these new 
converts did not have any traces of Hinduism in their lives.  
Through Christianisation processes (both conversion and modernisation), a new 
social stratification emerged in colonial India. This new layer was not necessarily 
based on caste, but instead, the layering was based on relations between ‘native’ 
Christians and the rulers. Through this stratification, ‘native’ Christians became 
outcasts in the eyes of the broader Hindu community. But at the same time, they 
still remained ‘black’ or ‘native’ in the eyes of the English people, although these 
local Christians had accustomed themselves to Western customs and norms. As a 
result, a new blended form of identity emerged, presenting a mixture of Indian 
and Western culture.  
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Intimate colonisation through law creation processes 
Intimate colonisation has affected ‘native’ Christians not only through 
Christianisation processes but also through the state-building initiatives, such as 
law-making. The historical analysis of Christian personal laws (also known as 
family laws) in British India, compared to that of other personal laws, captures 
the overt complexity of the socio-legal situation within the ‘native’ Christian 
community. It also identifies the negotiation that took place within the processes 
to establish and provide a legal platform to ‘native’ Christians and their identity, 
which was often contested and competed over. 
The notion of ‘respect for law’ was brought in by the British, which was evident in 
their efforts towards law-making and establishing the ‘rule of law’. Partly, the 
‘respect for law’ that was introduced by the British led the minorities to demand 
separate laws for their groups. Moreover, according to Rajan (2003), personal law 
envisaged as a means of securing community identity and respecting religious 
difference. For this reason, since the 18th century, Christians in India had been 
demanding a separate set of laws. Through the Christianisation processes, ‘native’ 
Christians gained a new identity, but what they needed was legislation to 
establish the markers of community identities. Establishing their identities was 
one of the main reasons for ‘native’ Christians to claim their personal laws, which, 
they thought, would provide them with a stronger footing, a legal identity, as a 
community. 
In 1833, the East India Company’s charter was renewed by the British Parliament 
and it appointed a Law Commission to investigate and recommend 
improvements to laws of India. The Law Commission proposed a uniform law 
that was applicable to all classes of inhabitants of India (Cassels 2010). Such 
uniform law should be the lex loci9, or ‘law of the country’, applicable to every 
                                                 
9 The term lex loci came from the great philosophic Jurists of Rome who “devised a body of 
principles and distinctions for applying Equity and good Conscience to the complicated affairs of 
men” (Cassels 2010, 258). 
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citizen (Chatterjee 2010). However, before deciding upon lex loci, the British 
legislators faced the dilemma of whether they should have a uniform family code 
or religion-specific personal laws. However, unlike today, their focus was not 
women’s rights but the struggle that they had to go through was to “fit the legally 
defined categories of Muslim or Hindu” as, according to Chatterjee (2010, 1156, 
1164), “It was not a simple proposition to arrive at a ‘universal law’ which 
transcended the exotic differences of India”. 
There were two reasons for deciding on the issue of lex loci. Firstly, as part of its 
‘civilizing mission’, the British attempted to create and reform the legal 
institutions as well as laws, in which lex loci was the most logical choice. Secondly 
and finally, the British were careful to guarantee to their subjects in India the free 
exercise of their religion and to remain religion-neutral (Cassels 2010). The 
colonial rulers ensured to govern Indians in accordance with the existing 
practices and traditions in India since the beginning of British rule (Newbigin 
2009). Under such circumstances, the British colonisers did not want to disturb 
the religion-based legal practices and hence, again, lex loci was a safe choice, 
which itself seemed religion-neutral in nature. At the same time the Anglo-Hindu 
and Anglo-Muslim laws were created according to Hindu and Muslim practices 
and customs respectively, which provided these practices with a legal status in 
the modern sense (Mitra and Fischer 2002, Mallampalli 2010). The intention of 
the British rulers not to disturb Hindu and Muslim practices enabled Hindu and 
Muslim populations to be exempted from lex loci and simultaneously made 
Christians its only subject. In this way, Christians again became the subject of the 
intimate colonisation of the British Raj. As parts of lex loci, the Succession Act, 
the Marriage Act, and the Divorce Act were legislated, which I discuss below, and 
became instruments of intimate colonisation of the Christian community in 
undivided India.   
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The Succession Act  
In 1830, the Governor-General legislated called Regulation VII of 1832 of the 
Bengal Code to protect the civil rights of Indian convert Christians. Section IX of 
the Code states: 
[I]n any civil suit, the parties to such suit may be of different persuasions, 
when one party shall be of the Hindoo [Hindu], and the other of the 
Mahomedan [Muslim] persuasion, or where one or more parties to the suit 
shall not be either of the Mohamedan or Hindoo persuasions, the law of 
those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or 
parties of any property to which, but for the operation of such laws, they 
would have been entitled. (Bengal Regulation VII 1832, Section IX) 
The debate around Bengal Regulation made it clear that there was no personal 
law for Christians in place. Instead, they were situated in such an inconclusive 
position because, on the one hand, ‘native’ Christians were excluded both from 
the Hindu and Muslim jurisdictions as they did not belong to those religions; on 
the other, these Christians could not get remedy from the English law as they 
were not English. Following these petitions to the Law Commission from 
Christian missionaries from Calcutta (now Kolkata), Nagpore, and Bombay (now 
Mumbai) began arriving, making queries about laws governing marriage, divorce, 
and inheritance (Cassels 2010). Among them, a petition from the Bishop of 
Bombay in 1849 was the most effective. The Bishop argued that ‘native’ Christians 
had no protection of their civil rights and immunities under the existing state of 
laws. Cassels (2010) shows that Bishop’s letter included a number of case studies 
where many Christians, because of their conversion, were deprived of their share 
of inheritance.  
Finally, in response to these petitions, Act XXI entitled the Caste Disabilities 
Removal Act, 1850, was enacted, which states that no person should suffer the 
loss of rights they otherwise possessed because of a loss of caste. But this law was 
unable to create rights as it was a negative law that protected converts from 
losing their inheritance, whereas inheritance itself was a substantive right. Later, 
the Indian Succession Act, 1865, and then the Succession Act, 1925, were 
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legislated, which were mostly modelled on English law. These laws were 
originally meant to be a uniform law of inheritance in India. However, the law 
was not accepted by both Hindus and Muslims as it was not in line with their 
respective religious inheritance practices. The Parsis accepted only the section on 
wills. Therefore, Hindus, Muslims, and Parsis were exempted from this particular 
law and after exemption, it could only serve the Christian population (Chatterjee 
2010). In order to fulfil the civilizing mission of the British, the uniform law was 
seen as ideal. But instead of a uniform law, India received another set of personal 
laws for this particular community.  
Such law creation and negotiation processes were not gender-neutral. The gender 
impact of the new Indian Succession Act, 1925, was enormous. Unlike the Hindu 
and Muslim inheritance practices, under this law, women gained a significant 
right to their deceased husband’s property as well as rights to their deceased 
parents’ properties, equal to their brothers10. Women’s equal share of inheritance 
reduced the share of male members of the family, which resulted in a number of 
unsatisfied men. One can imagine that men were not eager to accept and 
embrace the law that “gave one-third of the male intestate’s property to his 
widow, and equal shares of the residue to daughters and sons, excluding the joint 
family consisting of male agnates” (Indian Succession Act 1865, Sections 29 & 30, 
Succession Act 1925, Section 33). It became clearer that Christian men, in 
particular, were not content with the new inheritance law in which they had to 
potentially lose a significant portion of their inheritance property, which they did 
not occur otherwise under the Hindu laws. Many men began to be vocal in 
complaining that this particular law restricted their otherwise ‘full rights’ under 
the Hindu inheritance laws, in spite of the lex loci of 1850 (Chatterjee 2010). 
However, many Christians in India continued to claim their inheritance rights as 
per the Hindu law in which some were denied while others were accepted. 
Although through the Succession Act, 1925, was a gender-equal law available for 
governing Christian inheritance, its implementation was not consistent within 
                                                 
10 For detailed analysis of the Succession Act 1925, see Chapter Three and Chapter Eight. 
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the community11. In fact, the social practices and attitudes of passing property 
down through the male line remained predominant. 
The Marriage Act 
The Act of Marriages in India, 1851, was another effort made by the British 
towards a uniform civil law. It was a law of purely civil marriage, under which at 
least one of the parties had to be Christian and both parties had to fulfil the 
necessary conditions of minimum age or consent of a guardian, the absence of a 
living spouse, not being related within prohibited degrees, and providing due 
notice to the Marriage Registrar. However, Chatterjee (2010) shows that the 
Indian Government objected to the requirement of parental consent in the case 
of under-age men and women, which it was thought might cause discrimination 
against Indian Christians. Being outcasts from their parents’ religious 
community, many ‘native’ Christians did not have parental consent for their 
marriages and they had to wait until they reached 21 years of age. However, 
according to local practice, the average age of marriage was significantly lower in 
19th century India. In most instances, girls even before reaching puberty were 
married, although the marriage was not consummated usually until after puberty 
(Gatwood 1985, Mandelbaum 1948). “Eleven years old and not married!” is the 
opening line of Himself: The Autobiography of a Hindu Lady which shows that it 
was shocking to see any unmarried girl around that age (Ranade and Gates 1938). 
Therefore, 21 years of age was unquestionably over age for marriage purposes.12  
In the following year, Act V of 1852 was legislated, which was, by and large, a 
reflection of the British Parliamentary law. Only in two sections of this law, 
namely VII and XII, the issues of ‘native’ Christians were mentioned to make sure 
that they were aware of the obligations arising out of marriage and particularly 
that of monogamy. Later in 1864, the Christian Marriage Act, 1864 provided a 
marriage law for India that enabled Indian Christians to have civil as well as 
                                                 
11 I address this issue in Chapter Eight. 
12 For detailed work on the age of consent see Anagol-McGinn (1992), Sarkar (1993), and Desai and 
Andrist (2010). 
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church marriages. But in the following year, this law was amended and the 
Christian Marriage Act, 1865, excluded the requirement of parental consent for all 
‘native’ Christians, following the Roman Catholic Church’s recommendation. The 
law also fully exempted Roman Catholics from Part V of this law, dealing only 
with the marriages of ‘native’ Christians (Part V, Clause 53).  
However, the President of the Bengal Christian Association, Reverend Krishna 
Mohan Banerjea, a Bengali scholar and a patriot who was converted to 
Christianity and later became an Anglican priest (Sarker 2002), criticized the 
removal of parental consent for marriages of under-aged parties (Chatterjee 
2010). Finally, the latest version of the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, re-
incorporated the requirement of parental consent until the age of 21, keeping the 
minimum ages of 13 and 16 for women and men respectively. Therefore, some 
traces of negotiations between the law-making colonisers and ‘native’ Christians 
can be found here. I will elaborate on such negotiation processes later in this 
chapter.    
The Divorce Act 
Conversion to Christianity by one spouse broke up many marriages as the non-
Christian spouse often abandoned the other and in many cases remarried. For 
example, Laxmibai Tilak, a writer and reformer in the late 19th century, did not 
convert initially to Christianity when her husband converted in 1895. She 
separated from him for a few years until she converted (Anagol 2010). However, 
unlike Laxmibai, when other spouses did not convert to Christianity the Christian 
spouse had to go through a lengthy procedure to break the marriage legally, 
sometimes lingering more than two or three years, to get permission for their 
remarriage in the church (Chatterjee 2010). Although this procedure was never 
legally formalised, it was working to some extent. However, it ended with the 
formulation of the Act of Marriages in India in 1851, followed by the Acts of 1864 
and 1865, which restricted marriages for Christians (including ‘native’ Christians) 
with a living spouse (Act of Marriages in India 1851, Christian Marriage Act 1864, 
1865). Numerous petitions were filed by convert Christians complaining about 
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the restrictions of remarriage that they were subject to and when abandoned by 
their non-Christian spouse they could not obtain a divorce as there was no 
divorce law in place until 1866. In fact, Christians, who had already remarried 
through the earlier procedure, had committed the criminal offense of bigamy 
according to the Act of Marriages in India, 1851 and the Christian Marriage Act, 
1864, 1865. Such a situation essentially forced Indian Christians to defer 
remarriage until the death of their spouse. 
Although a few women such as Laxmibai Tilak, mentioned before, used their 
agency rather than being passive objects and denied conversion to Christianity 
following their husbands (Anagol 2010), there were not many instances in which 
women alone went for conversion, leaving their husbands and children. It is quite 
understandable that most of the convert Christians were men, as during the 19th 
century most married women would not have the power and authority over 
themselves to convert to Christianity alone, without their husbands, and leave 
them after conversion. So the converted men, whose wives left them due to their 
conversion and who remarried, were mostly the victims of this rule that 
restricted them from remarrying. There was a country-wide protest by the 
Christian community, both from the Catholic and Protestant groups, 
complaining about how their men were suffering because of the restriction on 
remarriage when their previous marriages were already broken and beyond 
reconciliation (Chatterjee 2010). They also argued, according to Chatterjee (2010), 
that it was a unique situation that the Indian Christians had to face by 
themselves, as polygamy was not illegal among Hindus and Muslims.  
Responding to the petitions from the Christian community, the Government 
proposed a new law of divorce, entitled the Native Converts’ Marriage 
Dissolution Act, 1866. Under this law, the deserted spouse would demand the 
restoration of conjugal rights and if the deserting non-Christian partner refused 
to comply, the marriage would be dissolved between the two parties. However, 
most Christian missionaries objected to the proposed law on the grounds that it 
was unnecessarily complicated, time-consuming, and undignified for women as it 
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required establishing the fact of consummation in court among others. Also the 
law required the deserting spouse to appear in the courtroom, which was not 
possible as most of these spouses were usually untraceable. Moreover, the 
Catholic Church sought permission to follow the Code of Canon Law for handling 
cases to dissolve the marriages. The Protestant leaders rejected the law by 
arguing that such a law would not retain any scope for reconciliation, which is 
widely encouraged in Christian marriages. Because of this rejection, further 
opportunity to preach Christianity might have ended. Reflecting on the events 
that followed, Chatterjee (2010, 1189) quotes Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjea in 
his remarks on the speech of the Earl of Ellenborough: “the law was entirely the 
creation of missionaries who were totally unrepresentative of Indian Christians 
and who treated the latter as their serfs”. 
The Indian Divorce Act of 1869 after two years added yet another Act in the 
uniform category, which again had the same consequences of serving the 
Christian population in undivided India. According to this particular Act, which 
was formulated following the British law of divorce, adultery was the most 
necessary and compulsory condition for divorce. However, the law was highly 
gender-discriminatory with separate conditions for the husband and the wife, 
except on the common ground of adultery, as mentioned in earlier chapters13. The 
gender differences impacted Christians significantly. The remarriage of non-
Christian wives of convert Christian husbands easily qualified as adultery and 
provided men with sufficient grounds for divorce. So divorce became easy for 
men. On the other hand, similar acts by non-Christian husbands of Christian 
women did not provide these convert women with sufficient grounds for divorce 
and these cases had to be built differently. 
                                                 
13 For a detailed discussion on this, see Chapter Three and Chapter Seven. 
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Marriage with a deceased wife’s sister 
Marrying one’s deceased wife’s sister has been long practised in the Indian 
subcontinent. Traditionally, marrying one’s sister-in-law, if she is eligible for 
marriage, has been an acceptable and preferred practice when a man becomes a 
widower. In the third quarter of the 19th century, this long-practised custom was 
prohibited for members of the Anglican Church in India. This prohibition 
resulted in debates and conflicts that lasted for about half a century. Before the 
formulation of the personal laws that began to govern the Christian society in 
undivided India, marrying one’s deceased wife’s sister was such a socially 
accepted and common practice that it did not even exist as an issue. Soon after 
the personal laws were legislated, the governance of Christian communities 
changed significantly and in this process, long-term and well-established 
practices began to fall apart. But this prohibition affected only Anglican 
Christians, who were directly associated with the Church of England. Catholics 
and the other Protestant groups either encouraged or tolerated these marriages. 
However, the Anglican community had strictly banned marriage with a deceased 
wife’s sister. But the question is: What made the Anglican Church take such 
action? Perhaps the answer lies within the political and legal context of Britain in 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth I.  
In the 17th century, Elizabeth I prepared the table of consanguinity prohibiting 
certain types of marriages, including marriages with a deceased brother’s wife 
and a deceased wife’s sister. Later, in 1835, a new law was passed in Britain that 
ratified past marriages with a deceased wife’s sister and prohibited any further 
marriages of the same nature (Kippen 2009, Wallace n.d., Anderson 1982). This 
law made all marriages with a deceased wife’s sister, along within the other 
prohibited degrees conducted after the bill was passed, illegal. So India, as its 
colony, also felt the impacts of the English law that prohibited marriages within 
certain degrees of consanguinity, including a deceased wife’s sister. This 
prohibition particularly affected the Anglican community in India that was 
governed by the Church of England directly.  
  
101 
In a letter dated 20th June 1878 to the Secretary to the Government of Madras, the 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India of the Home Department, C. 
Bernard wrote that “… as the English law governs questions of marriage with a 
deceased wife’s sister in the case of East Indians, such a marriage is not legal 
among that community” (Bernard 1878, 1). He argued that unlike Hindus and 
Muslims, who had their own personal laws in place, Christians were governed by 
the ‘territorial law of India’ (uniform law), which was a modified form of English 
law. Back in Britain, the prohibition of certain types of marriage had received 
royal approval, but not parliamentary approval, which made these marriages not 
void, but voidable. In other words, these marriages were legal unless challenged 
in the ecclesiastical courts within the lifetime of the marriage (Kippen 2009, 
Bernard 1878).   
However, the prohibition on a customary practice of the Indian Christian 
community had a significant impact. Dissatisfaction eventually took the shape of 
protests from the Indian Christian community. On 21st May 1879, a memorandum 
capturing the views of ‘native’ Christians that showed respect for marriage to a 
deceased wife’s sister, written on behalf of the ‘native’ Christian community in 
South India, was sent to the Indian Bishops (Native Christians 1879). The 
memorandum showed in detail why such marriages were important and common 
in the Indian context. A number of profound reasons were provided by the 
protesting Christians. They showed that among ‘natives’, the deceased wife’s 
sister was found to take a greater interest than a wife from another family in the 
welfare of the children of the first wife, who was her sister. This interest of 
children’s welfare was particularly highlighted in the event of the husband’s 
death after a second marriage. A second wife from another family was generally 
found more or less neglectful of her husband’s children from a previous marriage 
and after his death the level of neglect became severe. They also brought in the 
role of the grandmother in her grandchildren’s lives and where the second wife 
was the sister of the first, the children by both marriages had the benefit of the 
care of one and the same grandmother. This advantage was more apparent after 
the husband’s death.  
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In the memorandum, ‘native’ Christians also claimed that, predominately, the 
second marriages between the widower and his deceased wife’s sister best 
promoted domestic peace. When the second wife was a stranger, it was often 
found that she promoted the interests of her own children to the disadvantage of 
the children by the former marriage. In many instances, a second wife who is not 
his deceased wife’s sister tended to deprive or misappropriate the children’s 
inherited property. In the case where a wife did not have her own children, she 
often pursued this course for the benefit of her relations. The petitioners also 
argued that such marriages tended to preserve and promote good feeling among 
the relations of the married persons (Native Christians 1879). When a man 
married his deceased wife’s sister, he maintained his connection with the family 
into which he had married before. Marrying a stranger did not allow such 
relationships.  
The memorandum also stated that such marriages involved the least expenditure. 
A new dowry was not needed for the deceased wife’s sister if she married her 
brother-in-law. The dowry that was provided to her sister, which was generally 
land in the rural areas, was passed on without trouble or expense to the second 
wife. Moreover, when a ‘native’ became a widower with young children, he found 
it difficult to search for a suitable second wife. The junior sister in such cases 
considered it her ‘duty’ to step into her senior sister’s place.  
‘Native’ members of the Church of England believed that they were placed at a 
greater disadvantage in this regard than the members of other Christian 
denominations in India. In Roman Catholic missions and in missions of the non-
Episcopal communities, whether connected with Great Britain, Germany, or 
America, marriage with a deceased wife’s sister was either encouraged or 
tolerated. It was only in the Church of England that such marriages were 
absolutely prohibited. Finally, ‘native’ Christians stated, “…of all marriages that to 
a deceased wife’s sister is the most dutiful, charitable, and laudable, and therefore 
most in accordance with Christian ideas” (Native Christians 1879, 2).  
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However, even after all those reasoning, the Anglican Bishops did not accept such 
changes in the Anglican Church. Bishop R. Caldwell wrote in a memorandum, 
endorsed by Bishop E. Sargent, on 21st July 1879, 
… [I]t seems desirable to explain that we (the writers of the memorial) 
should be decidedly opposed to any relaxation of the rule in England, 
where family life has grown up and flourished under this restriction. If we 
were at home and had a vote, we should vote for the retention of the 
existing law. It need not be added, we think, that the Natives for whom we 
plead, never could entertain the idea of imposing their wishes upon the 
people of England. (Caldwell 1879, 1)  
Bishop Caldwell argued that such prohibition rested solely on a Canon, the 99th 
of 1603, citing the words of a Table put forth by Archbishop Parker in 1563. Parker 
wrote: 
This Canon speaks of the consanguinity as ‘prohibited by the laws of 
God’…I may add that there is no probability of the Indian Christians ever 
proposing that the wife should be permitted to marry her deceased 
husband’s brother, the discredit attaching in India to a widow who 
remarries and the honour attaching to her who remains ‘the wife of one 
husband’ being sufficient preventives. (Caldwell 1879, 2, 4) 
However, it is important to note here that the Bishop wrote this memorandum 
approximately two decades after the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act, 1856, was 
enacted legalising the remarriages of Hindu widows in every jurisdictions of 
undivided India under East India Company rule.  
The Diocesan Registry Office confirmed on 28th July 1879 that in a marriage 
between an English-born British subject, who had lost his English domicile, and 
his deceased wife’s sister was absolutely void. On the other hand, although 
marriages between Christians within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
might be unlawful, they were not absolutely void. In other words, they were not 
made void until they were set aside by a competent court (Upton 1879). The letter 
referred to the Advocate General’s advice that it was certainly not unlawful for 
Hindus and Mahamedans (Muslims) who became Christians to marry their 
deceased wives’ sisters not only because it was a common practice but also there 
were no provisions in their respective personal laws forbidding such marriages.  
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By the end of the 19th century, the shape of protest and appeal took a more 
organized form. In 1901, the Anglican bishops received another memorandum, 
along with a statement of their arguments, signed by about 3,200 South Indian 
Christians, including some of the lay church leaders (Native Christians 1901). The 
memorandum argued for why the issue of marriage of deceased wife’s sister was a 
question of great importance to the Indian church. Many Christians from the 
Church of England who were affected by this prohibition were solving the 
situation by leaving the Church of England and joining other church bodies, as 
they accepted such marriages. They felt that membership of the Church of 
England means a curtailment of personal liberty in innocent social customs. 
Therefore, according to the writers of the memorandum, it was high time that 
the church does something to prevent the loss of members.  
The memorandum also argued that according to Resolution XVIII of the Lambeth 
Conference14, for the growth and development of an indigenous Indian church it 
was “of the utmost importance that from the very beginning the idea that the 
Church … [was] … their own, and not a foreign Church should be impressed upon 
converts” (Native Christians 1901, 1). In addition, Resolution XIX stated, “it is 
important that so far as possible the Church should be adapted to local 
circumstances and the people brought to feel in all ways that no burdens in the 
way of foreign customs are laid upon them” (Native Christians 1901, 1). 
The petitioners further argued with regard to widowers marrying their deceased 
wife’s sister that this was not only an inconvenience but also a “real hardship” for 
them, as the best selection of a second wife in such a situation was already 
prohibited (Native Christians 1901, 1). They also showed that in the Indian 
context, the wife often goes to her father’s house and ordinarily she stays with her 
parents during the period of pregnancy and confinement15. The children became 
                                                 
14Decennial assemblies of bishops of the Anglican Communion convened by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. 
15 Post-delivery confinement is about keeping a new mother and her baby at home for a certain 
number of days (usually 40 days) after delivery. It is an Indian traditional practice, in which the 
new mother has many restrictions during the confinement period.  
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familiar with the faces of the wife’s sisters as the features of their mother and her 
sisters had much in common. Therefore, in the case of the death of the wife, 
there was a natural inclination towards the same home for the benefit of the 
children. Therefore, it was the best selection that could be made by them, 
especially considering the benefit to the motherless children. They said, “It is 
seldom that a man of our country will choose another woman if he has a 
marriageable sister of his deceased wife. This prohibition is therefore not only an 
inconvenience but a real hardship” (Native Christians 1901, 1). According to them, 
“[N]o reasonable man will say that a person who married his deceased wife’s 
sister loses his salvation just because he violates Archbishop Parker’s rule. How 
then can the Church which calls itself Christian exclude a man from Holy 
Communion just for this reason?” (Native Christians 1901, 1). 
As a colonial subject, India experienced the impacts of the political and legal 
changes that occurred in Britain. The issue of the deceased wife’s sister’s marriage 
was one such example. In Britain, in 1842, the first bill for legalising marriage 
with a deceased wife’s sister was first introduced in the Parliament but was not 
legislated until 1907. After the bill was introduced, the issue was repeatedly 
debated and defeated almost every year until it finally passed by the Parliament 
(Anderson 1982). In addition, a number of pamphlets, letters, statements, and 
articles from all sides were published continuously during this period (Wallace 
n.d.). Although marriage with a deceased wife’s sister was prohibited in Britain 
during this period, a survey by the Commission appointed to inquire into the 
state and operation of the law of marriage as relating to the prohibited degrees of 
affinity showed that 90% of voidable marriages were with a deceased wife’s sister 
(Wallace n.d.). Finally, the Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act of 1907 was 
legislated by the English Parliament.  
To what extent did Anglican Christians in India benefit from the Britain’s 
Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act of 1907? In an opinion of the law officers of 
the Crown, written on 6th October 1911, it was explained that this particular Act 
was to legalise marriages with a deceased wife’s sister in all cases where, at the 
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time of the marriage, the parties were domiciled in the United Kingdom, whether 
the marriage was celebrated in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and whether 
the parties were British subjects or not. The legality of such marriages depended 
on the law of the domicile and had no concern with nationality or with the place 
where the marriage was celebrated. According to the legal officers of the Crown, 
the Act of 1907 had no application to the people who were domiciled in India at 
the time of marriage. So Indian Christians were able to use this Act only when 
they moved to the United Kingdom and began to live there. However, this 
restriction in the operation of the Act was not confined to East Indians (Anglo-
Indians) and ‘native’ Christians but extended to all persons of British birth who 
were domiciled in India (Law Officers of the Crown 1911).  
Although the Act of 1907 was in place in England, it did not change the situation 
of Indian Christians with respect to the deceased wife’s sister’s marriage question. 
In 1915, through Resolution 29, the Episcopal Synod resolved that clergy 
(ordained priests) still regarded it as forbidden to celebrate these marriages. In 
the beginning of the year 1916, in an opinion, the Advocate General wrote: 
Assuming the correct view to be that the English Act is limited in its 
application to marriages of persons domiciled in the United Kingdom, a 
marriage in India with a deceased wife’s sister by persons of the domiciled 
community would seem to be voidable, and not null and void until so 
declared by a competent tribunal during the lives of both parties thereto, 
… has been held to have no application in the case of persons domiciled in 
India. 
On the same assumption, in the case of Indian Christians domiciled in 
India marriage with a deceased wife’s sister would be seem to be null and 
void, as the prohibited degrees in their case would be the degrees 
prohibited by the customary law of the class [i.e. denomination] to which 
they belong, i.e., the Church of England…, and marriage with a deceased 
wife’s sister is within a degree prohibited by the law of the Church of 
England, though it has been legislated by the law of England by the 
Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act 1907. (Advocate General 1916, 2-3) 
Although it appears that first, the Advocate General recognised marriage with 
one’s deceased wife’s sister as one of the customs in India, later it is evident that 
he stepped back and dismissed these marriages by providing a religious 
  
107 
interpretation. However, later, the issue of marriage with a deceased husband’s 
brother, along with marriage with a deceased wife’s sister, was discussed. In 1924 
in the Episcopal Synod a resolution (Resolution 6) was made which stated that, 
“The Metropolitan be asked to enquire from the Bishops of the Province the facts 
as to the local customs and views in the Indian communities regarding the 
question of marriage with a deceased wife’s sister or deceased husband’s brother” 
(Episcopal Synod 1924, 3). In response to this resolution, Christians from Madras 
(now Chennai), Bombay (now Mumbai), Rangoon, Colombo, Calcutta (now 
Kolkata), Tinnevelly, Lahore, Dornakal, and Assam provided their opinions on 
the matter. The summary of their opinion was that marriage with a deceased 
wife’s sister was customary, decent and proper amongst all Hindus except 
Brahmins. Muslims were allowed to practise this type of marriage and some 
continued to do so. They also stated that marriage with a deceased brother’s wife 
was forbidden and never practised by the upper classes of Hindus, the Brahmins, 
and if practised by others, it was thought to be wrong. Their latter statement 
about marriage to a deceased brother’s wife contradicts other sociological and 
anthropological findings. It is, in fact, argued that such marriages were part of 
custom in most of the lower castes across India. K.P. Chattopadhyay (1922) argues 
that in most parts of North India, including Bihar, Bengal, Agra, Oudh, Punjab, 
and the North-Western Provinces, it was most common and even the preferred 
practice of dewor (the husband’s younger brother) to marry his boudi (elder 
brother’s wife) after his brother’s death. In fact, in some places, if the widow 
refused to marry her available dewor, she would lose both her rights to 
maintenance and her children from her previous marriage. Moreover, in other 
places, if the widow married anyone else than her available dewor, then he (the 
dewor) would be compensated by money or cloth (Chattopadhyay 1922). 
However, marrying a deceased husband’s elder brother (bhashur) in all cases was 
strictly prohibited. In most cases, it was considered improper for her to talk or 
even show her face to her bhashur. On the other hand, boudi and dewor would 
enjoy great freedom to talk to each other, even with some amount of mild 
flirtation (Chattopadhyay 1922).  
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Although the prohibition of marriage to deceased wife’s sister mostly came from 
Britain both at the church and the political levels, some church leaders, such as 
Bishop of Mumbai, who were living in India at that time understood the 
importance of the local custom. The Bishop pointed out that to the majority of 
Indian Christians the union is not objectionable; instead, it is the most suitable 
and desirable. He recommended a number of alternative ways of relaxation of the 
prohibition: First, refusal to allow such marriages by the clergy or in the 
churches, but admission to communion at the discretion of the Bishop; second, 
the marriage to be allowed at the Bishop’s discretion based on a criterion and not 
to be performed without reference to him; third and final, removal of a deceased 
wife’s sister from the Table of Affinity (Episcopal Synod 1932).  
In 1926, the debate turned around. In this year, the Episcopal Synod enacted a 
resolution (Resolution 8) that states, “No evidence of custom having been elicited 
by action under 1924 resolution, no need to approach Archbishop about 
modification of existing church law” (Episcopal Synod 1926, 4). Finally, the 
Episcopal Synod resolved in 1932 that it would recommend that the General 
Council to consider the amendment of Chapter XXIV of the Canons and Rules of 
the Church of India, Burma, and Ceylon so that the marriage of a man with his 
deceased wife’s sister would no longer be prohibited (Episcopal Synod 1932). This 
resolution, prepared by the Bishop of Bombay (Mumbai) at the Metropolitan’s 
request in accordance with custom, was taken by the Episcopal Synod.  
Later, in 1947, after many debates, arguments and counter-arguments, the Table 
of Prohibited Degrees was relaxed with respect to marriage to a deceased wife’s 
sister. The new Canon II of Chapter XXIV was passed by Decision 7 of GC 1944 
and confirmed by Decision 8 of GC 1947, which superseded all previous 
resolutions of the Episcopal Synod in relaxing the Table of Prohibited Degrees 
(viz 33 of 1932, 27 of 1935, 13 of 1938 and 10 of 1940). As per Resolution 31, 
“[M]arriages between a man and his deceased wife’s sister be hereafter contracted 
under civil sanction the Holy Communion should not be administered to the 
parties without previous reference to the Bishop” (General Council 1947, 2). 
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At around the same time, it is important to note that it was not Britain or British 
India alone that went through the process of dealing with the issue and 
controversy with regard to marriage to a deceased wife’s sister. The issue also 
reached other British colonies, such as Australia (Kippen 2009). In the 1870s the 
Australian colonies went through the process of passing the Deceased Wife’s 
Sister Marriage Act. In 1873, when the bill was introduced to the Parliament in 
Tasmania, it created huge debate and controversy. A number of petitions against 
the bill were presented, including a petition from 285 women residents. They 
argued that such marriages would “disturb family life, and would be dangerous to 
the peace, comfort and sanctity of many homes” (Kippen 2009, 4). The local 
Anglican church under the Church of England also argued against the bill by 
saying that such marriages would be incestuous and adulterous, and would 
jeopardise the relationship of a man and his wife’s sister who at present treat each 
other as brother and sister. Some opponents of the bill, including 
parliamentarians and members of the community, thought that the law would 
interrupt social harmony and it was likely that all men would regard their sisters-
in-law as potential partners. Moreover, they thought that all married women 
would feel uncomfortable with an unmarried sister who seemed ready to take the 
married sisters’ places at any moment (Kippen 2009). Some thought that the law 
would ensure the welfare of the children, who needed a mother and a loving aunt 
would fit in naturally. The bill allowing marriage to a deceased wife’s sister was 
passed in 1873 (Kippen 2009). Colonial law-making encountered local resistance 
across the globe, both in India and Australia. But what gendered impact did these 
negotiation processes had on women of the Christian community? The next 
section answers this question.  
The resilient patriarchy 
Traditionally, in South Asia, the relationship between a man and his wife’s 
younger sister is characterised by sweet and mild flirtation. In Bangla, a wife’s 
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younger sister is known as shali and her brother-in-law is known as dadababu16. It 
is common in Bengal, along with other parts of South Asia, that the dadababu 
would be slightly flirtatious with his shali and vice versa. In fact, there is a saying 
in Hindi, “sali adhi gharwali” (which means that shali is a half-wife). The 
negotiation that took place between the colonial church authorities and ‘native’ 
Christians on marriage to a deceased wife’s sister provides an extraordinary 
insight into how colonial domination was resisted by Indians year after year. 
Marriage with a deceased wife’s sister question provides a story of how British 
India was not only dominated by the colonial power but also tells a story of the 
continuous negotiation that the ‘natives’ undertook in order to continue long-
practised local culture and norms. The case of marriage with a deceased wife’s 
sister provides an idea of the impact of the uniform laws that the British 
legislated that often altered the lives and practices of the intimately colonised 
groups. The story also has a reverse aspect to it, with a particular gendered 
consequence. The colonial civilizing mission was not gender-neutral; instead, it 
impacted women at a greater but different level than it did men, although in 
most cases the impacts on women were invisible and unnoticed. 
The negotiation to re-allow men to marry their deceased wife’s sister restored 
and reinforced patriarchy and made it more resilient. Such resilient patriarchy is 
also called the ‘new patriarchy’ by many historians, including Sen (2000). The 
new patriarchy or the resilient patriarchy, no matter what it is called, has been 
founded on the ideological and symbolic location of women, strengthened by 
legal and administrative measures (Sen 2000). I argue that the term ‘deceased 
wife’s sister’ is a construction of patriarchy that came out as the subject of debate 
and bargain through the law creation processes.  
According to Gruner (1999, 429) in the context of Britain, “For the deceased wife’s 
sister does not, in some sense, even exist until law creates her, constructing her 
as not just any sister-in-law but a particular one, not just any sister but a desired 
                                                 
16 Sister’s husband is called as dulabhai by Muslims, jamaibabu by Hindus, and dadababu by 
Christians in Bangladesh. 
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and desiring one”. Such construction had repeatedly addressed only the man’s 
question reflecting the man’s desire. In fact, the way the debate is formulated, 
entitled ‘marriage with deceased wife’s sister question’, it clearly made men the 
subject and objectified women. The debate never addressed the issue from a 
woman’s perspective — ‘marriage with deceased sister’s husband’ — instead, it 
deliberately put men in the principal subjective position and women’s voice and 
position are hardly seen anywhere. For the entire debate, women’s voices are 
remarkably absent (Gruner 1999). The main reason for this silence of women 
could be the fact that, “Women in the colonies tend to be understood as neither 
the subject nor the object of colonization” (Mascarenhas 2014, 434). 
Women were not only absent from this debate, but their identity, as typical in 
patriarchy, was constructed as sister, wife, and mother, based on men’s identity. 
In this case, women were labelled as wife’s sister, without a single self-identity, 
which completely relied on men. Moreover, according to Gruner (1999, 429), 
“[t]he sister, in most discussions… is a silent participant in the conflict. Defined 
more by her relationship to the dead than to the living, to the past rather than to 
the present or future, she figures most often as an object of exchange between 
men”. 
In the processes of negotiation with regard to marriage to a deceased wife’s sister, 
a number of events indicate that the entire process had an active role in restoring 
and reinforcing patriarchy. The protests and advocacy conducted by ‘native’ 
Christian men to allow the church to continue the practices of the marriage of a 
deceased wife’s sister restored patriarchy. During the time at the beginning of 19th 
century, when the Christian population in India was almost negligible in 
numbers, the creation of such a movement with more than 3000 people signing a 
petition had a lot more significance than it may seem. 
The first collective petition from South India elaborates why ‘native’ Christian 
men should be allowed to marry their deceased wife’s sister (Native Christians 
1879). Their arguments were entirely based on a number of patriarchal 
assumptions and these assumptions had been naturalised. The main point of the 
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petitioners was that such marriages should be permitted for the welfare of the 
children of men from their first marriage. The children were at the centre of their 
arguments each and every time. The point was that as a stepmother, who was 
also the children’s aunt, the deceased wife’s sister had a greater interest in the 
welfare of the children of her sister than any woman from another family. Myths 
and stereotypical assumptions about the stepmother as a negative, evil, cruel, 
jealous, selfish, and wicked character are rampant. Salwen (1990) argues that the 
role of the natural mother, no matter if she is dead, absent, or available, becomes 
idealised with regard to the stepmother. The ‘wicked stepmother’ from old fairy 
tales still holds significant power in today’s imagination. A number of the fairy 
tales, Western or Indian, more specifically Bengali, have a ‘wicked stepmother’ 
character who is an evil person. Starting from the Western fairy tales, such as 
Snow White, Cinderella, Hansel and Gretel, many Indian and Bengali fairy tales, 
such as Sat Bhai Champa (Flower brothers and their sister), Nilkamal aar 
Lalkamal (The magnificent adventures of the two princes), Dalimkumar 
(Controlled by the seed), Sukhu aar Dukhu (Friend of the Animals), have a 
‘wicked stepmother’ character. The presence of a ‘wicked stepmother’ in many 
fairy tales is indeed a reflection of the social values and a product of patriarchy. 
As Barzilai (1990, 253) argues, “[M]yths and fairy tales are complex reflectors of 
the conscious and unconscious concerns of their readers”. Thus, in our case of 
marrying one’s deceased wife’s sister can be considered a strategy to protect the 
children from the ’wicked stepmother’ as the stepmother in this particular case 
was the children’s aunt herself who was assumed to have a greater interest 
towards her sister’s children.  
Marrying the deceased wife’s sister would enable the children to be closer to their 
grandmother from their mother’s side who usually had a significant role in the 
children’s lives. Such marriages also allowed the children to easily exercise their 
inheritance rights as their stepmother, who is their mother’s sister, will have care 
and sympathy ‘naturally’ towards them. However, perhaps what the petitioners 
did not want to point to was the benefits that they were getting from such 
marriages, apart from the children’s welfare. During that century, the health care 
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system was not as good as it is today and at that time the infant mortality rate 
was much higher. Therefore, it was a common practice to have many children in 
every family, so that even if some of them die, they would still have some living. 
Such practices impacted the mothers’ health negatively. Women were married off 
at a very young age, and early and frequent pregnancies had an adverse impact on 
the mother’s health. Therefore, many young mothers died either during delivery 
of a child or post-delivery period, leaving their husbands widowed.  
The search for a suitable spouse also had to consider a number of issues. In the 
marriage market, if a widower had a number of small children, he would not find 
a second wife that easily, except if he was a very rich man. The majority of the 
converts came from lower Hindu castes and poor Muslim communities. The 
majority of ‘native’ Christians were poor. Therefore, their low economic status 
made the situation harder for men to find a suitable second wife. On the other 
hand, the father of the deceased wife, who had an unmarried young daughter(s) 
at home, would go through difficulty to organise the amount for his unmarried 
daughters’ wedding and the payment of dowry. However, if he could marry his 
younger daughter to his widower son-in-law, then the dowry that he provided for 
his deceased daughter’s wedding earlier would pass on to his younger daughter. 
In this case, the father did not have to provide any additional dowries. From both 
sides, for the widower as well as the father, these marriages were associated with 
significant benefits that brought these two men in a win-win situation. In my 
opinion, these mutual benefits were the main reasons why native’ Christians 
became extremely resistant to the prohibition of such marriages. 
The entire process reproduced, reinstituted and reinforced patriarchy. In such a 
process the deceased wife’s sister’s role was mostly passive, conforming to norms 
and customs, if not totally invisible. After all, “rules formulated in a male-
dominated society reflect male needs, male concerns, and male experience” 
(Taub 1980, 1694). These marriages were based on familial ideology, which, as 
argued by Cossman and Kapur (1996), refers to a set of assumptions about the 
roles and responsibilities of the family members that are strictly allocated on the 
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basis of gender. Under these familial ideologies, women’s gender roles were as 
wives and mothers, responsible for child care and domestic labour. Men, on the 
other hand, had the role as breadwinners who should provide the financial 
support for the family. However, women’s roles as wives and mothers had been 
so deeply embedded in the dominant discourse that it was universalised and 
naturalised and as a result it had been accepted as nothing but common sense 
(Cossman and Kapur 1996).  
When the wife died, according to the familial ideology, the person with the role 
of wife and mother was absent and hence childcare and domestic labour 
functions were interrupted. In such a situation, it became the responsibility of 
the deceased wife’s family to supply a substitute for the reproductive roles that 
the deceased wife performed. The easiest, safest, and the most convenient option 
was to provide her unmarried sister. The deceased wife’s sister was expected to 
conform to two prescribed conditions. First, to become a ‘good’ daughter, where 
she accepted her father’s decision to marry a widower, her own brother-in-law, 
and stepped into her sister’s place. And second, to become a ‘good’ wife, where 
she became the wife of her brother-in-law and performed her gender role 
obediently, including taking care of her sister’s children (or her stepchildren). 
From a different angle, the controversy regarding marriage to a deceased wife’s 
sister had established how the kin terms, such as brother, sister, sister-in-law, 
brother-in-law, husband, wife, amongst others are contested as well as fluid over 
time and space (Wallace n.d.). Such fluidity of kinship posed questions over the 
dominant discourse of shapes, forms, and stability of ‘family’ and/or ‘household’. 
It is a reminder that family, as well as kin, is not a stable category; rather, they are 
fluid concepts.  
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Conclusion 
India’s story can never be told in simplistic terms of colonisation and resistance. 
Christians were intimately colonised by British rulers compared to Muslim and 
Hindu groups, first, through their Christianisation processes and then, through 
the law-making processes. Intimate colonisation provided the shape of the 
‘native’ Christian identity. On the one hand, the British aimed for civilising 
mission through creating laws; on the other, ‘native’ Christians negotiated with 
these law-creation processes to reach their own political goal of establishing their 
Christian identity. This identity creation, which was a result of negotiation and 
resistance, is reflected in the case of a deceased wife’s sister’s marriage. 
Christians, who were intimately colonised, at once relied on ‘colonial’ religion to 
legitimate their existence and at the same time resisted its applicability in some 
parts of their lives. Furthermore, they were up not only against the British rulers 
but also churches and Christian men themselves that provided a multifaceted 
shape of the colonisation and resistance. The next chapter situates the Christian 
community at the present time and explores the type of patriarchy that operates 
within the community. 
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Chapter Five 
Constructing minorityness: The raising of  
a mission-compound patriarchy 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine how the Christian community in Bangladesh is 
positioned as a religious minority group both by the majority community — 
predominantly made up of Muslims — and by Christians themselves in the 
broader context of Bangladeshi society, how the Christian community relates to 
the state and the majority communities, and how inter-denominational dynamics 
work. In order to achieve the above, it is important to examine the community 
both from inside and outside by exploring how the Christian community is 
organised, how their governmentality works, and more importantly, how gender 
works within these broader pictures of their ‘minorityness’. I use the term 
‘minorityness’ to show a community’s experiences of its minority status. In other 
words, ‘minorityness’ is the position that a person or a community acquires from 
being a minority, which is different from having a ‘minority status’; instead, 
‘minorityness’ is an identity that people or communities acquire through their 
experiences of being a minority.  
In this chapter, I also show how patriarchy coalesces with minorityness and the 
community’s governmentality and creates another variation of patriarchy, which 
I call a ‘mission-compound’ patriarchy. Understanding the patriarchy within the 
Christian community and the factors responsible for the creation of such a 
patriarchy will help readers across the next few chapters to have an in-depth 
understanding of gender relations and how laws, particularly the personal laws, 
interact with gender.  
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The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss and 
review the literature and debates on minority issues. In this section, I link these 
debates on minority with the notion of patriarchy. I show how minorityness 
blends with private and public patriarchy and how a specific type of patriarchy 
emerges in this community. In the second section, I examine the minorityness of 
the Bangladeshi Christian community, which is constructed by the influence of 
different factors, such as the state policies, the majority community’s attitudes 
and actions towards Christians, and inter-denominational dynamics and politics. 
The final section unpacks the concept of mission-compound patriarchy and 
shows how this specific type of patriarchy is created within the Christian 
community in Bangladesh through its internal governance and politics and how 
gender plays a role in these factors. In this section, I specifically analyse women’s 
leadership in the Christian community and show how women in this community 
become subject to this mission-compound patriarchy.   
Minorityness and patriarchy 
Members of minority and majority groups are differently positioned, often by 
the state and its mechanisms, with regard to both status and power and are 
subject to different conditions in the enjoyments of their rights. In post-colonial 
states such as India and Bangladesh, the constitutions support preferential 
policies, including affirmative actions, to ensure equal rights for recognised 
minorities, which creates a private sphere within the ‘common domain’ or public 
sphere.1 In her research on religious and ethnic minorities in six South Asian 
countries, including Bangladesh, Manchanda (2009) analyses the causes of the 
powerlessness and the non-domination of minorities. She argues that differences 
in positions, status, and power between majority and minority tend to produce 
‘minoritisation’, where day-to-day discrimination reflects the constitutional 
                                                 
1 For a discussion on the Constitution of Bangladesh and its treatment of minorities see Chapter 
Three. 
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limitations in safeguarding minority rights as opposed to the values of tolerance 
and justice in society (Manchanda 2009). She also articulates that at the centre 
of this minority-majority dichotomy, the key factor is the discourse of power 
that lies particularly within the relation between the state and national 
minorities. 
Besides the discourse of power between the state and minorities, 
multiculturalism and autonomies have emerged as two critical strategies, 
produced to accommodate the difference in post-colonial multi-ethnic, and 
multi-religious societies. Manchanda (2009, 18) further argues that while 
accommodating differences through the strategy of multiculturalism, “the 
majority culture is uncritically accepted and used to judge the claims and define 
the rights of minorities”. Therefore, the critics of multiculturalism wipe this out 
as a strategy for accommodating difference as it only protects cultural identity 
and fails to promote equality, non-discrimination, equity, and moreover, it 
directly depends on the distribution of power.  
The other strategy to accommodate peoples’ aspiration for ‘self-rule’ is autonomy, 
which is used as a tool to allow minority groups “to exercise direct control over 
affairs”, directly of interest to them, while allowing the majorities “to exercise 
those powers that govern common interests” (Manchanda 2009, 20). Autonomy, 
according to Manchanda (2009, 20), is also deployed as a “device for resolving 
conflicts over peoples’ struggle for justice and dignity” and hence redesigning 
power relations and multiple control over resources. The notion of ‘self-rule’ or 
autonomy may have consequences on intra-group equality. For example, 
Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (2005) argue that often ‘external protections’ and 
‘internal restrictions’ cannot be separated and one may lead to the other. For 
example, for minority groups, ‘external protections’ appear to be valuable, which 
provides them with more power to govern their own affairs. Such governance 
involves imposing traditions and practices on their members that are sometimes 
discriminatory and oppressive against some of their members (Eisenberg and 
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Spinner-Halev 2005). In Shachar’s (2001, 2-3) words, “Under such conditions, 
well-meaning accommodation by the state may leave members of minority 
groups vulnerable to severe injustice within the group, and may, in effect, work 
to reinforce some of the most hierarchical elements of a culture”. Therefore, even 
when the state promotes self-governance of minority groups, the groups 
themselves do not treat their members equally and such inequality is often 
gendered. 
Irrespective of the strategies adopted, scholars argue that women in minority 
groups become ‘minorities within minorities’. According to Rajan (2003, 164), 
minority groups function “as an enclave within the space of a larger public life 
from which it is isolated”, which provides an impression of women within that 
community being hostages, prisoners or deluded subjects, living under a “state-
within-a-state”. These women often have to fight the patriarchy within their own 
communities along with tackling the patriarchy of the larger community, thus, 
“living under two states” (Manchanda 2009, 23). Therefore, minorityness 
becomes not only a gendered experience, where women’s experience of 
minorityness differs from men’s experience of the same, but also these different 
experiences form some sort of hierarchy, where men experience their 
minorityness directly from the state and the broader society and women 
experience the same both from the state, the broader society, and men within 
their own communities. 
A number of contributors analyse the notion of ‘minorities within minorities’ in a 
volume edited by Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (2005). From the disciplinary 
perspective of political science, the volume deals with questions such as: To what 
extent should the state accommodate minority groups that discriminate against 
some of their own members? Under what circumstances must the state interfere 
in the internal matters of a minority group when such discriminations take place? 
According to Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev (2005, 4), multicultural theories of 
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citizenship do not adequately address these questions related to “minorities 
within minorities”. 
The tension between multiculturalism and feminism has been explored by a 
number of feminist scholars. One of these scholars is Kukathas (2001, 88), who 
believes that, “[F]eminism and multiculturalism remain in tension to the extent 
that there are any groups which neglect the interests of women, and which seek 
accommodation within the polity” (emphasis in the original text). Kukathas’ 
(2001) above statement is in agreement with Spinner-Halev’s (2001) argument 
that group autonomy can harm women of that group. Levy (2000, 51-62) labels 
such acts “internal cruelty” that elaborates the problematic cultural practices that 
harm women and girls. According to Friedman (2003, 179), it is clearly “no 
surprise” that “minority cultural practices” particularly affect women. In her 
words:  
[Minority groups] may find that the only areas of life in which they can 
hope to exercise some communal control over their lives and practice their 
cultural traditions unimpeded are areas commonly treated as matters of 
‘privacy’ by the surrounding … society. (Friedman 2003, 179)  
Women’s access to full rights as a citizen of their nation-state is virtually 
impossible when they remain obliged to the traditions and religious and cultural 
practices of their respective minority groups. Shachar (2001, 68) argues, “Women 
may either enjoy the full spectrum of their state citizenship rights or participate 
in their minority communities. They cannot have both simultaneously” 
(emphasis in the original text). In both cases, if women exercise their full rights 
as citizens or they confine themselves within traditional religious and cultural 
practices, patriarchy plays a significant role. Linking women’s minorityness to 
patriarchy becomes vital to understanding their experiences of law and 
governmentality. 
Radical feminists have systematically examined the concept of patriarchy since 
the 1970s (Bryson 1999), but my specific focus will be on the two types identified 
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by Walby (1990): private and public patriarchy. According to Walby (1990, 24), 
private and public patriarchy are two distinct categories of classic patriarchy2: 
“private patriarchy is based upon household production as the main site of 
women’s oppression”, whereas “public patriarchy is based principally in public 
sites such as employment and the state”. Under private patriarchy, the senior 
male member exercises power over junior (also sometimes senior) female and 
male members of the household, whereas, under public patriarchy, patriarchs 
collectively share and exert power based on the stratification system that exists 
among them (Moghadam 2004, Hapke 2013, Walby 1990). In the last few decades, 
Bangladeshi society experienced significant changes in household organisations 
(from a joint family to a nuclear family system), education, employment, and 
citizenship, which redefined or blurred (in some cases) the boundaries between 
the private and the public (Hapke 2013). Women gained significant achievements 
in the areas of politics, employment, and education, along with other rights. 
Although there has been a reduction in the degree of patriarchy, patriarchal 
forms of organisation have continued within the family, society, and the state. 
This transformation is often seen as “the product of the encounter between 
modernity and tradition” (Hapke 2013, 13). 
The dichotomy noted by Walby (1990) and others resonates in the works of 
scholars who suggest that the home and the state are situated at the two ends of 
the private and public domains. For example, Feldman (2001, 1115) considers that 
both home and state are in a “mutually constitutive” situation, where they create 
boundaries to represent particular interests of patriarchy. In other words, as 
much as the home is a locus of patriarchal domination through private 
                                                 
2 Under classic patriarchy, property, residence, and descent proceed through the male line 
(Kandiyoti 1988). According to classic patriarchy, the older men hold authority over almost all 
women and younger men. Also, a distinct sexual division of labour exists under classic patriarchy, 
where childrearing is considered the principal labour of women (Hapke 2013). Moreover, women 
are considered as property, their sexual piety is seen as the key to the women’s as well as family’s 
honour (Hapke 2013).    
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patriarchy, the state and its institutes also enable a similar domination through 
public patriarchy.  
Patriarchy can be made up of different types and forms. Walby (1990) argues that 
the patriarchy within different ethnic groups can be in different forms. In 
Bangladeshi context, Cain et al (1979, 406) defined patriarchy “as a set of social 
relations with a material base that enables men to dominate women”. According 
to them, in Bangladesh patriarchy defines how power and resources within 
families are distributed, where men maintain power and control the resources 
and women are powerless and mostly dependent on men. Cain et al (1979, 406) 
point out that “the structural elements of patriarchal control are reinforcing and 
include aspects of the kinship system, political system, and religion”. 
I argue that for minority communities, such as Christians in Bangladesh, private 
and public patriarchy is not a straightforward division. Most scholars, while 
describing private-public patriarchy, associate the home with the private realm 
and the state or workplace with public patriarchy as mentioned earlier. It is 
important to recognise that there are other influential actors in between the 
home and the state and workplace. These in-between entities (which cannot be 
categorised as either purely private or completely public) often become more 
powerful in some ways than both the home and the state in governing peoples’ 
lives. Here, I problematise the sharp dichotomy between the private and the 
public and focus on the intermediate groups and/or institutions that can be 
considered both to be an expansion of the private, the home, and a shrinking of 
the public, the state. In this way the boundary of private and public shifts with 
the entry of this third party, in our case the religious groups and/or institutions.  
The presence of this third space in between the home and the state gives rise to a 
third kind of patriarchy. For Bangladeshi Christians, the patriarchy that emerged 
due to the involvement and influence of Christian missions gave rise to what I 
call a ‘mission-compound patriarchy’. The mission-compound offers a space that 
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lies in between the home and the state that provides a ‘safe’ space for women, 
where they enjoy free mobility outside their home boundaries. The mission-
compound patriarchy allows women to come out of the home to the mission 
compound but not into the state. As regards the term mission-compound, I do 
not necessarily mean the physical boundaries of the mission compound. Instead, 
by mission-compound, I mean Christian institutions such as the church, 
Christian schools, hospitals, NGOs, and other church institutions. Under such 
patriarchy, gender roles are also expanded beyond families to the church. It 
became men’s role to provide leadership to their families as well as in the 
community, whereas women’s roles remained limited to reproductive caring 
work in families as well as in the community through prayers, running Sunday 
Schools for children, and mahila samity (women’s group within the church).  
Bangladeshi Christian minorityness  
The processes of the construction of minorityness among the Bangladeshi 
Christians take a complex form that involves some external factors, such as the 
role of the state and the broader society where the Christian community is 
situated, and some internal factors, such as missionary activities, inter- and intra-
church relationships, and the governance of the churches. This section addresses 
these processes of construction of minorityness among Christians in Bangladesh. 
A prominent Christian leader, Dr Dennis Dilip Datta, is one of the few who has 
written on the government and church’s interactions in the context of 
Bangladesh. Two of his books (titled Government’s Decision: Church’s Response, 
published in 2010, and Council theke Fellowship (From Council to Fellowship), 
published in 2009) focus on the relationship of the church with the state, 
highlight a number of historical events that has provided a shape to the 
contemporary Christian community as a minority group in Bangladesh, and 
portrays the roles of missionaries and the inter- and intra-denominational 
dynamics. During my fieldwork, I met Dilip Datta and interviewed him. This 
  
125 
 
section discusses both the books penned by him and extensive interviews with 
him. If some of the following discussions appear as snippets of historical 
accounts, then that is intentional in order to help the readers understand how 
the minorityness of the Christian community is produced and reproduced, and 
what the state’s — as well as the broader society’s — roles and reactions are in 
these processes.   
The changing role of the state in Bangladesh 
Before Partition in 1947, British India was governed by the Government of India 
Act of 1935. After East and West Pakistan were formed, it took nine years for the 
Pakistan government to adopt a new constitution in 1956. Islamisation of state 
began with this constitution. The name of the country was chosen to be the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan. According to this constitution, the President of the 
country was required to be a Muslim and no law would be passed against the 
teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah.3 Such Islamisation of the state gradually 
trickled down to many of the state’s policies and actions and this contributed in 
constructing and intensifying the minorityness of the Christian community.  
After Partition of India, the Pakistan government (for East and West Pakistan) 
undertook a number of nation-building activities (Phadnis and Ganguly 2001, 
Jaffrelot 2002). In pursuing various projects, the government began to acquire 
land in both East and West Pakistan. As land had always been an important 
factor in the church’s identity and existence as a minority group, Christians of 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) became concerned about protecting the 
properties of both the church and the Christian population.4 These concerns of 
Christians made them protective of the state’s intervention in these matters. In 
1949, as Datta (2009) points out that, the East Pakistan Christian Council (EPCC), 
                                                 
3 Sunnah is the verbally transmitted record of the teachings, deeds and sayings, and silent 
permissions (or disapprovals) of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, as well as various reports about 
Muhammad's companions. 
4 I will discuss how land contributed to the creation of Christian identity in Chapter Eight. 
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which was created to provide the churches a common platform, requested that 
the central government of Pakistan not acquire the properties of the church, 
church institutions, and houses of the members of the Christian community.   
A similar fear emerged much later in 1972. Bangladesh then was a new nation-
state, just liberated from Pakistan after a nine-month-long Liberation War in 
which, according to the government of Bangladesh, about three million civilians 
died and about 400,000 women became victims of systematic campaign of 
genocidal rape (Dummett 2011, Totten and Parsons 2004, Cheldelin and 
Eliatamby 2011, Roychowdhury 2016). After independence, nation-building 
activities began immediately. One of these activities, initiated by Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, was to bring revolutionary 
changes in the country’s education policy.  As part of these proposed changes, the 
government intended to nationalise all primary schools (Datta 2010).  
However, this intention of the government made the Christian community 
concerned as they (Christians) had been providing educational services by 
running schools and colleges for children from all communities for a long period. 
In fact, the most of the well-reputed schools in the country were, and still are, 
run by Christian missionaries and the churches. As many of these schools were 
situated in the church compound, the leaders of the community feared that if the 
schools were nationalised, then church activities might be hampered and the 
government would easily enter and interfere in church matters. Therefore, in 
1973, in a joint meeting between the Catholic and the Protestant groups, 
including the Anglican and Baptist, a decision was made, which stated that if the 
schools were nationalised, then they would take the necessary steps to separate 
the school properties from church properties to avoid any possible interference in 
the peaceful functioning of religious activities on church premises (Datta 2010). 
So the Christian community has always been apprehensive of possible state 
interference in the church’s activities, which may risk the church’s independence.   
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After the Liberation War, a number of international missionary organisations 
came to Bangladesh and began operating as voluntary organisations with the aim 
of ‘developing’ the country, both economically and socially. These organisations 
included the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the Christian Reform World 
Church (CRWC), World Vision, Food for the Hungry, World Relief USA (in 
Bangladesh this organization is known as the Christian Service Society), and 
World Concern, amongst others. Additionally, a number of churches also 
established their NGOs and began undertaking development work. For example, 
Caritas had been working as an NGO of the Catholic Church, the Social Health 
and Education Development Board (the Shed Board) had been functioning as the 
service organisation of the Bangladesh Baptist Church Sangha (BBCS), and 
Baptist Aid had been working as part of the Bangladesh Baptist Church 
Fellowship (BBCF), and so on. 
After President Ziaur Rahman came to power in 1977 after political unrest leading 
to martial law, the relationship between foreign donors and the government was 
at stake. During this period, according to Datta (2010), the success rate of the 
projects implemented by the government was much lower than that of the 
Christian NGOs. The government’s poor performance made the international 
donor community, including the UN, highly dissatisfied with the government’s 
performance in the development sector. In 1974, the Secretary of State of the 
United States, Henry Kissinger, during his visit to Dhaka, called Bangladesh, as 
Ahmed (2011) and Mannan (2010) reported, a ‘bottomless basket’, which is 
commonly known as a ‘bottomless pit’. The high performance of the Christian 
NGOs and their ability to run large projects and programs all around the country 
brought them into the limelight within the sector, which caused high 
dissatisfaction among state bureaucrats (Datta 2010).  
In 1978, the government enacted the Foreign Donations (Voluntary Activities) 
Regulation Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. XLVI of 1978), which had provisions 
that controlled the activities of the church, through the control of missionary 
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activities and Christian NGOs, along with any other NGOs. Under the definition 
of ‘voluntary activity’ in Section 2(d) of the Ordinance, missionary activities were 
included, which enabled the government to regulate their activities as part of 
voluntary activities.5 The Christian community leaders (both Catholic and 
Protestant) met President Ziaur Rahman in 1979 under the leadership of 
Archbishop Michael Rozario and submitted a memorandum appealing to the 
President to keep the church outside the scope of this Ordinance (Archbishop et 
al. 1979). After a year of persuasion, the government finally decided that the 
churches would not be included within the scope of the Ordinance.      
But, later, during the Ershad regime (1983–1990), a number of initiatives directly 
or indirectly exacerbated the minorityness of Christians. During Ershad’s time, he 
attempted to ban religious conversion. In 1982, a national daily reported such 
initiatives by the government (Montu 1982). In 1988, Islam was declared the 
religion of the state. This was a time when Christians were significantly 
concerned about their minority status. When President Ershad brought a bill to 
make Islam as the religion of the state before the Parliament, the leaders of the 
Christian community wrote him a memorandum (Archbishop et al. 1988), 
followed by an open appeal in a national daily (New Nation 1988), categorically 
explaining that the concept of state religion is against the spirit of Bangladesh’s 
independence movement.      
Islamic fundamentalism in a number of ways constructed the minorityness of 
Christians. In 1992, after Begum Khaleda Zia came to power, the Secretary 
General of Jamaat-e-Islami, Moulana Motiur Rahman Nizami6 placed the 
Blasphemy Bill before the Parliament, which was almost a copy of the Blasphemy 
Law of Pakistan, with the intention of protecting the respect and honour of the 
                                                 
5 Other activities apart from missionary activities included under the definition of “voluntary 
activity” in the Ordinance (Section 2(d)) were agricultural, relief, educational, cultural, vocational, 
social welfare, and developmental activities. 
6 In 2016, Moulana Motiur Rahman Nizami was executed for war crimes by the state, convicted of 
genocide, rape and massacres. 
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Quran and the Prophet Mohammad (Ittefaq 1994). However, large protests were 
carried out by secular cultural groups and after a number of demonstrations, 
seminars, meetings, and reports, the Bill was not tabled in the Parliament (Datta 
2010). Later, during the second ruling period of Begum Khaleda Zia (2001-2006), 
minority religious communities, including Christians, suffered enormously from 
rape, arson, loot, and murder (Daily Star 2002).  
In 1999, the first land survey began, which created problems for the church land. 
The Catholic Church, in every part of the world including Bangladesh, purchases 
land in the name of the Holy See (the Pope). On the other hand, most of the land 
that belonged to the Church of Bangladesh (Anglican Church) was purchased and 
registered during the British Raj in the name of the Diocese of India, Ceylon, and 
Burma. Such notion of land ownership within the churches created huge 
confusion and misunderstandings among the local land surveyors and attestation 
officers as they had no prior historical knowledge in this area. As a result, they 
immediately declared all of these lands to be Vested Property.7 Later, most of 
these issues were resolved by continuous representation to government officials, 
including Ministers (Datta 2010). Still, the community suffers from the Vested 
Property issues to some extent. A Catholic priest, who is in-charge of the legal 
and land matters of Catholic Church in Dhaka, also confirmed this during my 
fieldwork. He told me that not only had the church’s property been taken under 
the Vested Property Act, but the land of a number of Christian families had also 
be seized. Those who resided along with Hindu populations, such as in Barisal, 
Khulna, Jessore, Gazipur, and so on, and who had now migrated to India had 
been taken by the government under this Act.      
                                                 
7 The Vested Property Act is a controversial law in Bangladesh that allows the Government to 
confiscate property from individuals it deems as enemies of the state. Before the independence of 
Bangladesh in 1971, it was known as the Enemy Property Act and is still referred to as such in 
common parlance. The Act is criticized as a tool for appropriating the lands of minority 
population. 
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A gradual Islamisation had taken place in the country first, after Partition in 1947, 
and then later, after Independence from Pakistan in 1971. In this Islamisation 
process, the state played a critical role by changing its laws, policies, and actions 
in order to gain more control over the church and the church organisations, and 
the NGOs run by Christians, including their land and financial resources. Such a 
changing role of the state, since Partition, compounded the construction of 
minorityness of the Christian community.    
Violence by fundamentalists 
The minorityness of the Christian community is also impacted by violence and 
fundamentalism. The Christian community, along with other minority groups, 
has been subject to a number of incidents of violence by fanatic and 
fundamentalist groups. Even in recent times, such violent acts are still going on. 
The Christian community faced violence on a number of occasions whenever 
Muslims were violated in other countries. For example, when the Babri Mosque 
was attacked by Hindu fanatics in India in 1992, Muslims in Bangladesh attacked 
both Hindus (Bhardwaj 2003) and Christians and their religious premises in 
various locations (Datta 2010).  
One common form of violence that minority groups, including Christians, face is 
looting. Datta told me when I interviewed him that in Bangladesh there has been 
a 'loot culture' throughout history. He gave me two examples of incidents of 
looting where the Christian community became a victim. In his first story, in the 
1990s in Malumghat Hospital in Chittagong (a renowned Christian hospital), 
some rumours about conflicts between a Christian and a Muslim were circulated, 
which were apparently not true. But listening to the rumours, the local Muslims 
looted the properties of local Christians. In another incident also in the 1990s, in 
Sadar Ghat Anglican Church in Old Dhaka, Muslims lit a fire based on a rumour 
that the church attacked the local mosque physically. The Christian leaders 
guessed that the agitated Muslims might attack the church. So they advised the 
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Home Minister, who also went to visit that church, to send instructions to all 
police stations in that area and inform them that there might be possibilities of 
looting Christians’ properties the next dawn, right after the fazr namaz.8 The 
Home Minister took the advice and also declared in the media that the church 
did not attack or cause any damages to the mosque. Additionally, the Minister, 
while declaring this, also provided strict instructions to the media not to 
misreport the incident, as there was a risk of misreporting by a number of pro-
Islamic dailies. The next day, after dawn, right after fazr namaz, many Muslims 
who attended namaz were ready to loot Christians' properties. However, because 
of the prior instructions of the Home Minister, police managed to prevent the 
agitated Muslims from carrying out any destruction.  
Bangladeshi Christians also experienced more severe violence than looting. 
During the 2000s, a number of Christians were killed in different districts of the 
country, including two in Faridpur (in 2005), two in Jamalpur (one in 2003 and 
the other in 2004), and one in Sathkhira (in 2004). Two Christian men survived 
the attack in Mymensingh in 2005. In recent times, such killings again are 
occurring; more than 40 people were killed (2013-2016) in a series of attacks 
targeting activists and non-Muslims, including a number of Christians. For 
example, in October 2013 attackers attempted to slit the throat of a Christian 
pastor in Bangladesh's northern region (BBC 2016). In June 2016, a Christian man 
was knifed to death after Sunday prayers near a church in northwest Bangladesh 
in an attack claimed by Islamic State (IS) (Guardian 2016). Moreover, there were a 
number of death threats against many Christians, including a priest, in Dhaka 
and other places (Prothom Alo 2015). The recent attack and massacre at the 
Holey Artisan Bakery in July 2016 in Dhaka and the killing of foreigners has 
created enormous fear among Christians in Bangladesh (The Telegraph 2016). In 
this way, violence shaped the minorityness of the Christian community in 
Bangladesh. 
                                                 
8 Dawn prayer of Muslims. 
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Missionary activities 
Missionary activities and their attitude towards the ‘native’ Christians as well as 
broader Bangladeshi society influenced the construction of minorityness among 
Christians. The missionaries imposed a number of restrictions on the lifestyle of 
local Christians, particularly that of the young generations. For example, in my 
conversation with Datta, he told me that he also experienced these restrictions 
from the missionaries in his youth. According to him, the restrictions imposed by 
missionaries disconnected Christians from the broader society and this developed 
a sort of ‘ghetto mentality’ among Christians in Bangladesh. In his words: 
I remember the missionaries used to say that it will be a ‘sin’ if someone 
goes to the cinema/theatre or even smoke cigarette. So what they were 
basically saying is that we should not go and mix with the outer world. As 
if, when we mix with the outer world, we will be spoiled. This might be 
one of the reasons for our ghetto mentality. 
The restriction of missionaries also impacted the education of ‘native’ Christians. 
It is true that missionaries built schools and colleges all over the country, which 
are still considered the best educational institutes. However, the missionaries 
also impacted the education of Christians in other ways. During my fieldwork, a 
Protestant leader told me a story about how missionaries impacted the education 
of Christians. Nihar Sarker was one of the few Christians who was a communist 
leader in the 1940s. Nihar Sarker was from the Barisal area. Nihar Sarker was then 
studying at Zila School9 in Barisal. By that time he had already joined the 
communist party. One day, Nihar sneaked through the fence and entered the 
DC's residence and put up a communist flag. Nihar’s act created enormous 
controversy and became the talk of the town. Everyone began talking about who 
would do something like this in the DC's residence, particularly when the DC was 
the most powerful official in the town. The missionaries investigated the matter 
and Nihar finally confessed that he had done it. The issue was managed internally 
by the missionaries and the DC did not find out about Nihar.  
                                                 
9 A renowned public school. 
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As a consequence, Nihar was sent to Kolkata on the instruction of those 
missionaries. But they did not stop there, the leader I interviewed said. Soon after 
that incident, the missionaries took a decision that no boy should be allowed to 
study beyond class IV. The missionaries thought that if boys are educated beyond 
primary schooling, they might become anti-state rebels, which would be harmful 
to the mission as well as the British government. However, this restriction was 
not imposed on girls but only on boys.  
Later, when I met Datta again, he told me that the missionaries did not stop girls’ 
education for two particular reasons. First, since the missionaries established a 
number of schools across the country, they needed teachers to run these schools. 
At that time, only women could become teachers and therefore the missionaries 
continued women’s education. Second, besides schools, the missionaries also 
established hospitals all over the country. So they were in need of nurses for these 
hospitals. During that period, the nursing profession was not seen as a noble one 
and, therefore, not many women took up this profession. The missionaries 
trained Christian women in nursing and only women worked in this sector. So 
the missionaries had to educate Christian girls to fill the shortage of nurses in the 
hospitals. Datta said that when his sisters were studying in class IV or V, he read 
their khata (notebooks) one day. He saw that a number of times the question was 
written: What will you become when you grow older? He said, "One of my sisters 
wrote that — I will be a teacher — and the other one wrote — I will be a nurse". 
Although Christian women had almost no participation in state activities, the 
only places where they were found were either in the primary schools (both 
government and missionary schools) as teachers or in the hospitals (government 
and missionary hospitals) as nurses.   
Apart from intervening in the lives of the local Christians, the attitude that the 
missionaries had towards broader Bangladeshi society also contributed to the 
minorityness of the Christian community. Some missionaries were arrogant and 
often neglected local administration. For example, Datta (2010) described an 
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incident in Brahmanbaria (a district in east-central Bangladesh), where the New 
Zealand Baptist Missionary Society was running a primary school, and where 
some irregularities emerged due to the politics of the local church. A teacher in 
that school, and who belonged to that particular local church, lodged a complaint 
against school management to the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) of the 
government. The SDO called in the missionary who ran the school for 
questioning. The missionary became angry and behaved rudely and 
discourteously to the SDO. In Datta’s (2010, 14) words, “At one stage, he 
supposedly said, by slapping the table, that the school was established by New 
Zealand missionaries and is run by the funds of New Zealand. So he [the SDO] 
should not interfere in school matters”. However, the missionary did not realise 
that the office of an SDO is also an Executive Magistrate of the government with 
substantial judicial power and hence the missionary was at risk of going to jail. 
Datta (2010) also described a similar story where the missionary had to spend a 
night in jail hajat (prison) in Faridpur (in central Bangladesh) until he was 
released the next day.  
Such arrogant attitudes had an influence on how broader Bangladeshi society 
began to view Christians. As the missionaries brought in huge foreign funds and 
employed a number of ‘native’ Christians, these Christians had limited choice but 
to be loyal to the missionaries. As a result, instead of mixing with broader society, 
the Christian community limited itself to the mission-compound, with the 
mentality that the state and the broader community was ‘dangerous’ for them 
and they would be safe in the mission environment. This idea also trickled down 
to women, which I will discuss later in this chapter. 
‘NGO-isation’  
I have already mentioned that since liberation there was a number of Christian 
NGOs, both faith-based and directly church-based, operating in Bangladesh. 
These organisations appointed a number of Christian young people (but not at 
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the decision-making levels). But most of the decision-makers of these 
organisations were expatriates and hence the local Christians were mostly 
carrying out their decisions. Almost no Bangladeshi local staff were promoted to 
decision-making roles until recently. As a result, the leadership and capacity of 
the local Bangladeshi Christians did not flourish. When I interviewed Rev 
Shubrata Sarker, an Anglican priest, in my fieldwork he also confirmed this. He 
told me that, 
All these Christian NGOs have destroyed our capabilities and ambition. 
When I passed my Secondary School Certificate examination, I received a 
letter, which asked if I was interested in working in the World Vision. A 
number of my Christian friends also received the same letter. Although 
many of us did not go for that job and decided to continue with our 
studies, some did take the job. One of our friends, who joined there, had 
to end his higher education to continue working. 
Due to such NGO-isation, jobs in NGOs were easily available for most Christian 
men and women. Because of such easily available jobs that did not require high 
competition equal to public service or private sector jobs, a number of Christian 
men and women became employees of these different national and international 
NGOs. Most local Christians preferred to work in a Christian environment and 
were not keen to compete for the government or other private sector jobs. This is 
why Christians were almost absent from working for any state institutions. Even 
today, the number of Christians in public service or in private sector is still 
limited. A similar situation occurred in the military forces, where very few 
Christians entered. Their minorityness worked as a barrier to entering into these 
sorts of jobs.  
Divisions within the church  
The Bangladeshi Christian population is highly diverse and divided into small 
groups that make it difficult for them to unite and have one single voice, which is 
particularly important when in a minority status. The reasons for this division are 
a lack of coordination among the various denominations, the difference in 
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theological ideologies, their affiliation with different churches globally, and 
church politics. The Christian population in Bangladesh is half Catholic and half 
Protestant. The Catholic Church operates under the Catholic Bishop’s Conference 
of Bangladesh (CBCB).10 Most Protestant churches, on the other hand, are 
associated with two major alliances with different theological stances: the 
National Council of Churches (NCCB)11, which is ecumenical in nature, and the 
National Christian Fellowship of Bangladesh (NCFB)12, which is evangelical in 
nature.13 Although there are some networks that exist among these church groups 
and denominations, all of them have separate and autonomous governance as 
well as different theological basis, which often makes it difficult to bring them 
together. 
Although there has not been much coordination found among different 
denominations of the Christian community, occasionally, and particularly during 
crisis moments, they acted as one community. According to Datta (2009), the 
Catholic and the Protestant churches united only when there were perceived 
threats to the Christian community. Otherwise, during normal times, such unity 
was almost non-existent. Their apparent unity surfaced when the government 
made decisions, adopted policies, or passed laws that directly threatened the 
                                                 
10 The year of establishment was 1971. The Dhaka Archdiocese consists of seven Dioceses: Dhaka, 
Chittagong, Dinajpur, Khulna, Mymensingh, Rajshahi, and Sylhet. 
11 The year of establishment was 1949. Member churches are the Bangladesh Baptist Church 
Sangha (BBCS), the Church of Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Methodist Church, the Salvation 
Army, the Gospel for Bangladesh Church, the Bagura Christian Church, the Bangladesh 
Evangelical Holiness Church, the Church of God, the United Church of Bangladesh, the 
Presbyterian Church of Bangladesh, the United Pentecostal Church of Bangladesh, the 
Bangladesh Christian Church, and Bangladesh Bom Tribal Baptist Church.   
12 The year of establishment was 1980. Member churches are the Bangladesh Assemblies of God 
Church, the Bangladesh Association of Baptist Church, the Bangladesh Baptist Church 
Fellowship, the Bangladesh Free Baptist Churches, the Bangladesh Lutheran Church, the 
Bangladesh Northern Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Bangladesh Tribal Association of Baptist 
Churches, the Bethel Assemblies of God, the Church of God (Administrative Council), the Church 
of God Lumdonbok, the Church of the Nazarene, the Evangelical Christian Church, the 
Evangelical Church of Bangladesh, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Bangladesh, the Free 
Christian Churches of Bangladesh, the Garo Baptist Convention, the Sylhet Prenbyterian Synd, 
the Churches of God, and the Talithakumi Evangelical Churches. 
13 There are a few other churches that are not part of these alliances. Among them the Seventh 
Day Adventist Church and All in One in Christ Fellowship are notable. 
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Christian community as a whole. Those were the only moments when they came 
together, discussed, made decisions, and submitted joint memorandums to the 
government. I have elaborated on this in the previous section.  
It was only recently, in 2011, that there was an initiative to institutionalise this 
loose forum between the Catholic and Protestant churches and as a result the 
United Forum of Churches, Bangladesh (UFCB) was created, which is currently 
working as a common platform for these churches. The UCFB is comprised of the 
Catholic Church, the NCCB, and the NCFB. However, the Muslim evangelical 
churches14 are not part of this forum. They have created another forum called the 
Isai Fellowship of Bangladesh (IFB). 
When I interviewed the President of a national Protestant church body, Tapan 
Halder, he said that it was not only between the Catholic and the Protestant 
groups that are divided, but even within the Protestant groups, that most 
denominations were scattered. In his words: “We, the Protestant communities, 
have created our own space and we do not want anyone to interfere in our 
matters. We want to be content in our own small bubbles. Whereas in the 
Catholic Church, everything happens under the Archbishop’s leadership”. Such 
division among the churches increased the feeling of minorityness within the 
Christian population.  
The church also contributes to the construction of minorityness by creating 
boundaries through a number of its activities. The church prefers that its 
members would remain within those boundaries. During fieldwork, I met 
Shubrata Sarker, an Anglican priest, who explained to me how the church sets up 
this boundary. He said, 
                                                 
14 Muslim evangelism is becoming increasingly controversial in Bangladesh. Muslim evangelism 
has integrated Islamic prayers (namaz) and culture, including language, into Christianity and the 
converts do not announce publicly that they have converted to Christianity; instead, they 
continue as Muslims superficially and follow Isa Nabi (Jesus is known as Isa in the Quran). They 
have excluded baptism and communion from their rituals. Since my topic does not directly relate 
to Muslim evangelism, I am not elaborating on it in this thesis.   
  
138 
 
Yes, as a Christian community, we are a minority group here and we are 
continuously subject to violence, injustice, and insecurity. But it is hard to 
feel such intense insecurity in our day-to-day lives if we openly interact 
with the broader society that we live in. For example, I never realised as 
being in a minority in this country until I joined the church as a priest.  
In my childhood and in my young age, we used to live in a town where we 
were the only Christian family among about 500 Muslim families. We lived 
there in harmony and peace. Overall, I never felt discriminated against 
just being a minority Christian. But as soon as I joined the church, this 
minority feeling became prominent in front of me. It became evident to 
me that we, as a minority group, are also responsible for creating our 
minority identity to some extent.  
When I entered the church as a priest, I felt like I have confined myself 
within a boundary. Until my undergrad level, I never felt that I am alone 
or we are very few in numbers. I used to feel enormous strength around 
me even living with Muslim people all around me. I knew if anyone wants 
to harm me, I will have hundreds of my friends around me. But when I 
entered into my church work, I realised that all of a sudden I was within a 
boundary and I was neither going outside that boundary nor I was letting 
anyone enter that boundary from outside. Now I feel more insecure than 
ever before.  
Clearly, the state, broader Bangladeshi society, the missionaries, NGO activities, 
and the church’s politics and its divisions all contribute to the construction of the 
minorityness of the Bangladeshi Christian community. Does this minorityness 
touch men and women in a similar way? Or do they experience this differently? 
What are the implications of such minorityness within community’s governance, 
particularly in the governance of women? I will address these questions in the 
next section.  
Mission-compound patriarchy 
The minorityness that has been constructed among Christians in Bangladesh by 
different factors, as discussed in the previous section, has deep implications 
within the group. Scholars have critiqued multiculturalism policies in Western 
countries and have shown the effects of such policies on minority groups around 
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their relations and status within the broader context (Barry 2002, Joppke 2004, 
Kymlicka 2010). But when the community confines itself away from the state and 
the rest of society, its internal governance is affected the most, particularly in the 
area of community leadership, where men come to assume disproportionate 
power with regard to decision-making involving women. In this process, women 
within the community experience minorityness in an intensified way that has 
resulted in the mission-compound patriarchy as mentioned earlier. Mission-
compound patriarchy is a form of classic patriarchy and is situated between 
public and private patriarchy. As I have shown, the churches and the missions 
had been educating women, which made women go out of their homes and work. 
Christian women, compared to other communities, became more educated and 
increasingly went for paid employment, but effectively, their free movement has 
always been within the mission compound. Although a number of Christian 
women worked in public hospitals as nurses, their mentality has always been to 
be confined within the mission-compound. So there has been a shift of the 
boundary of the public-private dichotomy, where the boundary to some extent 
shifted up to the mission compound but women were not and still are not 
encouraged to go beyond this limit. This mission-compound patriarchy isolates 
Christian women from the state’s mechanisms.  
The state is thought to be a ‘dangerous’ place for Christian women. If women go 
outside the church environment, they will be ‘spoiled’ — this has been the 
mentality of the Christian community. The community had played an over-
protective role in keeping women within the ‘safe’ compound. The Christian 
community perceived that Christian women (similar to other minority women) 
are seen as ‘gonimoter mal’ (booty) by the majority community. However, the 
idea is not only a perception within the community but also is widespread. 
During the Liberation War in 1971, the Pakistani Army usually picked up Bengali 
girls and women with the help of Razakar, Al-Badar, and Al-Shams15 by declaring 
                                                 
15 The local Islamist paramilitary forces, those who were convicted as war criminals. 
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them as ‘gonimoter mal’ (booty) to rape them. Even today, minority girls are still 
called ‘gonimoter mal’. This is one reason for the overprotective mentality. Until 
now, people have thought that the mission-compound is a safe place for women 
and they can go there anytime. However, the community perceived that going 
outside the mission-compound is dangerous for Christian women.   
The mobility of women within the mission-compound provides them with a false 
illusion of having free mobility. During my fieldwork, I heard from a number of 
men, women, and even from Christian leaders that the Christian community is 
very open and women of this community are also free to do anything they wish. 
But the fact is that while they exercise certain freedoms within the mission-
compound, this does not necessarily provide access to exercise their rights in the 
wider world.  
In an interview during my fieldwork with Rev. James Sarker, the General 
Secretary of the National Baptist Society (NBS)16, a national-level Protestant 
church body, he told me that he thought that the gender relations within the 
Christian community were much better than those in other societies, such as 
Muslim and Hindu societies. He thought that at least Christian women have the 
opportunities to raise their voice, compared to other communities. I asked the 
General Secretary about the leadership roles that women were playing in NBS. He 
showed his satisfaction with women’s leadership in NBS. He informed me that in 
NBS, a position for Vice President is reserved for women. Also, a number of 
women serve on various committees. However, later, the Women’s Desk 
Coordinator of NBS, Nancy Poddar, told me a different story. in their Executive 
Council, there is no woman except one, who has been elected to fill the 
constitutional requirement. In the committees, the ratio of men and women is 
not even close as men far outnumber women and there is no woman leading the 
committees as a convenor. The maximum number of female participates only in 
                                                 
16 The actual name of the church body has been altered. 
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the Education Committee since most female leaders are in the teaching 
profession, there has been a natural inclination of these women to serve in this 
specific committee.  
When I analysed the constitution of NBS, I found that although it reserves one 
position of Vice President for women and one for ethnic minorities out of three 
positions of Vice President (Section 8.1), it does not provide any indication of 
gender regarding the selection of general members as representatives in its 
General Meetings. If a particular church decides to send only men as its 
representatives in the General Meeting, the Constitution (Section 3.1) does not 
have any provision to restrict this or ensure a gender balance in the General 
Meeting. Hypothetically, if the churches increasingly chose men over women as 
their representatives, then the opportunity for women to be nominated in the 
Executive Council will become slimmer and slimmer. Moreover, according to 
their constitution (Section 8.5), the Nomination Committee, which is responsible 
for nominating suitable persons in various positions of the Council, should be 
formed with three ‘senior’ persons. These three ‘senior’ persons have almost 
always been men as historically men led this institute and therefore when the 
general members nominated the Nomination Committee, they chose three 
elderly men by default. This is an example of classic patriarchy (institutional) 
within the mission-compound, where the highest power concentrates in the 
hands of senior/elderly males.  
I also interviewed Dr Swapan Halder, the newly elected President of NBS. When I 
asked him about this woman-specific Vice President position and overall 
women’s leadership in their church body, he told me, 
Every time the same woman comes to this Vice President position. Only 
two or three women serve in different committees. Every year, you will see 
the same faces. They do not allow other women to come in the leadership, 
whereas they talk about gender equality and gender equity when they are 
not ready to leave their space for other women! 
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Swapan sounded frustrated. I asked him if NBS provides the local churches under 
it with any instructions to balance male and female delegations for the general 
meetings. He said that, “NBS does not provide any formal instructions on this. 
But even if they do, don’t you think they will bias the delegation? All churches 
have the right to send women delegation as much as they want. They are free to 
do it”. 
Pastor Sunil Saha, a leader of NBS as well as the priest in a local church in Dhaka 
told me, “It is some sort of compassion that NBS shows towards women to 
allocate one position at the Executive Council”. He explained that often the 
leaders say that there is no barrier or restriction for women to come in any of the 
other positions in the Council, but that still it is hard to reach those positions. He 
said, “By this ‘compassion position’ of one Vice President reserved for women, we, 
the men are giving a message to women that if we do not give you the 
opportunity, you do not have the qualification to come to the leadership”. 
Swapan Halder, the President of NBS echoed Pastor Saha. He said, “We men feel 
high satisfaction by giving just one seat to women as a Vice President. But this is 
basically a kind of ‘compassion’ which we show to women”.  
But why are there so few female leaders at the national level? Is it because there is 
a lack of female leaders at the local church level? Is it because women are not 
interested in church leadership? Or is it because they are not enabled to become 
leaders in the church? Why cannot women grow as leaders, when their 
participation in the mission-compound is free and encouraged? In my view, there 
is a number of factors resulting in this situation. First, monopolisation of 
leadership by older women. In my fieldwork, I observed that the majority of the 
female leaders, at the local church, district, and national levels are older women; 
most of them are in their 50s and a number of them have passed their 60th 
birthday. All of the national-level female leaders in NBS are wives of the country’s 
prominent Christian leaders and pastors. Their age, which provides them with 
huge power (under classic patriarchy), and moreover, their social status as being 
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Christian leaders’ and pastors’ wives provide them with additional power to hold 
these positions. In such a situation, it is very hard for younger women to rise to 
the leadership positions.  
For example, Nancy Poddar, who is now working as the Women’s Desk 
Coordinator of NBS told me that she faced enormous problems to work in this 
position. She said, "Because I am younger than most female leaders, they do not 
give me enough importance in the role that I am playing in this organisation". 
Some female leaders in the mahila samity (women’s group), both at local and 
national levels, monopolise power and authority. But this monopolisation is not 
unique among women only. The monopolisation of leadership is also a common 
practice within the mainstream leadership (among men); there are a few leaders 
who monopolise the power and authority at that level also. Exactly the same 
situation is reproduced or replicated by female leaders in mahila samity. Nancy 
often organises women's training programmes for the development of women’s 
leadership. But every time these elderly women who are already leaders come as 
participants without allowing younger women to participate. So, virtually no new 
female leaders are created through these training programmes.  
Second, women’s leadership is limited in leading the mahila samity’s activities. 
Although one of the purposes of the formation of mahila samity is to develop 
female leadership in the church, over the years, mahila samity became their only 
territory to practise their leadership. The other place where women can practise 
their leadership skills is at Sunday School for children. Women’s traditional 
gender roles in childcare have been extended under this mission-compound 
patriarchy and women are made responsible for teaching children Christ’s 
teachings. I have observed in a number of church services and women’s camps 
how women are made responsible for rearing future Christians. The other major 
roles beside childcare are praying, fasting, and holding Bible study. In the church 
in Bangladesh, I have seen only women devote their time to praying (in many 
times with fasting) and to conduct Bible study. I did not find any similar activities 
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run with or for men. So, most of the mahila samity’s activities revolve around 
praying, fasting, and studying the Bible, none of which provides them with any 
direct opportunity to build or practise their leadership skills. The most that 
women do is to conduct a Sunday service in every few months. Therefore, it is 
evident that although mahila samity had been established to build and nurture 
women’s leadership to lead the church, it has taken a very limited and confined 
shape and has failed to function as a leadership-building platform.     
Third, the church’s leadership-building mechanism does not specifically include 
women. Local churches usually rely on their jubo samity (youth group) to supply 
the future leaders of the church. For example, both Swapan Halder (President) 
and Rev James Sarker (General Secretary) of NBS, used to be active youth leaders 
in jubo samity of their respective churches. But for women, being in jubo samity 
does not enable them to be future church leaders for two related reasons. One is 
that they leave their natal church if they marry a man from another church and 
usually become a member of their husband’s church. Once this happens, a 
woman will directly enter into mahila samity instead of jubo samity there as often 
married women are not considered being youth ideologically; instead, they are 
viewed as ‘adult’women after their marriage. A similar practice is also common 
even when a girl marries a man from her natal church. Nancy experienced the 
same when she married a few years ago. She said that as soon as a girl gets 
married, they are considered a mahila (woman) as opposed to meye (girl) and are 
encouraged to join mahila samity and not jubo samity. So marriage or marital 
status determines if a woman is still a youth or an adult woman. But this practice 
is not particularly strictly observed among men who are married. A number of 
married men is seen providing leadership in jubo samity. Leadership creation as a 
whole usually happens in jubo samity, where women are discouraged to attend 
once they become married. So in this way women are drained from the process of 
the mainstream leadership development and confined to the leadership of 
women’s groups.  
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Finally, it is important to understand the politics of how women are brought into 
church leadership. Julian Folia, an Anglican Church leader, helped me to 
understand this. He told me that in his church when they held elections for the 
Central Committee, there was a quota in their constitution for women that says 
that at least three women should be elected to the committee. This quota was 
interpreted in such a way that it ignored the fact that three was the minimum 
number and above three any number of women could be elected. I found a 
similar interpretation of the constitution of NBS that states that at least one 
female Vice President should be elected to the council. In order to comply with 
the constitution, NBS elects only one woman in the Council in every term just to 
fulfil the constitutional quota.  
Similarly, in his church also, Julian Folia told me that, every time, they just filled 
the quota and elect three women to the committee. All three women were 
brought under specific categories, mostly as ex-officio members of the 
committee. For example, one of them became the person in-charge of the Sunday 
School, which has been a norm (even if the quota was not there, Sunday School 
was always in the charge of a woman) as no man was interested in Sunday School 
and everyone assumed that it was a women’s job. Another member was usually 
from jubo samity (because they thought that a young woman should represent 
the youth) and the third woman became the women’s representative on the 
committee. Julian said that “these women came with different roles with specific 
criteria. As a result, in the mainstream leadership, no woman remained to take 
those positions”. In most cases, these women became ornamental in the 
committees. Recruiting these women, on the one hand, fulfilled the constitution, 
and on the other, showed that the church is promoting women’s leadership. But 
in effect, women were still absent from the mainstream leadership in the church. 
Julian told me that when three women were elected to the Central Committee, as 
their roles were pre-defined and no more women were brought in the committee, 
the Officers positions, for example, Secretary or Treasurer, were never been filled 
up by a woman. Otherwise, these women had to be provided with a dual role (for 
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example, Secretary and Sunday School in-charge), which was not a regular 
practice, hence all the officers’ positions were held by men only. In his 
observation, whenever women’s leadership came under consideration, the church 
limited it both by numbers (quota) and women’s roles (Sunday school or mahila 
samity representative).  
I met Arpita Malakar in my fieldwork who is now working as the CEO of an 
international donor organisation in Dhaka and is married to a Bangladeshi 
Anglican priest. She came from a reputable Christian (Baptist) family in India and 
studied in an evangelical and ecological college in Kolkata. After she moved to 
Dhaka by marrying a Bangladeshi, her first work was with the Moderator of the 
Anglican Church. She joined the church as the Coordinator of Social 
Development as they also run development work.  
After a few years working at the Anglican Church, Arpita wanted to resign and 
move on to other external jobs because she was not professionally satisfied 
working at the church. The Bishop (Moderator) told her that it was her ‘duty’ to 
work for the church, especially being a priest’s wife. But slowly tensions began to 
arise between her and the Bishops and the other priests as she was not a woman 
who conformed to or complied with all that the Bishops told her to do. She told 
me that, “the church already became aware that I have a strong personality and it 
will be hard for them to make me work and behave the way they want”.  
The fight between Arpita and the Moderator began in 2007 when she received a 
scholarship to travel to the UK to study for a Master’s degree in theology. When 
she informed Bishop about this opportunity, his first reaction was very positive. 
He told her that she deserved it and encouraged her to take it up. She then took 
the IELTS test, received her visa, and even bought her air ticket. With each 
progress of her travel arrangements, she informed Bishop and his reaction in each 
time was, “very good, fantastic”. But when she submitted her leave application, 
things began to change. Another Bishop, who was the Deputy Moderator then, 
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sat down with her and had a long discussion. She said, “He told me that ‘actually 
that old man is jealous of you, he feels threatened by your capabilities. So 
probably he will not approve your leave. So if you want to go for this studies, you 
better resign and go.’ I didn’t understand that it was part of the politics and was 
stunned to hear that”.  
Then after a few days, she received a long letter from the Bishop, which said that 
as per their church constitution, being the wife of a priest, she could only do 
things that the Bishop approved. “That flared me up”, she said, “I have read the 
constitution so well, where on earth the constitution says that thing? So basically 
he was trying to bully me. So I confronted him”. Finally, she submitted her 
resignation and left for the UK for her higher studies.  
The Bishop then wrote a pastoral letter, which was published in the church 
magazine as well, and she said the whole letter was about her — how she was too 
ambitious, how she should be controlled, and so on so forth. But even after all 
these, when she came back to Bangladesh with her degree, she still showed an 
interest in serving the church again. In her words, “I thought I would be more 
useful to the church and I wanted to serve my church”. But after waiting for 
about five months without any response from them, she joined a theological 
college and began teaching there. She said,  
From this what I have realised as a woman is that, the church is happy as 
long as you have done things according to their way. So they will not allow 
you to be empowered. But simultaneously, they also have an agenda to 
show to the outside world that they are promoting women’s 
empowerment. And as a woman, you just have to play the roles where you 
fit into. It is no way women empowerment.  
Although the mission-compound patriarchy provides women with freedom 
outside the boundaries of their homes, it also restricts their mobility to reach out 
to the state and its mechanisms. However, women’s freedom within the mission-
compound does not liberate them to lead the community. Men still hold the 
mainstream leadership positions in the church and women’s leadership is 
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confined to women’s groups only, except for a few token positions in the council. 
As women are not viewed as mainstream leaders of the church, they often are 
excluded from the church’s leadership development processes. Women such as 
Arpita, who do not conform this norm of leadership, often face discrimination 
and become easy victims of church politics.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how minorityness has been constructed within the 
Bangladeshi Christian community. By linking the community’s minorityness to 
patriarchy, I have also shown how mission-compound patriarchy developed 
within the community. Through this mission-compound patriarchy, the churches 
operate as a mechanism to maintain patriarchy. The mission-compound 
patriarchy creates a third category of space outside women’s homes by providing 
them with freedom but, at the same time, restricts women from connecting with 
the state and practising their rights as full citizens of the country. Therefore, 
women in the Bangladeshi Christian community become disconnected from state 
mechanisms and hence become invisible to the state. In other words, the 
mission-compound patriarchy works as a crack through which Christian women 
fall and become absent or invisible to the state. 
The invisibility of Christian women has also made it difficult for state institutions 
and feminist and human rights movements to intervene to advocate their issues. 
As a result, the mission-compound patriarchy feeds into the strength of the 
community leadership and increases its autonomy in controlling the fate of 
community members, particularly women. On the one hand, the mission-
compound patriarchy restricts women from exercising their rights as full citizens; 
on the other hand, because women are excluded from the community’s 
mainstream leadership, they cannot exercise their rights as full members of the 
community. Therefore, Christian women are doubly affected by not being able to 
exercise their rights as both full citizens of the state and full members of the 
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church. This understanding of Bangladeshi Christian women’s position in the 
state as well as in the community helps to gain a deeper understanding of the 
context of legal pluralism that Christian women encounter in their daily lives. 
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Chapter Six 
Minority anxieties over marriages: Creating mutuality to 
accommodate difference 
Introduction 
Since my childhood, many times have I heard the story of how one of my pishis 
(aunt; father’s cousin)1 fell in love with a Muslim man and married him and how 
my father, being her only male cousin (in the absence of her father, who had died 
long back and she had no brother), decided that our extended family must cut all 
contact with her as she had done a ‘terrible thing’ by marrying a Muslim man. For 
many years, my pishi was prohibited from contacting her family, even her own 
mother. It was only when she became a widow with three small children that my 
father accepted her back in the family.  
I do not remember how many times I have heard this story from my two never-
married grandaunts. But I remember one thing very distinctly. Every time they 
told this same story, two points were emphasised: one was that it was an awful 
act that my pishi committed by marrying a Muslim man; the other was how kind 
and considerate my father was to accept her and her children back into the family 
during the crisis in her widowhood. In the Christian community, marrying a non-
Christian is considered unacceptable, as the anecdote suggests.    
This chapter examines the marriage practices within the Christian community in 
Bangladesh, particularly the issue of mixed marriages between a Christian and a 
non-Christian party. By examining ‘unequal marriages’ or inter-religious 
                                                 
1 Usually a father’s cousin is a first cousin once removed. But in Bangladesh, a parent’s first cousin 
sister is considered an aunt and a parent’s first cousin brother is considered an uncle.   
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marriages (mixed marriages) using the concepts of kinship, marriage, and gender, 
I show how the community creates and defines boundaries through marriage, 
while simultaneously accommodating differences in order to create mutuality. 
While marriage is commonly described through a lens of mutuality and 
symmetry, what can be achieved empirically, theoretically, and politically by 
observing the so-called non-mutual and asymmetrical marriages? How can 
asymmetrical unions be positioned in this ideal picture of ‘Christian marriage’? 
How do the concepts of asymmetry, mutuality, and difference within marriage 
circulate within the community? How can mutuality be created out of 
asymmetrical marriages? How can the difference be accommodated within 
marriage? These questions are at the heart of this chapter. I explore these 
questions through the theories of mutuality and difference (Sahlins 2011a, b, 
Goldfarb and Schuster 2016) and social structure and agency (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 
Rubin 1975). 
Inter-faith or inter-religious marriages are often seen as ‘unequal marriages’ 
within the Bangladeshi Christian community. In Bangladesh, marriage is a 
universally stable institution. In other words, most people marry early and 
remain married throughout their lives. However, mixed marriages between 
Christians and non-Christians is taboo and highly discouraged both in Catholic as 
well as Protestant groups. In fact, in order to prevent mixed marriages, both the 
Catholic and the Protestant churches have introduced a number of initiatives 
among young people, such as Bible camps, Christian students’ movements, 
Sunday School, and other church activities, so that the young generations have 
the opportunity to choose a Christian spouse. However, in Bangladesh, mixed 
marriages are particularly prohibited for women as compared to men. There has 
been a constant effort to ensure that Christian women do not marry non-
Christian men under any circumstances.  
Marriage is considered one of the sacraments in the Catholic Church, a direct 
contract with God. The sacramental characteristic of marriage is also part of 
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Hinduism. Within Christianity, different denominations of the Protestant church 
consider marriage to be an institution that is approved and sanctioned by God 
and hence a permanent union between a man and a woman. The civil law that 
governs marriage for Christians in Bangladesh is the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 
(Act XV of 1872). The Christian Marriage Act, 1872, does not prohibit inter-
religious marriages. According to Section 4 of this law, “Every marriage between 
persons, one or both of whom is or are a Christian or Christians, shall be 
solemnised in accordance with the provisions of the next following section; and 
any such marriage solemnized otherwise than in accordance with such provisions 
shall be void”. As the same law, the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, is also 
applicable to Christians in India (which is entitled the Indian Christian Marriage 
Act, 1872), the Law Commission of India (2008) confirms that, under this Act, not 
only are marriages between two Christian parties solemnised but also the 
marriages between a Christian and a non-Christian parties are solemnised. In 
order to have a valid marriage, only one party must be Christian, which means 
the other party may or may not be Christian. The Catholic Church allows 
marriages with non-Catholics. By the term ‘non-Catholic’, the Catholic Church 
means both non-Christians and Protestants. Marriages between a Catholic and a 
non-Catholic party (either a Protestant or a non-Christian) is known as ‘mixed 
marriages’ in the Catholic Church. Although the state law allows Christians to 
marry outside their religion, the Protestant churches do not allow mixed 
marriages (except with Catholics). According to the Protestant churches, only 
persons who practise Christianity and has been baptised are eligible for Christian 
marriages. Therefore, the Protestant churches only apply the Christian Marriage 
Act, 1872 when both parties to a marriage are Christians. 
Before discussing how mixed marriages affect women and men differently, 
understanding the concept of marriage with respect to kinship and gender is 
vital. Although kinship and gender are two distinct concepts, they are 
interlinked, which I am going to demonstrate in this chapter. As I have 
mentioned, both Hindu and Catholic traditions consider marriage a sacrament; 
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according to Hinduism and Catholicism, marriages cannot be broken. As most 
Bangladeshi Christians or their ancestors had a Hindu background, such ideology 
is deep-rooted among all Christians, both Catholics and Protestants.  
Although there are differences between Hindu and Christian (both Catholic and 
Protestant) marriages doctrinally, ideologically Holden’s (2008) argument about 
Hindu marriages is somewhat true for Bangladeshi Christians: 
Divorce is very often declared to be unknown within Hindu tradition. 
Such a purported absence is framed within the notion of Hindu marriage 
as conceptualized in the classical Hindu texts: the union sanctioned by the 
performance of the sacred rites that bring a permanent change to the 
spouses and yield a sacred and indissoluble union. Accordingly, once the 
rituals are properly accomplished, the conjugal bond is established for 
eternity because of the indelible and internal changes produced within the 
spouses by very performance of the rites. (Holden 2008, 1) 
Based on the sacramental characteristic of marriage in Christianity, the churches 
(both Catholic and Protestant) strongly discourage and prohibit mixed marriages. 
This chapter traces women’s experiences of mixed marriages and the church’s 
roles in these marriages. The chapter has five sections. The first section provides 
a theoretical basis to explain these mixed marriages. In this section, I particularly 
unpack the theories of mutuality and difference, coined by Sahlins (2011a, b) and 
later expanded by Goldfarb and Schuster (2016), and the theory of social structure 
by Rubin (1975). In the second section, I show how the concept of mixed marriage 
has been portrayed within the Bangladeshi Christian community, how the 
concept circulates, and how it is gendered. The third section explores how these 
‘love’ marriages or in other words ‘self-chosen’ marriages with non-Christian 
parties have created a moral panic within the community. In this section, I show 
that although the community has been attempting significantly to protect and 
prohibit its young generation from entering these ‘unequal’ relationships (in their 
terms), at the same time they accommodate the differences by creating mutuality 
in order to include these marriages in various processes.  
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The following section discusses this mutuality creation processes. This section 
also shows that these mutuality creation processes occasionally take a violent 
form, which remains unseen and unrecognised within the community. Finally, in 
the last section, I depict these blindspots within the processes of creating 
mutuality through these mixed marriages.   
Kinship, marriage, and gender 
Although kinship, marriage, and gender can be considered to be distinct 
concepts, they are closely entangled with each other. These three notions are 
mutually constructed and they cannot “be treated as analytically prior to the 
other because they are realized together in particular culture, economic, and 
political systems” (Collier and Yanagisako 1987, 7).  Therefore, in order to 
understand marriage and gender, we also need to understand kinship and vice 
versa. Traditional kinship studies focus on conceptualising different ideas and 
elements about “bounded integrity” (Franklin and McKinnon 2001, 19) of a group 
(Schneider 1969, Delaney 1995, Williams 1995). However, Franklin and McKinnon 
(2001) argue that, recently, kinship theories are not only confined to within how a 
nation or a community or a group is bounded but also how crossing those 
boundaries between these categories takes place. Therefore, in order to 
understand kinship and gender, we need to have an understanding of not only 
how the boundaries are created but also how they are crossed.     
Scholars working on and/or critiquing kinship studies have been involved in a 
range of debates around the issue of what should and what should not be 
included under the umbrella of kinship studies, particularly when kinship is more 
and more becoming fluid and complex in this globalised world (Schneider 1984, 
Franklin and McKinnon 2001). According to Franklin and McKinnon (2001, 18), 
“[K]inship becomes a signifier of the power relations, inclusions, and exclusions 
that are definitive of religious faith and community”. In such a situation, it is 
important to examine how kinship ties are both assembled and disassembled in 
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different cultures. It also becomes vital to see how choice and agency come into 
play in this assembling/disassembling process of kinship. While examining this 
process, Franklin and McKinnon (2001, 13) argue that we should also take an 
account of “how kinship is created in ways that coexist with, push against, 
complement, contradict, erase, and make explicit divergent means of connections 
and disconnections”, in Weston’s (2001, 152) words, “connecting some different 
and less familiar dots”.  
For Weston (2001, 168), kinship is neither a pre-existing phenomenon, nor it is a 
“coherent ideology or core concept”. But instead, it is something “congealed” and 
those who choose to cross the boundary of kinship rules are seen as disloyal to 
their respective community. Weston (2001, 168) asks a vital question, which is at 
the heart of my argument: “Congealed how, for whose benefit, and from what?” 
According to Franklin and McKinnon (2001): 
[K]inship can be mobilized to signify not only specific kinds of connection 
and inclusion but also specific kinds of disconnection and exclusion — as 
well as the boundary-crossing trickster movements that confound such 
classifications. Since relations of power are central to the articulation of 
such classificatory boundaries and movements, kinship is also utilized to 
articulate the possibilities for social relations of equality, hierarchy, amity, 
ambivalence, and violence. In so doing, it becomes evident that kindship’s 
classificatory maneuvers can be mobilized to bring into being other 
categories of relationality — including genders, sexualities, races, species, 
machines, nature, and culture. (Franklin and McKinnon 2001, 15) 
Leach (1961) argues that marriage cannot be considered an isolated institution, 
which is why understanding marriage in a holistic manner is important. 
Therefore, understanding the concept of marriage should not only be confined by 
law. No matter if the marriage is arranged by the family or relatives, or chosen by 
the couple for love, the institution of marriage is structured based on a set of 
social practices and relations. In South African context, Palriwala and Kaur (2014) 
depict the holistic nature of marriage that brings together more than just two 
individuals or families, which is equally true for the South Asia region. In their 
view:  
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[A] marriage is articulated as more than an ongoing relationship between 
two individuals. It establishes a tie between two social groups such as 
family-households, lineages, or clans, at times, reiterates an already 
existing tie between them. Whether viewed primarily as a contract or a 
sacrament, marriage establishes a relationship between more than just the 
two in the conjugal pair. In other words, marriage is an alliance in 
structuralist and political terms, entailing affinal relations. (Palriwala and 
Kaur 2014, 4) 
The holistic and complicated nature of marriage has also been depicted by other 
scholars. For example, Lévi-Strauss (1965), while examining the number of 
marriage types for different clans within Crow-Omaha systems, had to appoint a 
mathematician for calculation purposes. One of the results he derived with the 
help of mathematicians was that in a society comprising of 30 clans the number 
of marriage types potentially was 297,423,855. However, Leach (1961, 108) 
concludes that “the nature of the marriage institution is partially correlated with 
principles of descent and rules of residence”. Based on this view of Leach (1961), 
Needham (1971) argues that marriage is more than a jural institution, which 
accommodates unpredictable and uncontrollable types of moral and mystical 
concepts as well.  
A few years later of Lévi-Strauss’ (1965) mathematical calculations on marriage 
types, Korn and Needham (1970) made an intensive analysis of kinship and 
concluded that mathematical techniques are neither capable of nor convenient to 
helping conceptualise the complexity with regards to kinship and marriage even 
in such simple and closed forms of societies. In my opinion, a parallel can also be 
drawn between mathematics and law, where both are incapable of capturing all 
the complexities associated with marriage. So in order to understand marriage, 
one has to go beyond law and see marriage in a holistic way. 
Understanding marriage within a society is a key to understanding the society 
inside out. To explain marriage, Needham (1971) cites Onvlee’s (1949) findings in 
eastern Sumba, where matrilateral cross-cousin marriages are the most preferred 
forms of marriages and one would not be able to understand a completely 
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unrelated issue, such as dam-building, unless they understand the norms with 
regard to marriages. Similarly, without understanding the forms of cooperation 
that follow marriages, one would not be able to understand the marriage system 
within that society. According to Rivière (1971), marriages should be viewed as 
expressions of social structure. In other words, a marriage itself can be a 
consequence of a social structure, and moreover, it can have a consequence for 
the social structure. Therefore, according to Rivière (1971, 63), questions such as, 
“Would you let your daughter marry a Negro (dustman, or peer)?” is a question 
about the social structure. Each marriage that crosses the boundary has some 
kind of consequence for that respective social structure.  
According to Sahlins (2011a, 11), “mutuality of being” makes kinsmen “persons 
who belong to one another, who are members of one another, who are co-present 
in each other, whose lives are joined and interdependent”. However, Goldfarb 
and Schuster (2016) critically engage with Sahlins’ (2011a, b) theory of mutuality 
that asks ‘what kinship is’ and offer an alternative argument. Goldfarb and 
Schuster (2016) conclude that instead of focusing on an identity of similarity that 
struggles with mutuality and difference, they take up non-mutuality and turn it 
into the comparative frame itself. According to them: 
Notably, our attention to difference as a key factor for understanding 
kinship as precisely a systematic interplay between similarity and 
difference, between self and other, parsing those who are too similar to 
marry from those incorporable as marriage partners … — a process that, in 
turn, has long been understood to produce lasting hierarchies and 
inequalities. (Goldfarb and Schuster 2016, 8) 
Thus, as Goldfarb and Schuster (2016) suggest, the difference lies right at the 
centre of kinship. So by expanding Sahlins’(2011a, 11) concept of “mutuality of 
being”, Goldfarb and Schuster (2016) trigger some of the kinship experiences (not 
all) and reveal culturally and historically contingent ways in which kinship is 
materialised and de-materialised, which is similar to how people negotiate both 
similarities and differences in their daily lives.  
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In pre-state societies, kinship is the idiom of social interaction, organizing 
economic, political, ceremonial, and sexual activities. One’s duties, 
responsibilities, and privileges vis-à-vis others are defined in terms of mutual 
kinship or lack thereof. The exchange of goods and services, production, and 
distribution, hostility and solidarity, ritual and ceremony, all take place within 
the organizational structure of kinship. (Rubin 1975, 169-170). Although in this 
particular instance Rubin (1975) talks about pre-state societies, most of her 
analysis is still applicable in today’s societies in one way or the other. According 
to Rubin (1975), kinship systems from culture to culture vary significantly. 
Kinships determine rules that govern who can and/or cannot marry whom. For 
Christians in Bangladesh, a combination of Christian values and pre-Christian 
kinship rules have created the current kinship practices, particularly around 
issues of marriage (who can and/or cannot marry whom). 
Both Lévi-Strauss’ Elementary Structure of Kinship and Mauss’ theory of primitive 
social organization theorise the ‘gift’, a very significant feature of primitive 
societies. Lévi-Strauss (1969) takes it further and argues that “marriages are a 
most basic form of gift exchange, in which it is women who are the most precious 
gifts” (Rubin 1975, 173). Lévi-Strauss (1969) argues that marriage is a complex 
form of social transaction that involves the exchange of women, dually 
articulated by two factors, the ‘gift’ and the ‘incest taboo’ that prohibits people 
from marrying within a degree of relationships. So in order to understand such 
exchanges, as Lévi-Strauss (1969) suggests, one should deeply understand incest 
taboo within a society.  
The concept of incest taboo is universal but its content varies from society to 
society (Rubin 1975). So examining the incest taboo reveals “the social aim of 
exogamy and alliance upon the biological events of sex and procreation” (Rubin 
1975, 173). It is the incest taboo that sets the boundary between permitted and 
prohibited sexual partners. However, I argue that by examining the incest taboo 
in a particular society, one can only capture the inner boundary of permitted and 
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prohibited sexual partners. But most societies also put an outer boundary to 
define how far one can go in choosing their sexual partner. In this way, the pool 
of possible sexual partners would be limited to these two — inner and outer — 
boundaries. If exogamy is preferred, then the question of how much exogamy is 
accepted becomes vital.    
Coming back to the ‘gift’ component in marriage, Lévi-Strauss (1969) further 
argues: 
The total relationship of exchange which constitutes marriage is not 
established between a man and a woman, but between two groups of men, 
and the woman figures only as one of the objects in the exchange, not as 
one of the partners … This remains true even when the girl’s feelings are 
taken into consideration, as, moreover, is usually the case. In acquiescing 
to the proposed union, she precipitates or allows the exchange to take 
place, she cannot alter its nature. (Lévi-Strauss 1969, 115) 
Therefore, in such exchanges, women become a channel of the relationship, 
rather than being a partner to it (Rubin 1975). However, Rubin (1975, 174) does 
not necessarily argue that such exchanges objectify women but they “imply a 
distinction between gift and giver”. According to her, if women are the gifts, then 
men are the exchange partners and in such a situation “women are in no position 
to realize the benefits of their own circulation … [instead,] it is men who are the 
beneficiaries of the product of such exchanges.” (Rubin 1975, 174). A similar 
exchange that Rubin (1975) describes can be seen in the konnya shampradan 
(daughter’s bestowal) ceremony held as part of the wedding rituals among 
Bengalis. Nicholas (1995, 141) describes this ceremony as making “a selfless ‘gift of 
the bride’ … to the groom with no expectation of return”, is a ceremony held 
during both Bengali Christian and Hindu weddings. Konnya shampradan is a 
classic example that creates a symbolic meaning where the father (or uncle in the 
father’s absence) bestows his daughter on the groom. A mother cannot bestow 
her daughter as she does not have rights to be her daughter’s guardian equal to 
her father (Rubin 1975).  
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This discussion leads to the fact that, according to Rubin (1975, 176-177), in the 
most general sense, a kinship system is a ‘production’ system where “a 
transformation of objects (in this case, people) to and by a subjective purpose … 
It has its own relations of production, distribution, and exchange, which include 
certain ‘property’ forms in people”. According to Rubin (1975, 177), “In this sense, 
the exchange of women is a profound perception of a system in which women do 
not have full rights to themselves”. It is important to note that these sorts of 
property rights are not equivalent to private property rights. Such an ‘exchange of 
women’ is an expression to say that men hold certain rights over their female kin 
that women do not hold over themselves or over their male kin.  
Unequal marriages: Oshomo jowal 
During my PhD fieldwork, I stayed in my father’s house in Dhaka in between 
travelling to different places around the country. My father has an enormous 
collection of books. While staying there, one of the activities that I enjoyed the 
most was to browse through his books. In the process, one day my eyes were 
stuck at a corner of his bookshelf. It was not a new book. I have seen this same 
old book (written in Bangla) in our bookshelf since I was a child. Yet, this old 
familiar book all of a sudden appeared to be an important piece of the puzzle that 
I wanted to solve at the time. The title of the book is Oshomo Jowal. A direct 
English translation will be ‘unequal yoke’. The book was published in 1982 by the 
Association of Baptists in Chittagong, and written by a Christian female writer, 
Basanti Das (Das 1982). The book is a collection of fictional stories that aims to 
describe the negative effects on Christian girls of marrying non-Christians. 
Oshomo jowal (unequal yoke) is a metaphor that came from the Bible (II Cor. 
6:14-18)2 and is used to describe mixed marriages between a Christian and a non-
                                                 
2 "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for what fellowship hath righteousness 
with unrighteousness? And what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath 
Christ with Belial? Or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel? And what agreement hath 
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Christian in Bangladesh. There are Hindu equivalent terms — anuloma3 and 
pratiloma4 — and in most cases, Hindu vedic text has prohibited pratiloma. 
Under Christianity, the phrase ‘unequally yoked together’ is the translation of just 
one Greek word, heterozugeo, which means, to yoke up differently; to associate 
discordantly; unequally yoke together. The word yoke means a coupling as when 
two oxen are coupled or yoked together by a pulling beam to do work such as 
ploughing a field or pulling a wagon. The notion of ‘unequal yoke’ has been 
translated in Bangla and became oshomo jowal, where the word oshomo means 
unequal and jowal means yoke. When Christian men and women enter into 
mixed marriages with non-Christian parties, it is often said that the person has 
entered into an oshomo jowal relationship or the person has become involved in 
oshomo jowali. 
 I took the book in my hand. The cover of the book summarises clearly the 
intended message of it. A sketch of a crying woman has taken half of the book 
cover (see Figure 6.1). Half of her face is visible and the sadness and tears in her 
eyes certainly catch readers’ attention. I turned to the cover page and opened the 
inner cover. What I saw there made me stunned for a few moments. Three 
particular words are written in small fonts within parenthesis, right below the 
title Oshomo Jowal.  It says, “Khrishtan torunider jonno”, which means ‘for young 
Christian girls’. The author Basanti Das wrote a small note as a preamble to the 
book, which can be translated as “A portrait of our modern young Christian 
women has been presented in this book through small stories. I hope my book 
will speak to them” (Das 1982).     
                                                 
the temple of God with idols? For ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will 
dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. 
Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye separate, says the Lord, and touch not the 
unclean thing; and I will receive, and will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and 
daughters, says the Lord Almighty", (II Cor. 6:14–18). 
3 Anuloma Marriage in Hinduism refers to the hypergamy form of marriage, under which a boy 
from an upper caste can marry a girl from a lower caste. 
4 Pratiloma refers to the hypogamy form of marriage, in which a man of lower caste marries a girl 
of higher caste. Many Hindu religious texts have condemned such union. 
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After reading such a preamble, I had no other choice but to read the entire book 
in one sitting. The book clearly provides evidence that oshomo jowal is an issue 
about which the Christian community has been concerned particularly with 
respect to women. The book contains six small stories; each one of them portrays 
how appalling women’s lives could be if they marry a non-Christian man. One of 
them, titled “Chithi” (the letter), tells a story of a young Christian girl, Ranu, who 
married a Hindu man, Samir, when they were very young. In the first few 
months, they had a happy life together. But none of their families accepted their 
marriage. They did not have a regular income as both were still students. Reality 
began to become harsh after some time. In the meantime, Ranu became 
pregnant. But Samir could not endure the hardship any longer and hence one day 
he left her and went back to his parents’ house without telling her. After a few 
weeks, she came to know about Samir’s return to his parents’. But she could not 
Figure 6.1 
Cover page of the book Oshomo Jowal 
(Picture used with permission) 
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go back to her own house as she was pregnant and she thought her parents 
would not be able to face society if she returned home in this situation. So finally 
Ranu committed suicide. The story provides her narrative that repeatedly stated 
that how she has committed this awful ‘sin’ by marrying a non-Christian man and 
she will be ‘burnt in hell’ for her action. In her words, “[I]f you choose to be apart 
from God and only cling human, this is the misery that you have to go through” 
(Translated by the author) (Das 1982, 22).  
Interestingly, all of the stories in this book depict oshomo jowal as a sin, the 
definite consequence of which is unhappiness. Not even one single story shows a 
situation where a Christian girl became happy in her life after marrying a non-
Christian man. In the Bangladeshi Christian community, oshomo jowal is seen as 
a women’s issue. Some myths circulating around this notion include those that 
state that girls who married non-Christian men would never be able to become 
happy in their lives, they have removed themselves from God, and they have 
committed sin.   
What makes a woman writer write such fictions? Who are the readers of this 
book? Later I asked these questions of a Protestant lay leader. He told me that 
during the 1980s, a number of Christian girls married non-Christian men, mostly 
Muslims, and left the community. Most of them converted to Islam as they had to 
move to their husbands’ family and live with them. He continued, “The whole 
Christian community in Bangladesh began to panic about our girls leaving the 
community. During that time many churches organised seminars for young boys 
and girls and attempted to raise awareness on this issue”. The book Oshomo 
Jowal was written in the same period. He informed me that the writer Basanti Das 
was approached by the church to write a book such as this. Three thousand 
copies were printed of the first edition of the book and were made available 
through different churches, Christian bookstores and other Christian or church-
based organisations around the country at a minimum price. The book is still 
available in the Association of Baptist and other Christian bookstores. 
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Oshomo jowal is a concept that circulates widely within the community. When a 
Christian woman marries a non-Christian man, particularly a Muslim man, it 
becomes the talk of the town for some time. In informal social settings, you will 
often hear statements such as ‘so-and-so’s daughter Muslimer shathe vege gache’, 
a direct English translation of which would be ‘fled with a Muslim’. What they 
mean by this expression is that she married a Muslim man. In formal settings, the 
term oshomo jowal is often used to mean the same situation. This particular term 
is often heard in Christian youth meetings and at Bible camps for young people. 
Even sometimes from the church pulpit, the term is pronounced. A Protestant 
church body runs similar Bible camps every year for the Christian students who 
recently completed the Secondary School Certificate Examination. In the Bible 
camp, the church body includes a complete course on oshomo jowal in their 
curriculum each year and they run these courses for girls and boys separately in 
the camp.  
Love marriages create moral panic 
The anecdote at the beginning of this chapter, followed by the stories from the 
book Oshomo Jowal, shows that Christian women marrying non-Christian men 
are considered a sin against God by the church. These inter-religious marriages 
are only accepted by the community if the non-Christian party converts to 
Christianity. During my fieldwork, I saw that a number of Christian women who 
married non-Christian men were excluded from society. In many instances, even 
when their parents had accepted their marriages, they were still not encouraged 
to attend the usual extended family or church events.  
Traditionally, in Bangladesh, similar to elsewhere in South Asia, parents are the 
ones who arrange their children’s marriages. However, in recent times, a child 
finding their own spouse by themselves for love has become increasingly 
common. Inter-religious marriages are clearly a form of love marriage. Vatuk 
(2014) explores the changes in marriage patterns in contemporary South Asia, 
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and how people are moving away from traditionally arranged marriages (by 
parents and relatives) towards love marriages. She also explores whether today’s 
marriages strictly follow the principles of endogamy and/or exogamy. According 
to Vatuk (2014), there is a considerable increase, particularly among the urban, 
educated, young people, to choose for ‘arranged love marriage’, where parents 
allow their children to choose their own spouse and then they proceed with a 
wedding that includes traditional wedding rituals. However, Donner (2002) 
found that even when parents continue to initiate the choosing of mates for their 
children, both daughters and sons are allowed to have more control than they 
used to have in the past over the process of choosing their respective spouse.   
I observed that in most places in Bangladesh people still associate the concept of 
‘love marriage’ with a significant level of negativity. People often assume that 
whoever entered into a ‘love marriage’ violated their parents’ wish. Therefore, 
according to Vatuk (2014), the couples who have entered marriage for love, will 
try to downplay or conceal this part of their relationship history when talking 
about their marriage. 
I met Jacinta Rozario in my fieldwork in Dhaka, who had married a Muslim man 
named Rezaul Haque. They have a three-year-old son and now live in Australia. 
Jacinta was explaining to me when I visited their house in Dhaka during her visit 
to Bangladesh, how her parents and other relatives became very upset and to 
some extent aggressive about her marriage and how they repeatedly convinced 
Jacinta that she should return to her parent’s even after their marriage. Jacinta 
told me:  
I am from a Catholic family. When my parents and siblings came to know 
that I was going to marry Reza soon, they were angry with me. One day I 
fled with him and married him in the court. Then when we went to his 
house, we had our second wedding in an Islamic way, conducted by a kazi. 
My in-law’s family never asked me to convert to Islam. I just had to say 
kobul three times. My parents repeatedly called me and Reza and 
threatened us in many ways. They tried to make me understand what will 
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be the consequences in my society. At one point they gave up and cut all 
contacts with me. Even my siblings did not talk to me. 
After a couple of years, Jacinta and Rezaul migrated to Australia and within a year 
they became parents of a baby boy. Jacinta said, “Things began to become normal 
after we had a baby. Now my parents are happy about my life”. But Jacinta told 
me that although she has reconnected with her immediate family, she is still not 
in touch with her extended family or her church friends and other relatives.  
However, Shiuli Sarker did not face issues as intensive as did Jacinta. Shiuli is a 
daughter of a prominent Protestant lay leader. When she married a Muslim man, 
who is also from a very educated and politically influential family in Dhaka, the 
whole community began to discuss it as no one expected anything like this from 
her. Shiuly did not convert to Islam and did not face serious objection from her 
own family while marrying this man. But some church leaders made an effort to 
attach great significance to this issue and they attempted to force her husband to 
convert to Christianity. But Shiuly told me while describing her experience that 
she and her husband went to Canada soon after their marriage, where her 
husband was a permanent resident. Shiuly thinks that as she went and lived 
overseas for a few months just after their marriage, the church leaders could not 
continue with the conversion issue for long. However, Shiuly told me that 
although her family had accepted this marriage, she, for an extended period of 
time, had to stay out of contact with the church so that she did not encounter 
controversial questions from other church members. In my view, Shiuli escaped 
community control of mixed marriage because of her family’s influential position. 
Shiuli, being a daughter of one of the most influential leaders of her church, 
managed to position herself beyond the radar of the church.5   
A Catholic interpretation of mixed marriages is different from a Protestant 
interpretation. According to the Catholic Church, any marriage between a 
                                                 
5 I will elaborate on how women use their socio-economic and political status to achieve their 
goals in the following chapter (Chapter Seven). 
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Catholic party and a non-Catholic (both Protestant and non-Christian) party are 
considered to be mixed marriages. But the term ‘mixed marriage’ has two distinct 
meanings: one is a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Christian and the 
other is a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic (Christians from other 
Protestant denominations). The former is referred to as inter-religious marriage 
and the latter as inter-church marriage. In the Catholic Church, mixed marriage 
between two persons mentioned above is highly discouraged, acceptable only in 
exceptional cases, and depends on the merit of the particular case.  
According to the Canon Law, “A marriage between two persons, one of whom has 
been baptized in the Catholic Church or received into it and has 
not defected from it by a formal act and the other of whom is not baptized, 
is invalid” (section 1986). Only in certain exceptional, urgent, and serious cases 
can such inter-religious marriages be approved by the respective Bishop. 
However, such marriages will not be considered ‘sacramental marriages’. In cases 
of inter-church marriages, according to the Canon Law, without the permission 
of the respective Bishop, a marriage is prohibited between two baptised persons 
of whom one is baptised in the Catholic Church and the other is from another 
non-Catholic/Protestant church (Section 1124). 
The Catholic Church provides a number of justifications for the prohibition of 
such mixed marriages, both inter-religious and inter-church. However, most 
reasons directly justify prohibiting Catholic women specifically from marrying a 
non-Catholic man and not vice versa. According to a Bangla book titled Marriage 
and conjugal life: Light up our hearts with love (translated by the author), written 
by Dr Fr Mintoo L. Palma, Judicial Vicar of the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical 
Tribunal Dhaka, some of the most common reasons to discourage any forms of 
mixed marriages are when a Catholic woman marries a non-Catholic man, she 
has to move to a non-Catholic environment where she may encounter unhappy 
conjugal life or even marriage break-up or divorce; she may lose her faith; she 
may face an adverse residential environment to practise her faith; and, she will 
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not be able to raise her children in the Catholic way (Palma 2009). Although 
overall the Catholic Church discourages mixed marriages for both men and 
women, and in this particular context it focuses on women more than men and 
leaves the burden to maintain a family in the Catholic way only to women. In 
fact, a section (page 91) of the book describes how there are different 
complications when a Catholic man marries a non-Catholic woman and when a 
Catholic woman marries a non-Catholic man. The latter case is strictly 
discouraged by the Catholic Church, although it shows reasonable flexibility in 
cases of the former scenario. Among the Protestant churches, mixed marriage 
refers to only inter-religious marriages, in other words, marriages between 
Christian (Catholic or Protestant) and non-Christian. Marriages between a 
Protestant and a Catholic are not considered mixed marriage. However, under 
this interpretation, in Protestant churches provision for mixed marriages is 
almost absent, unless the non-Christian party converts to Christianity.  
While conducting my fieldwork, a Protestant national church body organised a 
theological consultation meeting on Christian marriage and its dissolution. The 
General Secretary of the organising church body told me that the Catholic 
Church has its own rules and regulation with regards to marriage and its 
dissolution. But, unfortunately, the Protestant churches do not have anything 
concrete. The churches have been solving their issues on a case-by-case basis and 
the church leaders around the country feel that there should be some uniform 
policies or guidelines to solve these increasing marriage and divorce related 
problems in churches. The consultation meeting was an initiative along that line, 
where leaders from different denominations, including Anglican and Baptist, 
were invited to contribute to the discussion. The meeting was attended by 27 
church leaders and pastors, out of whom only five were women.  
In the consultation meeting, the Chairperson and the General Secretary 
explained the issue with regard to mixed marriages and its associated crisis. 
According to the Chairperson, “As the family is the smallest unit of the church 
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when the unit becomes weak, the whole church experiences some sort of 
damage. Mixed marriages have done this damage in the church”. The General 
Secretary also spoke along with a similar line. According to him,  
The churches have developed a deep wound around the issues of marriage 
and its associated issues. There have been controversial debates going on 
in the churches around the questions, how should these people be 
punished? Who should take the lead to punishing them? What should be 
the degree of this punishment? Will the parents of the involved party also 
be included in this punishment?  
According to the church leadership, mixed marriages are responsible for 
weakening the church and, in this case, the leaders of the church intended to 
have a separate set of regulations that would set out the boundary in relation to 
marriage and specify how people should be ‘punished’ when they break these 
regulations by entering into mixed marriages. Most leaders agreed with the view 
of creating regulations in the church in order to “make this society orderly”, in 
their words. Some leaders present at the meeting provided emphasis to pre- and 
post-marriage counselling, which they thought was not being conducted properly 
at present. According to them, Christian boys and girls need “adequate teaching” 
on these issues. They recommended a manual both for pre- and post-marital 
counselling and establishing a counselling centre. Some other leaders thought 
that they do not have sufficient policies in place. According to them, besides the 
state laws, the church should have its own rules. Also, they recommended the 
creation of a special committee that would be responsible for monitoring, 
investigating, and reporting these marital issues to the council. There was also a 
recommendation to organise additional youth events for eligible young people so 
that they can meet their potential spouses.  
Mixed marriages were seen by these leaders as wrong deeds of young men and 
women and they believed that the young generations need ‘proper guidance’ 
from the church in order to overcome the tendency of entering into mixed 
marriages. The leaders also believed that creating rules and regulations in the 
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church and punishing people by withholding church membership or rights to 
Holy Communion from those who entered these types of marriages would reduce 
mixed marriages in the Christian community.    
A leader present at the consultation meeting raised the question of what happens 
when the children of church leaders enter into oshomo jowali? Will the 
punishment for them be equal to that of other general members? According to 
him, “From the Bible’s teaching we see that if leaders fail to keep their 
commitment as leaders, they must step down from their positions”. This is a 
similar view I found in the Constitution of another Protestant national church 
body. According to their Constitution, if a person from that community lives 
together or marries a non-Christian person, then they or any member of their 
family will not be eligible to be part of the leadership of that church body (Clause 
72(7)). In this way the church believes that not only the persons entering into 
mixed marriages have committed a ‘sin’ and are, therefore ‘punishable’ but also 
their family members, particularly their parents, are responsible for their 
children’s deeds and therefore these parents have lost their eligibility to be 
leaders of the community. 
Many members and leaders of the community are concerned about young people 
who have the possibility of crossing the boundary of the community and entering 
into oshomo jowali. Such moral panic leads them to take a whole range of 
initiatives, as I have discussed above. Most leaders are occupied in thinking what 
punishment they should hand to someone who has entered into such a marriage. 
Shaping the young people’s thoughts and values through pre-marriage 
counselling or by including a certain curriculum in their Bible camps are 
symptoms of this panic. Moreover, the eagerness and the urgency that they show 
towards creating concrete rules and regulations within the church also indicate 
the existence of the moral panic around mixed marriages. In my view, this moral 
panic is often created by the community’s minorityness. Because of Islamic 
radicalisation and the instances of torture and violence that the community often 
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experiences both from the state and the majority communities, when its 
members engage with marital unions with members of the majority community, 
the Christian community feels threatened and often attempts to protect its 
members from such unions.6   
The gendered effect of mixed marriage 
The moral panic that the mixed marriages create among the Christian 
community is not un-gendered. Men and women of the community experience 
the effects of this panic when they marry outside the community. Women are 
particularly targeted in this process and become more affected than their male 
counterparts. Due to social structure and practices, when two people from 
different religions enter into marital unions, women are the ones who commonly 
convert to their husband’s religion. One of the main reasons for this conversion is 
explained by the virilocal marriage system that exists in most parts of Bangladesh 
and South Asia. As per the virilocal marriage system, a wife moves out from her 
parent’s house and lives at her in-law’s house. Therefore, it makes more sense to 
the particular community if the wife converts and takes her husband’s religion so 
that the wife can be integrated into their husband’s family better. Therefore, 
when a Christian woman marries a non-Christian man, the usual assumption is 
that she will convert to her husband’s religion. This assumption often results in a 
greater level of panic within the community. But the questions that follow this 
discussion are: Why does the community fear losing women? Why do they 
become so concerned about this whole issue of Christian women marrying non-
Christian men?  The panic has a twofold explanation: first is the kinship and 
marriage explanation and second is the minorityness-related explanation.  
Under the kinship and marriage explanation, as mentioned before, women 
become a channel of the relationship in the marriage exchanges, instead of being 
                                                 
6 For detailed discussion on ‘minorityness’, see Chapter Five. 
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a partner to it (Rubin 1975).  As Rubin (1975) shows, marriage is an exchange 
between two men, where women are seen as the channels of the relationship, 
instead of being a partner to it, and women become the ‘gift’. Breaking this 
exchanges often leads to the fear of losing authority as the father of the bride 
when she chooses to leave the community with an external man. It becomes 
almost losing ‘property’ that they possess. It is not acceptable generally that 
daughters will choose their spouses by themselves. Although these days some 
parents are flexible about this matter, traditionally it is still expected that parents 
will decide who their daughters will marry. Moreover, through the marriage 
ceremony, the father plays an important role, which is a symbolic one, in the 
‘exchange’ process of the bride. Most of the churches now practice konnya 
shampradan (daughter’s bestowal) and biday (after the wedding saying goodbye 
to the daughter when she goes with her husband to her in-laws’ place), which 
symbolises this exchange that Rubin (1975) talks about.  
However, when a daughter chooses her spouse by herself for love, if the spouse is 
from the Christian community, and once her parents agree with her choice, the 
rest of the ceremonies becomes equivalent to a marriage traditionally arranged by 
the parents. Similar to arranged marriages, in this case, the two families will sit 
together and plan accordingly. So although the marriage is for love, it is easily 
convertible to a traditional marriage by adding necessary features. But when it 
involves choosing a non-Christian man, all these traditions and rituals collapse 
and the ‘exchange’ breaks down. Both the parents and the community perceive 
this as a failure from their ends particularly of her father. So, controlling women’s 
choice is a vital part of keeping the ‘exchange’ intact.   
The other reason for this panic is at a somewhat greater level, with regards to the 
group and its identity. The minority identity7 comes into play in creating such 
panic. Religion-based minority communities function as a separate and isolated 
                                                 
7 For detailed discussions on minority identity, see Chapter Five.  
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entity from the mainstream community in order to protect their interest and 
identity. In this process of identity protection, women’s position in the 
community becomes a critical factor. Under these circumstances, when the 
community loses women through mixed marriages, the community become 
protective of them. Therefore, being a minority group in a majority Muslim-
dominated society, the panic of losing women creates another layer of 
complexity. 
Creating mutuality and accommodating difference 
Despite the measures and precautions that the Bangladeshi Christian community 
has taken to prevent oshomo jowal, both young men and women marry people 
from different religions, mostly Muslims and Hindus. This section explores how 
mutuality is created and differences are accommodated within the Christian 
community with regard to these inter-religious marriages. During my fieldwork 
in Dhaka, I interviewed a number of Christian lay leaders of the Protestant 
community. Among them, John Adhikary was one of the most prominent Baptist 
leaders. Apart from his church leadership, he was also a leader in the amendment 
process of the Christian personal law. When I interviewed John, he told me that 
he had carried out an informal survey among the Protestant community on the 
issue of mixed marriages to understand the current trend. According to his 
survey, 14% of educated young people from the Protestant community marry 
someone from another religion. Out of this 14%, 70% leave the church. Moreover, 
80% of Protestant young men who marry Muslim women leave the church. Out 
of these young men who leave the church, 50% convert to other religions. About 
75% of those who do not keep their affiliation with the church because of mixed 
marriages are children of church leaders. As this particular survey was conducted 
in an informal way, I am assuming that it was not conducted by following 
sampling and other formal research techniques. However, in the absence of any 
other statistics, these ratios can provide us with some idea about what actually is 
  
175 
 
going on in the ground. John Adhikary told me that as part of his work in relation 
to mixed marriages, he also ran a workshop in 2009 for couples who have entered 
into mixed marriage relationships and where the non-Christian spouse has 
converted to Christianity. He also provided me with a copy of the report of the 
workshop. 
The workshop, titled ‘Mixed Marriage and Culture’, was held on the premises of a 
national NGO in Dhaka under the leadership of John Adhikary. In the workshop, 
more than ten couples with different religious backgrounds were present and 
shared the different experiences that they had been through because of their 
mixed-marriage situations. Among the couples, there were both husbands and 
wives who had Muslim and Hindu backgrounds and who had now converted to 
Christianity. However, while sharing their experiences, the most common 
experience stated was that due to their mixed marriages, they have lost family 
support from both sides. The Christian parties who married a Muslim or a Hindu 
found that their family had stopped maintaining relationships with them because 
of their marriage outside the Christian community. At the same time, those who 
came from other religious backgrounds and married a Christian and have 
converted also experienced their families cutting all contact because of their 
marriage and conversion. So from both sides, they have lost their familial and 
social support.   
Although mixed marriages have created various issues within families and 
communities, John Adhikary thinks that mixed marriages actually bring good to 
society as long as the non-Christian party can be integrated through conversion. 
In the workshop, a summary of John Adhikary’s address goes like this: Mixed 
marriages have enriched the Christian community. But in this globalisation era, 
this new commitment has not only challenged the older values. Mixed marriages 
lead to having a more brilliant generation. Science has proven that genetically the 
more distance exists between couples, the probability increases of having healthy 
and brilliant children. Those who have entered into mixed marriages, they have 
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strengthened community in this way. The time has come to see mixed marriages 
from different angles. Those who have entered mixed marriages, they should 
consider having more children, because they are genetically in a stronger 
position. The Christian community needs intelligent people as this is how a 
developed society can be created. The community needs good citizens and 
intelligent members. 
While some leaders show their anxiety for mixed marriages, some others find 
ways to accommodate these types of marriages. John Adhikary’s effort is closer 
towards the latter. In order to justify mixed marriages, his first condition was 
conversion. In the workshop, only couples where the non-Christian party has 
converted to Christianity were invited. Therefore, as per John Adhikary’s 
argument, mixed marriages can only be accepted in the community as long as the 
non-Christian spouse converts to Christianity. In this way, apart from the moral 
panic of the community, there is a clear case of mutuality creation taking place in 
other parts of the community. In this specific case, through converting the non-
Christian spouse and their enculturation, mutuality is created.   
Shumi Halder’s story provides another example of the creation of such mutuality. 
Shumi is a woman in her 30s from a Protestant family. She had a relationship 
with Sujay, a Hindu man, for more than ten years, beginning with their time at 
university. However, because of their different religious backgrounds, none of 
their parents agreed to their marriage. When I was conducting fieldwork, Shumi 
shared the story about how she and Sujay had been suffering for years. Finally, 
her father gave Shumi a condition. He said that he will only provide his consent 
as her father to this marriage if Sujay converts to Christianity. As both Shumi and 
Sujay were determined that they would go for a social marriage, finally, Sujay 
converted to Christianity to marry Shumi. She said,  
Sujay had no other choice but to convert. But I know this is not a 
conversion in the true sense. He just needed to satisfy my father by 
showing that he became Christian. No one from his family also know 
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about his ‘fake’ conversion [laughs]. The pastor took a few classes and 
taught him about Christianity and then baptised him two days prior to our 
marriage. Sujay doesn’t even care about any religion. So it was not a big 
deal for him. But at least through this, we could marry socially and 
received social recognition in my community.  
Another example of creating mutuality is provided by Elizabeth Saha’s conversion 
experience when, as a Protestant (Baptist) women, she married a Catholic man, 
Julian D’Costa. Elizabeth told me that their marriage was also for love. When 
both families met to talk about their marriage, they decided that the wedding 
should be held in Elizabeth’s church in a Baptist way. Julian’s family did not have 
any objections then. So, after a few months, their wedding took place and 
Elizabeth moved into her husband’s house. However, the local Catholic Church, 
to which her husband and his family members belonged, did not accept this 
marriage. Since Julian’s family did not inform the Catholic Church or seek their 
permission for this marriage and, moreover, since their marriage was not held in 
a Catholic way, the church informed them that such marriages cannot be 
accepted in the church. In order to resolve this issue, Elizabeth had to attend 
classes in the Catholic Church and converted to Catholicism. After her 
conversion, the couple remarried in the Catholic Church. Both Shumi and 
Elizabeth’s stories depict how, through conversions, mutuality is created and 
differences are accommodated in cases of mixed marriages. But in both cases, the 
non-Christian (in Shumi’s case) and the non-Catholic (in Elizabeth’s case) parties 
were only accepted by their respective societies once they converted and 
accepted the religion of that community.  
Violence within oshomo jowali  
The processes of creating mutuality in the cases of mixed marriages take various 
forms and degrees. However, within these processes, some blindspots exist which 
are not visible to the community, intentionally or unintentionally. In fact, some 
of these processes of creating mutuality even take violent forms and result in 
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domestic violence. The Christian community is occupied with protecting women 
from going to another community. But the Christian community often forgets 
about women who came to their community through marriage, followed by 
conversion. The blindspot exists in the latter cases, where women from other 
religious communities married Christian men and converted to Christianity.  
I met Chobi Biswas during fieldwork in Dhaka. Chobi is a convert Christian 
woman in her late 40s, now working as a cleaner in a school in Dhaka. Before 
marriage, Chobi was a Muslim woman. Her original name was Anwara Begum. 
After marriage, she converted to Christianity and took a new name. When she 
first met her husband in Dhaka, he was working as a caretaker of a foreign 
missionary doctor’s clinic. When I interviewed Chobi, she told me, "I never saw a 
Christian in my life before meeting my husband. I lived in a Muslim environment 
where we had no interactions with any non-Muslim community". After her visit 
to the clinic, a relationship between them grew. But during their relationship, her 
husband never told her that he was a Christian man. Chobi assumed that her 
husband was a Muslim. It was only after her marriage, that she came to know 
about his religion. They married at a court.8  
After marriage, she came to know that her husband was a Christian. I asked 
Chobi why after her husband’s deceptive behaviour, she did not consider going 
back to her own family. She told me, “Once my honour has been destroyed, what 
is the use of going back? I could easily leave him after knowing that he was not a 
Muslim and go back to my family as until then no one in my family knew that I 
married this person. But I decided to live with him and took it as my fate”. It was 
her decision to covert. In her words, “If I live with him in his songsar [family] and 
when we will have children someday, what identity will my children have? 
Thinking these consequences, I finally converted”. She also explained how the 
                                                 
8 Some people marry in the court through the Notary Public. This type of marriage is often 
referred to as a ‘court marriage’, but this type of marriage is not considered legal marriage as they 
are not performed under any marriage law. Many people still go through this type of marriage and 
live as married couples.  
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priest of a Baptist Church provided her with Christian teaching and then baptised 
her. After baptism, Chobi and her husband again married in the church.   
However, later, when her family and relatives were informed about her marriage 
and conversion, they did not accept her or her husband. Instead, they treated her 
poorly. Her family wanted to disown her legally, but her father did not go 
through with it. Because of her marriage, their community made her family 
ekghore, i.e., they were boycotted. But all this could not provide Chobi with a 
decent marital life. She told me how violent her husband becomes when anything 
goes wrong. Chobi has been enduring serious physical abuse just for the sake of 
protecting her marriage. She approached her church and a number of community 
leaders explaining her situation, but she has received no support from them so 
far. However, she still wants to believe that he is her husband and this is her 
family and no matter what happens, she should be there. She thinks she has 
already gone too far by marrying a Christian man, so she cannot afford to break 
this marriage and commit another ‘sin’, in her view. 
Chobi’s case shows the other side of creating mutuality, which is often unnoticed 
in the Christian community. The story depicts her extreme vulnerability that has 
been created by marrying a man from another religion, leaving her own religion 
and converting to her husband’s religion, and by losing her family support 
because of her marriage and conversion. Her gender ideologies of honour and 
chastity also played a role in her endurance of her husband’s abuse. She further 
became vulnerable in her new community after conversion as she entered the 
community from outside and she does not have adequate support within the 
community. All these factors shaped her situation in a rather complex way. As a 
result, Chobi thinks that now she has to endure severe violence from her 
husband.  
During my fieldwork, I also met Jhumu Baroi, who is also a converted Protestant 
woman in her late 40s. Jhumu had similar experiences to Chobi. Currently, she 
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works in a national NGO and serves as a woman leader in her local church in 
Dhaka as the Secretary of mahila samity. Jhumu was a Hindu woman before her 
marriage. She used to work for her husband’s construction firm as an accountant. 
He was a Catholic. She described her marriage as “an accident”. Jhumu had a 
relationship with another Hindu man and her husband (then boss) knew about 
it. She said, "I never ever imagined that I would marry someone from the 
Christian community". She told me that while working there she had no idea that 
her husband loved her secretly as he never told her about his love for her.  
In 1988, Jhumu travelled with her employer for work in a district town. But when 
Jhumu and her boss reached there, he attempted to create fear in her by telling 
her that he came to know that some of the local men were planning to abduct 
her, but he stopped them by claiming that Jhumu was his wife. Jhumu’s boss also 
said that those men demanded to see a proof that they were a married couple 
and, therefore, they should get married. Jhumu told me that she was a young girl 
back then and easily believed her boss’ story and became frightened and finally, 
she agreed to marry him. But after their marriage, she came to know that he lied 
to her in order to marry her. Their marriage was held according to Hindu 
customs in a kali mondir (temple).  
She said, "I had no feelings for my husband at all. But when he gave me the 
‘honour’ of being his wife, then some responsibilities arises from my side as being 
his wife. Willingly or unwillingly, I am then bound to perform my responsibilities 
as his wife and accept him as my husband". Moreover, she was from a Hindu 
family, with a particular set of values about the husband-wife relationship and 
marital life. After their marriage, her husband’s family did not accept her; instead, 
she was abused by them. Her in-laws' family belonged to the Catholic Church. 
Because of their marriage, her father-in-law stated that he had lost all his honour 
because of her. Jhumu’s father-in-law told a Baptist priest, who visited their 
house, "Pastor, please make this ‘creature’ [Jhumu] civilized. Please teach her 
according to your church rules and make her ‘human’. My son has picked her up 
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from somewhere and brought her home". Jhumu told me that both her father- 
and mother-in-law mistreated her for many years. Moreover, after listening to 
them, her husband beat her badly on several occasions. She said, "But after all 
these, how could I leave him and his family? I had no support anywhere else. 
Even if I wanted to go back to my parents' place, they would never accept me. 
Moreover, I had fear of public shame".  
I asked her if she had a shelter at that time and had an opportunity to leave him, 
would she do it? She confidently said, 
No, I would not. After my mother-in-law took me to her house, my father 
contacted me and they planned to rescue me from this marriage by 
sending me to India to our relative’s house. They also wanted to arrange a 
marriage for me there and I could restart my life. But I refused my father’s 
proposition as marriage is something which we have only once. So I told 
them that at any cost, I would not leave. My husband can commit 
mistakes, but I cannot. Maybe he has married me by bluffing me, but once 
he is my husband, I can't betray him. 
She further told me that after three months of Christian teaching, Pastor Ghosh 
baptised her. She said that the pastor's wife taught her how to live in a Christian 
community, how to read the Bible, how to pray, and even how to talk in a 
Christian environment. Finally, after sometimes, thinking about her future 
children, she decided to convert. In her words, “If I do not give importance to my 
husband's religion, then what will our children do? If I could not raise the 
children properly, then I would be blamed by this family as well as by the society. 
So it was logical for me to leave my previous religion. My previous religion is not 
going to help me anymore in my situation". I asked her, why had she endured so 
much? She said,  
Because of the fear of society, fear of dishonour. If I leave my husband 
today, people will point me out as a 'bad woman'. Why would I take 
that kolonko [scandal]? Already one kolonko has been printed on my 
forehead that I have left my own religion through my conversion. Do you 
think it is worth to take another kolonko on my forehead?  
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In Jhumu’s case, we can also see deception, about which the Christian 
community remains inactive. Moreover, similar to Chobi’s situation, Jhumu 
became vulnerable after losing her family support and became subject to her 
husband’s violence. In both Chobi and Jhumu’s cases, the processes of creating 
mutuality by their conversion took a violent turn. Most likely since both of their 
husbands know that they have no family support they continue to take advantage 
of their vulnerable situations.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, by examining mixed marriages within the Christian community, I 
have shown the trepidations of a minority community even when the state law 
allows mixed marriages for the Christian community. The community actively 
discourages and prohibits inter-religious marriages and maintain its integrity by 
building boundaries and in the process, the community shows a fear of a ‘sin’ of 
mixed marriages and blame all unhappiness on these inter-religious unions. 
Mixed marriage is a greater issue within the Protestant community than the 
Catholic community as the Catholics accept mixed marriages (both inter-
religious and inter-denominational) in the church. In this process, a moral panic 
is developed within the community, which is interlinked with gender ideologies. 
As a reaction to this panic, the community takes initiatives and creates additional 
rules and regulations in order to stop mixed marriages and this type of marriages 
play a crucial role in self-identification by blurring the boundaries of what 
constitutes a religious minority in South Asia.  
The community accommodates differences and in the process, mutuality is 
created. In many instances, the violence becomes a part of the process of 
mutuality creation. Here, a paradox can be seen around the issue of mixed 
marriages. On the one hand, the entire community overemphasises ‘protecting’ 
the young generation, particularly women, from leaving the community and 
marrying someone from other religion. On the other hand, they are 
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simultaneously accommodating the differences by creating mutuality, sometimes 
through violence. 
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Chapter Seven 
End of marriage: Bargaining with patriarchy  
in search of alternatives 
Introduction  
When I first told my father that I wanted to divorce my husband to escape an 
abusive marriage, he specifically provided me with two suggestions: one, I should 
resign from my position as the National General Secretary of the YWCA of 
Bangladesh, and two, I should leave the country and seek divorce elsewhere. I 
realised that there were two particular reasons for my father’s suggestions: first, 
the gender-discriminatory provisions of the divorce law for Christians makes it 
significantly difficult for women to initiate a divorce under the Divorce Act, 1869, 
and second, being a woman in the Christian community, particularly in a 
leadership position, it is scandalous to be divorced. I took both suggestions of my 
father. I came to Australia and obtained a divorce under the Australian divorce 
law. However, not many women can leave their jobs or leave the country to 
obtain a divorce. In that sense, I was one of the few fortunate women in this 
situation. Many Christian women in Bangladesh are forced to continue living in 
marriages that do not any longer exist as a bond between two people.  
In the academic realm, until very recently, marital dissolution or divorce did not 
draw the attention of many South Asian scholars or media as much as dowry or 
early marriage. Grover (2011) argues that the singular reason for this lack of 
attention is the prevailing view stating that South Asia still has much lower 
official divorce rates compared to the Western world. Simpson (1994, 831) found 
that divorce has become a “central demographic features of most European 
countries”. Comparatively, as a region, South Asia scores much lower divorce rate 
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than the Western countries. It was in the 1980s when the Shah Bano case stirred 
up controversy over Muslim women’s maintenance rights in India that issues 
such as divorce and maintenance began to be the subjects of debate among 
scholars as well as in the popular media. Consequently, recent times have seen 
considerable discussion on the question of divorce in both academia and in the 
human rights and women’s rights movements.  
This chapter examines divorce and associated practices in the Bangladeshi 
Christian community. As noted, under the situation of legal pluralism, divorce 
and its related issues for its Christian population are governed in Bangladesh by 
the Divorce Act, 1869. This 150-year-old civil law has not been amended since its 
passing during the colonial rule. This law contains several gender discriminatory 
provisions.1 Although the Divorce Act, 1869, allows the members of the Christian 
community to divorce their spouses, the idea of divorce itself remains a contested 
issue within the community. Many times, community members, including 
leaders, assert that Christians do not get divorced and they justify their assertion 
with the community’s religious, gender, and social ideology.  
By examining laws, social and gender ideologies, and practices around divorce, I 
make two arguments in this chapter. First, although the community prohibits 
and discourages divorce, both men and women actively seek to receive the 
remedy of divorce. In most cases, since the gender-biased provisions of law and 
social and gender ideologies do not enable them to initiate or receive a legal 
divorce, both men and women in the community choose different paths of 
alternatives to divorce by bypassing the state legal system. Second, within the 
processes of choosing the divorce alternatives, women, being within their own 
individual subjective positions, make strategic choices and engage in patriarchal 
bargaining in order to fulfil their objectives.    
                                                 
1 For details, see Chapter Three. 
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This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses two specific 
theories regarding legal pluralism and feminism. I anchor my empirical findings 
and discussions that are elaborated in the latter sections in these theories. I use 
the concepts of ‘forum shopping’ and ‘shopping forums’ (von Benda-Beckmann 
1981) and ‘patriarchal bargaining’ (Kandiyoti 1988) to theorise the practices of 
divorce amongst Christians of Bangladesh. The second section takes up the 
concepts of forum shopping and shows how Christian women take alternative 
paths bypassing the state law to receive a remedy of divorce or its alternatives. 
Based on the concept of shopping forums, the third section analyses how 
different institutions actively influence or shape the choices of women with 
regard to divorce alternatives. Finally, the last section shows how, within the 
contestation of the processes of forum shopping and shopping forums, women 
consciously use different strategies, based on their subjective positions, in 
achieving their goals (through divorce and divorce alternatives) and how they 
engage in patriarchal bargaining.  
Forum shopping, shopping forums, and the patriarchal bargaining 
The theoretical lens that has been commonly used by scholars in order to 
understand marriage and divorce are modernity, capitalist development, 
globalisation or individualism amongst other things, which has been recently 
questioned by other scholars. For example, according to Palriwala and Kaur 
(2014, 1), the questions that we should ask in order to understand marriage and 
divorce better are: Do we need to “rethink the theoretical models with which we 
have looked at marriage?” Or are these divorces results of modernity, 
transformation to a capitalist society, or globalisation or have the themes been 
long present? By keeping these questions in mind, I make use of two distinct but 
inter-related concepts: first, from the theories of legal pluralism the concept of 
forum shopping and shopping forums, coined by von Benda-Beckmann (1981) 
and then from feminist theories, the concept of the patriarchal bargaining, 
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introduced by Kandiyoti (1988). Although these two notions are distinct from 
each other, I demonstrate that they can be drawn together as one in order to 
theorise the practices of divorce among Bangladeshi Christians.   
Forum shopping under a situation of legal pluralism is articulated by von Benda-
Beckmann (1981) in her research in Minangkabau village in west Sumatra through 
a close examination of various institutions that deal with disputes. In pre-colonial 
times, village life was governed by adat (customary law). Although during the 
16th-century people of Minangkabau village converted to Islam, the norms of 
Islamic law had a very limited role in their social relationships and behaviour. 
Instead, Minangkabau’s social and political organizations operated based on 
matrilineal systems. Within such a situation, she found that the disputants in the 
village could choose between a number of institutions for dispute resolution (von 
Benda-Beckmann 1981). To explain, she invoked the idea of forum shopping and 
argued that “disputants have a choice between different institutions and they 
base their choice on what they hope the outcome of the dispute will be, however 
vague or ill-founded their expectations may be” (von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 117). 
The story does not end there. Von Benda-Beckmann (1981, 117) further argued 
that it is not only the disputants who shop between various forums but also that 
the forums shop for disputes “for their own, mainly local political ends”. In most 
cases, these institutions act as individual functionaries that have different 
interests from those of the parties. These institutes take advantage of the 
processing of disputes in order to fulfil their interests (von Benda-Beckmann 
1981). In her words, “So besides forum-shopping disputants, there are also 
‘shopping forums’ engaged in trying to acquire and manipulate disputes from 
which they expect to gain political advantage or to fend off disputes which they 
fear will threaten their interests” (von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 117). Therefore, as 
much as disputants shop for the forum, the forums shop for disputes. Von Benda-
Beckmann (1981, 145) calls these acts “reciprocal shopping”. In my view, instead of 
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being reciprocal, the disputants and forums are often engaged in more 
competitive processes, which I elaborate later in this chapter.  
Since the processes of forum shopping and shopping forums are dynamic ones 
that, in many cases, involve bargaining, negotiations, and socio-political moves 
and acts, the disputes are not resolved due to the manipulations of various 
functionaries (von Benda-Beckmann 1981). Although the disputants can always go 
to state courts capable of taking executive decisions, in most cases they do not 
see state courts as a “real alternative” as the outcomes of these cases are 
unpredictable and the processes are expensive (von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 145).  
Before going any further, however, let me define the term ‘divorce’ prior to 
explaining how women engage in patriarchal bargaining in the dissolution of 
marriage. For Bangladeshi Christians, divorce means the dissolution of marriage 
under the Divorce Act, 1869. However, apart from divorce or dissolution of 
marriage, there are other terms that are usually associated with the discussion of 
divorce. One is the annulment of marriage and the other is separation.2 It is 
important to note that although these three terms — dissolution, annulment, 
and separation — are very different legally, all of them enable a person to live 
outside of marriage. The divorce practices of Christians in Bangladesh involves all 
three types of remedy and in many instances, these notions overlap and cross 
their respective boundaries from time to time. In other words, they sometimes 
bring the same meaning and consequences in the lives of women in the Christian 
community. 
The commonly understood meaning of the term ‘divorce’ is the legal divorce that 
couples receive from state courts. Because of this specific and narrowed 
definition, even today, the rates of divorce are still low and the distinction 
between the notions of divorce, dissolution of marriage, nullity of marriage, and 
separation becomes blurred and ambiguous.  For example, as Parry (2001) 
                                                 
2 For detail discussion of the Divorce Act, 1869, see Chapter Three. 
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observes, there are many cases where couples have not seen each other, have no 
trace of their spouses, let alone any relationship, but have still remained legally 
married for years. In these specific cases, couples were living outside of marriage, 
no matter if they are legally divorced or not. Many of them remarried without 
being legally divorced. I found very similar findings in the Christian community 
in Bangladesh. Therefore, although distinguishing between jural and conjugal 
stability is essential (Parry 2001), we need to contextualise divorce as an umbrella 
of concepts which holds the whole spectrum of notions that lead to living out of 
marriage (dissolution, annulment, and separation). According to Parry (2001), it 
would be a mistake to assess the divorce situation in South Asia, including in 
Bangladesh, based on the official divorce rate. In fact, official statistics only show 
us the tip of the iceberg.  
Coming to the second concept — that of the patriarchal bargaining —  I find 
Kandiyoti’s (1988) view useful in analysing the cases I studied. The patriarchal 
bargaining examines women’s strategies — based on their respective subjective 
positions — to fight the ideologies that oppress them in their everyday lives. 
According to Kandiyoti (1988, 275), “women strategize within a set of concrete 
constraints that reveal and define the blueprint of … patriarchal bargain of any 
given society, which may exhibit variations according to class, caste, and 
ethnicity” (emphasis in the original text). Therefore, based on women’s 
intersectionality that cuts across class, age, ethnicity, amongst other factors, 
women’s strategies vary. Kandiyoti (1988) illustrates women’s patriarchal bargains 
by contrasting two systems of patriarchy in sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand 
and the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia on the other. By analysing 
different studies in these two regions, Kandiyoti (1988) shows that in sub-Saharan 
Africa, women resisted unfavourable labour relations in their respective 
households. However, in other areas, such as the Middle East or South Asia, 
women living under classic patriarchy3 employed interpersonal strategies to 
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion on classic patriarchy, see Chapter Five. 
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ensure their financial and social security in their old age through manipulating 
the affections of their husbands and sons.  
Although many scholars have developed Kandiyoti’s (1988) notion of patriarchal 
bargaining further by using the concept in different contexts and in different 
ways, I argue that Kandiyoti’s (1988) concept is still equally useful even after three 
decades.  
Molyneux (1998), a decade later than Kandiyoti (1988), used the concept of 
patriarchal bargaining to analyse women’s movements by combining discussions 
from feminist political theory and development studies. Around the same period, 
Read and Bartkowski (2000) also used Kandiyoti’s (1988) concept of patriarchal 
bargaining to examine the conflicting meanings of the veil among Muslim 
religious elites and Islamic feminists living in Austin, Texas.  
Later, Lahiri-Dutt and Sil (2004) found women’s similar bargaining against 
patriarchal ideologies through their income-generating activities among middle-
class societies in Burdwan, India. They trace these women’s efforts to push back 
the boundaries of social and cultural norms that they are subject to (Lahiri-Dutt 
and Sil 2004). However, they argue that these women negotiate with these 
boundaries “without overtly threatening the social system into which … [they 
belong]” (Lahiri-Dutt and Sil 2004, 258). In this article, the authors explore how 
through various kinds of informal income-generating activities, the ordinary 
middle-class women in non-metropolitan locations reconstruct their new 
identities and challenge and redefine their ideological gender boundaries that are 
products of patriarchy. However, in this process, women do not necessarily act in 
a collective form. Moreover, they do not assert their independence through their 
actions. But they take more a strategic stance by appearing “as subordinate, 
subservient and subject to patriarchal oppression” (Lahiri-Dutt and Sil 2004, 270).  
In a more recent work in Kenya, Gatwiri and Mumbi (2016) explore silence as a 
form of power that is used tactfully by women to negotiate and/or renegotiate 
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their positions. They use a feminist lens to understand and theorise the use of 
soft power in the form of silence. Gatwiri and Mumbi (2016, 13, 14) argue that 
using women’s voices as a form of resistance may intensify their oppression and 
abuse in many instances, which can be understood as “patriarchal backlashes”. 
However, in such situations, various forms and uses of silence can shift the 
gendered power structure in some instances. 
Coming back to Kandiyoti’s (1988) notion of the patriarchal bargaining, the 
concept acts as an influential driver in shaping women’s intersectional and 
gendered subjectivity. The concept of patriarchal bargaining also reveals gender 
ideologies in a specific context. However, by no means is women’s bargaining 
with patriarchy monolithic or single-fold; instead, its nature is multifaceted. 
Women’s resistance in this particular case could take active or passive forms, 
which are usually flexible. In other words, women’s patriarchal bargaining is 
somewhat fluid in nature, a more strategic battle, in Kandiyoti’s (1988, 286) 
words, “which may nonetheless be contested, redefined, and renegotiated”.  
Kandiyoti (1988) concludes that the nature of patriarchal systems in that specific 
culture, class, and temporal concreteness can be captured by systematic analyses 
of the strategies and coping mechanisms that women deploy in order to push the 
boundaries of patriarchal ideologies, and resist, accommodate, and conflict over 
rights, resources, and responsibilities.  It is important to note that women’s 
bargaining with patriarchy does not always reflect their rational or intended 
choices. Women’s bargaining with patriarchy also indicates their unconscious 
gendered subjectivity, which is a result of their early socialisation and adult 
cultural background (Kandiyoti 1987a, b). The strategies and choices are the 
results of women’s complex and contested personal and political struggles and 
negotiations. Therefore, women’s bargaining with patriarchy is multifaceted, 
flexible, and fluid, depending on their context, situation, and objectives in a 
particular situation. 
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Divorce and its alternatives: Forum shopping 
Under the Divorce Act, 1869, the option for mutual divorce does not exist in 
Bangladesh and, moreover, divorce cannot be received unless adultery is proven. 
Clearly, the state law does not treat men and women equally as it provides 
different conditions for men and women to initiate a divorce.4 In addition to all of 
these technical and legal factors, it is indeed hard for women to initiate a divorce 
by making a complaint of adultery in a court that is mostly occupied by male 
judges, lawyers, experts, and reporters. In such a male-dominated environment in 
a country where gender equality is still a distant dream, for a woman from a 
religious minority community to discuss her husband’s or her own adultery in a 
courtroom is commonly avoided to escape social scandal.  
All these factors contribute to making the divorce law unusable by the majority of 
men and women seeking a dissolution. As a result, many of them do not initiate a 
divorce under this Act, which was also reflected in my fieldwork findings. I 
examined all the divorce suits filed during the period from 2001–2016 at the High 
Court from the Divorce Suit Register at the High Court Division.5 However, 
divorce suits can also be filed at the District Court as per the Divorce Act, 1869 
(Section 10) as the petitioner has a choice to present their petition in either of 
these courts. Therefore, the number of suits at the High Court Division cannot 
provide us with a full picture of how many divorce suits are filed per year around 
the country. However, it surely provides an indication of how much the members 
of the Christian community use this particular Act. According to the Divorce Suit 
Register at the High Court Division, during the 16-year period from 2001–2016, 
the average number of divorce suits per year was only three. During this period, 
in 2009, the highest number of divorce suits was filed, which was seven. In 2002, 
there was no divorce suit filed at the High Court Division. These numbers show 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussions on the provisions of the Divorce Act, 1869, see Chapter Three. 
5 See Appendix F. 
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how the Divorce Act, 1869 is almost never used by the members of the Christian 
community in Bangladesh.       
If the divorce law for Christians is unused in most cases as the above statistics 
show, then the question that arises is: How do men and women deal with their 
marital breakups and related issues? How do they exit a marriage? The 
ideological beliefs and practices among Bangladeshi Christians do not stop them 
from exiting marriages. Although the statistics relating to divorce suits in the 
High Court Division show that the rate of legal divorce has been consistently low, 
in fact, in the last couple of decades, marriage breakups have greatly increased 
among Bangladeshi Christians. During interviews, many members of the 
Christian community, both from the Catholic and Protestant groups, expressed 
concerns about the increasing number of marriage breakups. 
During my fieldwork, I interviewed 50 Christian women who went through a 
process of a marriage breakup and, surprisingly, I found only one among them 
went to the court and received a legal divorce under the Divorce Act, 1869. This 
finding is also consistent with the number of divorce suits filed each year in the 
High Court Division. However, the rest of the women I interviewed did not go to 
the court for a legal divorce due to many reasons that I have mentioned above. 
Instead, they took alternative paths to exit their marriages by avoiding court 
cases and minimising social scandals in order to escape abuse, discrimination, 
and inequality.  
Some of the women I interviewed chose to be permanently separated from their 
husbands; some used other divorce laws (such as the Muslim law) and 
sent/received a divorce notice to/from the other party and considered it a 
divorce; some went for a mutual affidavit and declared themselves to be divorced, 
bypassing the court; and some applied to their church (Catholic) and received an 
annulment of their marriage. Many of these women (and their ex-husbands) 
remarried. Most of these women did not care if they received a legal divorce from 
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the court, instead, they were content simply by exiting their marriages. Many of 
them did not remarry, but some did.    
In this way, women from the Bangladeshi Christian community take alternative 
paths, bypassing the state law, in order to reach their goals and use various legal, 
semi-legal, or non-legal means in getting a divorce or its alternatives. However, it 
should be noted that these alternative divorces cannot be called ‘legal divorce’ 
and if they are challenged in the court, most of them will not be accepted by the 
court as a ‘proper’ divorce. But in reality, when people are ‘legally trapped’ with a 
century-old civil law that does not help them to receive a remedy of a decent and 
dignified divorce, these alternative measures become their only pathway that can 
provide them with a remedy for their problems. Below, I discuss the various paths 
that women take to exit their marriages. 
Divorce under the Divorce Act, 1869 
During my fieldwork, I found only one woman, Angela Baroi, who received a 
remedy of divorce under the Divorce Ac, 1869. Angela is a Baptist woman, in her 
mid-30s from Barisal, now working in a national NGO in Dhaka. When she was 
25, she married a Baptist man (who was 26 years old at the time) in a local church 
in Dhaka. But after their marriage, he began to doubt her, thinking that she had 
affairs with her male colleagues. Moreover, her husband did not have a stable 
career. All these issues contributed towards the breakup of the marriage. Angela 
decided to divorce her husband. She moved out of their home and rented a place.  
After she left their house, she approached her husband to settle the case mutually 
through affidavit (which I will discuss later in this chapter). But he did not 
cooperate with the process. After about six months, she filed a divorce suit in the 
High Court Division under the Divorce Act, 1869. Her lawyer advised her to file 
the case directly in the High Court instead of in a lower court as the latter would 
entail a lengthier process.   
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Angela further told me that she was informed by her lawyer before filing the suit 
that they have to prove his adultery as one of the grounds for divorce. She said 
that although there was no adultery committed by her husband, she had no other 
choice but to make a false complaint about his adultery. Later, I found from the 
court order that the High Court approved a decree nisi6 in favor of Angela. Her 
husband did not appear in the court. After six months of decree nisi, the couple’s 
divorce was made absolute by the High Court, according to the state law. As 
Angela’s husband (or his lawyer) did not appear in the court and defend himself 
(or his client), she did not have to provide any proof of his adultery. Otherwise, 
she might have had to provide some proof of his adultery. The whole process 
took about two years.  
She believes that instead of going to the court if she had gone to the church 
leaders for help and support, she could never have succeeded in getting a legal 
divorce. The leaders would have tried to “fix” their issues, in her words, and drag 
out the whole process in such a way that it would never be possible for her to exit 
the marriage. So she entirely avoided the community leadership and directly 
accessed the state court, which, she thinks, made it possible for her to get this 
divorce. She purposefully excluded herself from most social events so that the 
community could not interfere in the process. In fact, she said that she virtually 
stopped contact with most of her relatives, friends, and other members of her 
church. She did not attend church services during these years in order to avoid 
questions, comments, and scandal. 
It is indeed true that since Angela’s husband did not appear in the court, the 
process did not take a complicated turn. Otherwise, in a male-dominated court 
setting, it might have been difficult for Angela to receive this remedy. But it is 
important to note that before filing the suit, Angela attempted to convince her 
                                                 
6 A decree nisi is an order by the court stating the date on which a marriage will end unless a good 
reason not to grant a divorce is produced. 
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husband to take an alternative path of a mutual affidavit by declaring that they 
were divorced. Therefore, if her husband had cooperated, she might not have 
filed this suit; instead, they would have taken the alternative path. It was only 
because her husband did not agree to have a mutual affidavit that she took the 
path of filing a divorce suit.  
Life-long separation  
Unlike Angela, not every woman takes the path of filing a divorce suit in the 
court. Instead, they take a number of alternative paths to exit the marriage. One 
such path is living separately from their husbands for the rest of their lives. 
Technically, living in separation is not a divorce, but I found that many women 
have taken this path for various social reasons. I met Marline Gomes during 
fieldwork in Dhaka, who had also taken a similar path.  
Marline is a Catholic woman in her 50s, a mother of two grown-up children. She 
married at a very young age when she was studying for the Higher Secondary 
School Certificate (HSC). For many years after their marriage, her husband lived 
in the Middle East, working as a chef, while she and her children lived in 
Bangladesh. But he had never been stable in one job, Marline explained. She 
thinks that because of her husband’s drinking problem, he did not have a stable 
career. After a few years, he came back to Bangladesh for good. But again, he 
could not settle in a job. Moreover, he became abusive, both physically and 
mentally, towards Marline. When the situation worsened, she often fled to her 
brother’s house and then after a few days, came back when Marline’s husband 
became sober.  
Marline tried many options available to her socially for a remedy for her 
situation. She said that a number of times she and her husband went to the 
church for counselling. But counselling did not help them. She also made a 
formal complaint to the parish council, but they did not do anything for her. 
Later, she again went to the church to get a separation. But the priests did not 
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cooperate with her. The priests wanted the couple to resolve their issue and keep 
their marriage intact. She told me, “They used to say, look we do not have any 
divorce in the Catholic Church. If you want to be separated from your husband 
how will you raise your son? How will you give marriage to your daughter?” 
When I asked her why she did not apply for an annulment in the church, she told 
me that she did not know what it was and no one told her about this option 
before, not even the priests when she visited them so many times.  
She also went to Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK), a legal aid organisation for 
mediation. Many times ASK facilitated shalish (mediation) between her and her 
husband. But the situation did not improve. Finally, she left the house and moved 
into her brother’s house along with her children. During her time at her 
brother’s, she took some skill training and found a job and rented a place.  
When I asked her why she did not initiate a legal divorce, she told me that first of 
all, she thought about the possible scandals that she had to encounter if she 
sought a divorce. Second, she thought keeping her status as ‘married’ could help 
to protect her from other men who may be interested in her both in her 
workplace and her community. Third, she also considered the possible social 
impact of her divorce on her daughter, particularly when she married. In her 
words, 
Not everyone in the place of my work knew that I was a separated woman. 
I did not need to tell them. Only my bosses and a few more people whom I 
trusted knew that I was a single woman. If everyone knew that I lived 
separated from my husband, then many of my male colleagues would want 
to take advantage of me. You know what I mean, right? So keeping my 
marital status as ‘married’ helped me a lot to protect me from these kinds 
of people. 
In Marline’s case, a number of factors led her to take the path of life-long 
separation and not to seek a divorce or annulment. First, her consciousness of the 
possible social scandal, particularly the possible impact on her daughter’s future, 
had stopped her from seeking legal remedies. Marline placed significant 
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importance on thinking about her daughter’s future marriage, more so than on 
her son’s, which is a result of a gendered ideology that exists in Bangladeshi 
society. In many cases, a girl is judged by her mother’s deeds. It is often believed 
that if the mother has problems in her life, for example, if she becomes a 
divorcee, then her daughter’s chance of a good marriage reduced. However, the 
same thing does not necessarily apply to sons in most cases. Because of this 
difference, Marline was conscious about her daughter’s future more than her 
son’s. 
Second, her own financial insecurity did not provide her with the strength to 
fight for her rights. When she moved out of her house and began to live 
separately, she was unemployed at that time. Therefore, by the time she became 
financially solvent, many years had already passed, which did not make her 
concerned about initiating a legal divorce. Third, the church’s involvement in her 
conjugal problems made her think that she did not have any other option but to 
live separately as a way of exiting her marriage. Moreover, the church did not 
properly explain all her options to her; for example, they did not inform her 
about the annulment that she could apply for. So, her lack of knowledge about 
this particular process also reduced her options. Finally, Marline wanted to keep 
her marital status as ‘married’ in order to protect herself from other men in her 
workplace and community. Therefore, being ‘married’ worked for her as a shield 
for her protection. 
Muslim divorce  
Although the Muslim divorce law is not legally applicable to any person who is a 
non-Muslim, I found that even then many Christians have been taking this path 
in order to exit their marriages. Divorce for the Muslim community is governed 
by Section 7 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. According to the Muslim 
Family Law Ordinance, 1961, there are three mandatory steps to divorce for both 
husband and wife. However, the wife can only divorce her husband when the 
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power of giving a divorce has been delegated in the kabin (marriage contract). 
According to Section 7 of the Ordinance, the initiator provides a notice of divorce 
to the local Chairman of the Union Parishad7 and supplies a copy of the notice to 
the initiator’s spouse (Section 7(1)). The divorce becomes effective after 90 days 
of providing the notice to the Chairman (Section 7(3)). After the expiry of 90 
days, the concerned parties can receive a registration certificate from a registered 
kazi.8 
However, Christians cannot divorce under the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 
1961. But it is important to note that in Bangladesh more than 90% of the 
population is Muslim, which means the Muslim family law governs the majority 
of the country’s population. Lawyers with a wider knowledge and education, 
practising in large cities such as Dhaka, usually have in-depth knowledge of 
different personal laws for different religious groups. However, many lawyers in 
smaller towns outside Dhaka or in rural areas have a significant lack of 
knowledge about the Christian family law. So when a Christian man or a woman 
goes to a lawyer for advice, they direct them towards the Muslim family law 
without realising that there is a separate set of laws applicable to them.  
In my fieldwork, a lawyer, practising in the Supreme Court in Dhaka, confirmed 
this type of divorce practice among Christians. He told me that it is not only the 
lack of knowledge but also the lack of expertise that explains why these lawyers 
do not proceed with the Christian Divorce Act, 1869. Therefore, although some 
lawyers have knowledge of the Christian personal law, they do not necessarily 
know its detailed clauses and provisions and hence consciously direct their 
clients towards the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, knowing that this law 
cannot be applicable to the Christian population. Moreover, the lawyer I spoke 
with told me that many of his Christian clients also want to frighten their spouses 
just by sending them a divorce notice, which is only possible under the Muslim 
                                                 
7 The smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh. 
8 An Islamic legal scholar and judge who can conduct a marriage. 
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law. Therefore, in many cases, these Christian clients insist the lawyers take the 
path of the Muslim divorce law while knowing that that particular law is not 
applicable to them. Many of them consider themselves to be divorced simply 
after serving a notice to their spouses.  
Moly Biswas had the experience of being divorced under the Muslim personal 
law. Moly is a Protestant woman in her early 30s from the northern districts of 
Bangladesh, now running her own beauty parlour in Dhaka. She is the mother of 
a seven-year-old daughter. She lived separately from her husband for a few years 
as their marriage was not working at all. However, when her daughter was four 
years old, her husband sent her a “divorce letter”, as she described it. When I 
asked her what kind of divorce it was, she told me that she was not sure. In her 
words, “After I received the divorce letter, I did not respond to it. In the letter it 
was written if I do not respond, then after 90 days, the divorce will be finalised. 
So now we are divorced”. She did not consult with any lawyer or anyone else 
about it. Moly still believes that she has already been divorced and does not have 
any idea about laws. She also heard that her husband remarried after their 
‘divorce’.  
However, after being divorced (as she described it), I found that Moly still 
describes her marital status as ‘married’ in official documents and uses her 
husband’s name in her national ID, bank account, and other official documents. I 
asked her why. She told me that, otherwise, she has to tell the bank manager or 
government officials that she is divorced and it will not be dignified for her to 
discuss the matter in those offices. She thought that she would be safe if people 
see that there is a name written on the ‘husband’s name’ section or the ‘married’ 
box is ticked in a form. Otherwise, people want to take advantage from a 
divorced or a single woman.  
Moly’s lack of knowledge about the personal laws that are applicable to her 
enabled her to think that the way she was divorced is a legal form of divorce. 
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However, similar to other women I met in my fieldwork, Moly is also conscious 
about the social scandal that a divorced woman face in their day-to-day lives. 
Therefore, she still decided to use her ‘married’ status in official ID and 
documents in order to avoid the scandal and to protect herself. However, during 
fieldwork, I also met Shukla Baroi, who used the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 
1961 to divorce her husband.  
Shukla is a Protestant woman in her mid-40s from a poor family from Barisal, 
now living in Dhaka. She works as a menial staff in a Christian NGO. Shukla 
married a Protestant man who was married before. She told me that her husband 
told her that he divorced his previous wife, which actually did not take place. 
Shukla came to know about her husband’s false statement about his divorce after 
living with him as a married woman for a few years. But at one point her husband 
left her and began to live with his first wife. She told me that after her husband 
deserted her, she divorced him. She was not closely associated with any church 
and, therefore, she did not feel the need to seek help from the church. When I 
asked her about the divorce process that she followed, she explained that she 
divorced her husband “in the court”, as she expressed it. She described how she 
went to the court and met a lawyer, who asked her to sign a paper and told her 
that he would then send it to her husband. The lawyer also told her that within 
the following three months, their divorce would be finalised. Shukla has 
remarried another Protestant man, who works as a tailor in Dhaka.  
In Shukla’s case, both her poor socio-economic background, the lack of 
association with the church, and the lack of legal knowledge led her to take a 
path of divorce that is not applicable to her as a Christian woman. The first two 
factors are interlinked. Because of her poor background, her absence in the 
church was not noticed. Therefore, the church did not become involved in her 
divorce process. However, her lack of knowledge of laws misled her to take a path 
that is not applicable to her circumstances. But it clearly helped her to exit the 
marriage and even to remarry. 
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Mutual affidavit  
The mutual affidavit is one of the most common forms of alternative divorce 
paths that Bangladeshi Christians have been increasingly taking in recent times. 
In my fieldwork, I met a number of women (and men) who took the path of a 
mutual affidavit as they did not want (or did not have the option) to go to the 
court to get a divorce. Recently, many lawyers have been presenting this path to 
Christians as the Divorce Act, 1869, is difficult to use because of its gender-biased 
provisions. By signing a mutual affidavit, social scandal can also be minimised as 
neither party has to go to the court. For this reason, the mutual affidavit is 
increasingly becoming a common practice in order to receive a remedy of a 
‘decent’ divorce. However, this particular form of alternative divorce can only be 
received with mutual consent. In other words, if both parties cannot come to a 
mutual agreement, then this kind of affidavit is not possible.  
I observed that mutual affidavits are being increasingly socially accepted as a 
form of divorce within the Christian community. Although many people already 
know that mutual divorce is not a legal divorce per se, however, many men and 
women are using this sort of affidavit to declare themselves to be divorced. I 
found that many men and women who took this path have also remarried. Some 
of these remarriages took place in churches, while some occurred in the court 
through a notary public.9  
I met Bani Halder in my Dhaka fieldwork, who is an educated Protestant woman 
in her early 30s. Bani told me about her experience of taking the path of the 
mutual affidavit in order to exit the marriage. Bani was married to a Protestant 
man in 2008. Within a few years’ time, when their marriage broke down, she left 
her husband and began to live with her mother. Before moving out, for a number 
of years she lived with her husband even after she knew that their marriage was 
already broken and there was no way to revive it. Although they were living 
                                                 
9 For discussion on marriages through the notary public, see Chapter Six. 
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under the same roof, they hardly interacted or lived as a married couple. Bani did 
not want to initiate the social breakup of the marriage after she calculated the 
associated risks of being blamed by her husband’s family and the community for 
the marriage breakup. She said, “I never said I wanted to break this marriage. I 
knew in my mind that things will not work eventually, but I kept quiet. I also 
decided not to take any children as things will complicate even more”.  
After living separately for approximately three years but under the same roof, 
Bani’s husband finally told her that he wanted a divorce. After a moderate 
argument, she left the house. Soon her husband was desperate to divorce her. 
When he asked for a divorce, she went to a lawyer for advice. The lawyer told her 
that, under the circumstances, she can easily demand a good deal of money from 
her husband as compensation. The lawyer provided her with a list of reasons, 
based on which she could demand the money. For example, the amount her 
family spent for her marriage, the mental stress that she had gone through, and 
her maintenance for a number of years, and he also advised Bani to ask for the 
loss of her virginity. She began to negotiate with her husband. At first, she 
demanded a large sum of Tk.25 lacs (USD 32,000), gradually going down to finally 
settle at Tk.7 lacs (USD 9,000). Her husband then contacted a lawyer who 
prepared a draft for ‘mutual divorce’ agreement which both parties agreed on. 
Finally, the document was signed and the amount was fully paid by cheque at the 
time of signing.  
Bani showed me the affidavit they signed. This legal paper states on the top, 
‘Before the Notary Public, Dhaka: Affidavit: Dissolution of Marriage by the 
Mutual Consent of Husband and Wife’. In the document, a declaration was made 
by both parties that state that as within their conjugal life significant differences 
have now arisen and because counselling by friends, relatives, and acquaintances 
has failed to achieve the desired result and the parties have also begun to live 
separately for the last four months. So, under the circumstances, it has become 
extremely difficult for the couple to live together as a married couple. Therefore, 
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both parties have mutually decided to discontinue their conjugal life and to 
dissolve their existing marriage. According to the affidavit, the marriage is 
considered dissolved, null, and void. Moreover, there were some conditions to 
fulfil this decision. For example, both parties must live separated; no party should 
interfere in each other’s lives and lifestyle; both will possess absolute liberty to 
live their respective lives as per their desire and may be remarried in the future as 
per their wish without any kind of hindrance from the other; and neither of them 
should harass, annoy or interfere with the other and should always maintain a 
mutually respectful disposition. Four years after signing the affidavit, Bani 
remarried a Protestant man and their wedding took place in a Protestant church. 
She said there were no issues with this divorce paper and she did not face any 
problems during her second marriage.  
In this case, Bani and others who received a remedy of mutual divorce through an 
affidavit, the couple enforced a number of mutually agreed-on conditions that 
will allow them to exit the marriage without going to the court. The 
consequences of such exit strategies are almost similar to those of a legal divorce 
from the court. Although it is not a legal divorce per se, the couple and their 
families become convinced that it is a form of legal divorce. They also obtain the 
satisfaction by believing that they have taken a legal path. As the document is 
prepared by a lawyer, printed using a stamp paper and signed duly by both 
parties, along with the lawyer, as well as witnesses from both sides, to them it 
becomes a legal form of divorce. As it is done mutually, they also feel ensured 
that the other party cannot challenge or sue on the basis of this document. This 
process has become increasingly common among Bangladeshi Christians as it 
leads to minimum scandals and provides them with a feeling of legally executed 
divorce although in the true sense it is not a legal divorce.   
In this way, minority women take multiple, alternative paths, for example, life-
long separation, using majority divorce law, mutual affidavit and so on, in order 
to bypass the state law as it is difficult for them to conform to all the provisions as 
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well as to avoid scandals. By choosing alternative paths of divorce, women engage 
in forum shopping in order to achieve their goals. I will come back to these forum 
shopping strategies to show how women engage in bargaining with patriarchy 
while conduct forum shopping later in this chapter. Before that, let me show the 
flipside of forum shopping, that is, the shopping forums within the Christian 
community with regard to divorce.  
Institutional anxiety: Shopping forums 
Within the Bangladeshi Christian community, an anxiety of some sort is 
observable. This anxiety is seen within both Catholic and Protestant 
denominations. In the previous chapter, I showed how minority anxiety works in 
the case of marriage.10 But divorce is another phenomenon that creates anxiety 
among minority groups. Often, this anxiety takes an institutional form. In this 
section, I show how this institutional anxiety creates ‘shopping forums’, in von 
Benda-Beckmann’s (1981) terms, where different institutions or forums attract or 
catch divorce-related disputes. 
According to the Preamble of the Divorce Act, 1869, this particular law is 
applicable to any person who professes the Christian religion. In this sense, this 
law is applicable to both Protestants and Catholics. However, both of these 
groups persuade themselves and others by asserting that divorce is not available 
in their respective communities. However, I have observed that Catholics are 
stronger than the Protestants in persuading the non-existence of divorce in 
Christianity. A number of Catholic priests I met during fieldwork told me that 
Catholics are exempted from the Divorce Act, 1869, as they are governed by the 
Canon Law in relation to their marriage and its dissolution or annulment. 
However, later I was assured by another Christian lawyer, who practises in both 
High Court and Supreme Court that this state law applies to all Christians, 
                                                 
10 For details, see Chapter Six. 
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irrespective of being Catholic or Protestant. Therefore, the civil law for Christian 
divorce includes every Christian in Bangladesh and neither has it specifically 
exempted a particular group of Christians nor does it recognise the Code of 
Canon Law. But because of the misleading information about the applicability of 
the Divorce Act, 1869, most men and women in the Catholic community do not 
know that although the Catholic Church does not recognise divorce, they can still 
go to the court and receive a remedy of divorce as a citizen of Bangladesh under 
the Divorce Act, 1869.  
Bangladeshi Christian community leaders, as well as community members, suffer 
from the anxiety of divorce and as a result, they actively discourage (read, 
‘prohibit’) members from taking any steps along the path of divorce. They also 
undertake institutional initiatives that actively discourage men and women from 
living outside their marriages. When there are cases of marital problems among 
some couples, community leaders actively attract those cases towards them and 
try to solve them internally, without letting the parties go to the court or other 
mainstream support systems, such as human rights and legal aid organisations. 
However, if any party goes to mainstream functionaries to receive a remedy, the 
leaders actively intervene in those processes and often pull those cases back to 
them. So within the state and non-state forums, such as churches, a competing 
and dynamic relationship develops that actively searches for disputes towards 
them.  
For example, in the Catholic Church, an alternative forum for divorce is achieved 
through the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal, where Catholic marriages may 
go through an annulment process and can be declared null and void.11 The 
Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal acts as a shopping forum for Catholics that 
draws cases of marital breakups towards it. During fieldwork, I met the Judicial 
Vicar of the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal, Dr Fr Mintoo L. Palma, who 
                                                 
11 For details, see Chapter Three. 
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has written a book on marriage and conjugal life, titled Marriage and conjugal life: 
Light up our hearts with love (Palma 2009). The Vicar told me that he wrote this 
book to create awareness among Catholic men and women about the non-
existence of divorce in the Catholic community.  
In his book, the Vicar showed a number of reasons for marriage breakups. 
However, most of his reasons blame women’s modernity and their changes of 
gender ideologies for these breakups. He writes:  
In old days, the household chores were women’s main duties after 
marriage. Their social circles also were limited within their relatives. After 
marriage, in most of the time, women were under the control and care of 
her in-laws. In those days it would take years to reduce the length of 
ghomta [covering head with saree] from their head.12 By that time, they 
would already be a mother of several children. But these days, even if a girl 
gets married at a young age, they do not prefer their in-laws’ interference 
in their lives. Now instead of putting a long ghomta, their tendency is to 
show their faces to everyone. In today’s time, they like to move freely and 
have a broader social circle even after their marriage. They have the desire 
to move alone and work outside. Under the circumstances, they face the 
reality. And through these, they gain consciousness to see their lives 
differently and begin to regret their early-age marriage. This realisation 
results in ambivalence in their minds and starts doing mishaps. (Palma 
2009, 20) 13 
However, the Vicar, Palma (2009), agrees that, in today’s society, marital 
problems often lead to severe violence. However, having said that, he 
immediately makes the clarification that no matter how violent or severe the 
problems become, the couple’s ‘duty’ is to seek help and support at the church 
and not elsewhere. He clearly states that, 
It should be kept in our minds that a husband or wife must come to the 
church in order to seek help to restore peace in their conjugal lives. 
Without doing this properly, it is not acceptable that they (wives) call the 
                                                 
12 Initially the ghomta used to fully cover the head and almost half of the face and then as time 
passed it reduced and an elderly woman will now have a ghomta only covering part of her head. 
13 Translated by the author. 
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police to lock their husbands up in the jail or they (husbands) beat their 
wives and send them to their father’s house. (Palma 2009, 82) 
The entire book emphasises one particular aspect of marriage i.e., that marriage 
is indissoluble. He states that no matter how serious incidents of abuse are, there 
is plenty of guidance available in the church in order to repair and heal those 
incidents (Palma 2009). He shows forgiveness as one such path that is capable of 
restoring a healthy conjugal life. But, according to him, in this process many 
times the families of both parties create additional hurdles to interrupt this 
repairing process (Palma 2009). In many instances, family members provide both 
parties with ‘destructive advice’ that exacerbates their situation. These advice and 
the actions taken by these parties are all acts against the church’s rules and 
regulations and more importantly against the Code of Canon (Palma 2009). The 
Vicar asserts that family and friends, who provide either parties with advice for 
divorce, are breaking the Canon Law. In the Catholic Church, marriage is one and 
it cannot be broken at any cost. So there should be no thoughts beyond reunion 
and reconciliation (Palma 2009).   
Most Catholic priests in Bangladesh assert that Catholics do not have divorce and 
they are exempted from the Divorce Act, 1869. I met a number of priests during 
my fieldwork who claimed that such exemption existed. However, I found that 
this assertion has also been passed among the general members of the Catholic 
community. Most priests never clearly let them know that, as a citizen of the 
country and as a Christian, one can use the state law in order to receive a remedy 
of divorce. Instead of explaining that, although according to the Code of Canon 
law they cannot receive a remedy of divorce, but as a citizen of the country they 
have the rights to seek a remedy under the particular civil law, the priests simply 
assert that Catholics are exempted from the civil law. So, whenever a priest says 
that the Divorce Act, 1869 is not applicable to Catholics, most people in the 
general community, who honour and respect their priests diligently, believe the 
same without enquiring it further. In this way, most of the members of the 
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Catholic community believe that the Divorce Act, 1872 is not applicable to them 
and hence they are not eligible for a divorce.   
However, it is not only that Catholics believe that they are exempted from the 
Divorce Act, 1869, but also that they are not informed about the available options 
of annulment and separation under the Canon law. For example, Marline, whose 
story was discussed in the previous section, stayed in a life-long separation. 
Marline was not aware of her option of annulment being a Catholic woman. 
Moreover, although she went to the church and sought a separation, the church 
did not cooperate with her to approve a separation. Instead, Marline told me that 
the priests made her understand that her divorce or separation would not be 
good for her daughter’s future. Therefore, an active force within the Catholic 
Church prohibits women from seeking a remedy that they want for themselves. 
Instead, the priests and other church leaders play an active role in shaping the 
outcomes as per their own interpretation.    
Another mechanism that the Catholic Church actively deploys in order to address 
marital issues is counselling.14 During fieldwork, I met Sr. Muriel, a Catholic nun, 
who is the Director of the counselling centre in Dhaka. Sr. Muriel told me that, 
“Many people think that the Counselling Centre will help them in breaking their 
marriages or in receiving a divorce. They come here after deciding to break the 
marriage and seek help to accomplish their goals. But the centre does not work in 
that way. We are here to reconcile, not break marriages”. In many cases, the 
Judicial Vicar of the Interdiocesan Ecclesiastical Tribunal refers men and women 
seeking an annulment to the counselling centre and the centre provides them 
with counselling services to mediate the situation. This forum also acts as a 
shopping forum in order to divert men and women from going to the court or to 
human rights organisations. 
                                                 
14 For details, see Chapter Three. 
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Although the Catholic Church has its established functionaries and mechanisms 
dealing with marital disputes, the Protestant churches, on the other hand, do not 
have any uniform system in place to address the same issue. However, the 
institutional anxiety of divorce is also significantly present within the Protestant 
churches. One piece of evidence for this anxiety is the theological consultation 
session that a Protestant church body organised on Christian marriage and 
divorce in 2014. During my fieldwork, this consultation meeting was held where 
many church leaders, both men, and women, were present.15 The General 
Secretary of the organising national church body told me that the main purpose 
of this consultation meeting was to create concrete rules and regulations with 
regard to marriage and its dissolution so that there are some uniform policies or 
guidelines that would help the local churches.  
Apart from various issues with regard to laws, the consultation meeting discussed 
the role of the church in cases of divorce, what punishment should be sanctioned 
if people get divorced, who should be included in the punishment, how much 
sympathy the church should show to the parties, and so on. Some members in 
the meeting thought that divorce has become a common phenomenon within the 
Christian community, which has been damaging to the church. A church leader 
commented in the meeting that although some churches have rules on 
punishment, most of them cannot be implemented for fear of losing members, 
the influence of leaders, compromise, and so on. He believes that church should 
take strict decisions where necessary in order to establish and re-establish the 
church’s ‘discipline’.  
Some other members in the consultation meeting thought that there should be 
clear policies created in relation to marriage and divorce within the church. They 
also suggested that there should be special committees appointed to monitor and 
investigate the marital and divorce issues for the Council. One member stated 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion on marriage as discussed in the consultation meeting, see Chapter Six.  
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that in relation to divorce, there are state laws, but that there should also be 
church orders. Another member suggested that before going through the process 
of divorce, the couple must undertake counselling and, if they are still eager for a 
divorce, then they should seek permission from the church and the church 
should have the authority to approve a divorce. In this way, he thought, the 
members do not necessarily have to go to court. Some also thought that the 
church should be proactive and become involved when they have information 
about any marital issues that may lead to divorce, no matter if the parties invite 
the church to be involved or not. But some others thought that if the church 
recognised divorce, then the tendency to initiate divorce will increase, so the 
church should not allow divorce in the first instance, instead, they can approve 
separation. 
The extent of institutional anxiety that both Bangladeshi Catholic and Protestant 
groups have around the issue of divorce is clear from the above discussion. This 
anxiety actively encourages the church, as a forum, to attract the marital disputes 
towards it and at the same time prevents its members from approaching state 
mechanisms such as the court or other mainstream legal aid organisations.    
A similar anxiety was also expressed by Monica Adhikary, a woman leader and 
Assistant Pastor of a Protestant church. She is one of the two women who is 
leading their churches in the pastoral role in the Protestant community. She said, 
“We, the Christians, usually do not encourage to go to the state law”. When I 
asked her why she told me, 
If you go to the law, it will never bring good. Suppose, if a husband 
tortures his wife, she can easily go to the police and file a case on violence 
against women. But if she does that what good can it bring? Maybe the 
police will put him in the jail. But we do not want a Christian family or a 
man is harassed like that. The other reason is there are a lot of financial 
involvement occurs when someone files a case. Now think how many 
Christians have so much financial capabilities? No one knows how long 
that case will continue. Because of all these reasons, many people do not 
want to take this path and we do not encourage them either.  
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A complicated relationship exists between the state and the community.16 Similar 
to Monica Adhikary, other Christian leaders strictly think that Christians should 
avoid any state mechanisms, particularly in relation to private matters such as 
divorce. This avoidance led the community to practise resolving issues internally 
without involving the state. Because of this tendency of the church to resolve 
issues internally, Monica Adhikary also thinks that issues such as divorce should 
be dealt internally within the community and preferably should be conducted 
mutually. She also thinks that due to social ideologies, a “shy culture” (her term) 
exists in the community that holds back Christian men and women from seeking 
help from the church at the initial stage. Instead, according to her, the parties try 
to handle the issue by themselves with relatives and friends and then come to the 
church when the issue is already too complicated to resolve.  
In my opinion, the ‘shyness’ that Monica Adhikary referred to occurs in order to 
avoid social scandal. This ‘shyness’ is created by the power of the community, 
through its representatives, over women. Due to this ‘shyness’, women can 
neither go to the church to seek help nor can they go to the state mechanisms or 
to the mainstream human rights and legal aid organisations to receive a remedy. 
But within such situations when the community actively prohibits women from 
seeking help outside the church, some women still go to these mainstream 
mechanisms in order to reach their goals. One of these women is Koli Gomes 
from Gazipur district. Koli went to Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK) to file a 
complaint about her husband’s second marriage. She wanted to live with her 
husband peacefully without his second wife. With her permission, the lawyers of 
the ASK allowed me to read her case. However, along with Koli’s complaint, I 
found another letter to the ASK authority written by the Judicial Vicar, Dr Fr 
Mintu Palma. He wrote in his letter that he was aware of Koli’s situation. 
According to the letter, although he thinks her husband is an “inhuman, 
oppressive, drug addict, and a vile criminal, … it is [nevertheless] important to 
                                                 
16 For details, see Chapter Five. 
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note that within our Catholic community there is no divorce exists”. The Judicial 
Vicar recommended that ASK sends Koli’s complaint back to the church so that 
the church could handle her case internally.   
In this way, the churches function as shopping forums to attract cases towards 
them. Moreover, the shopping forums become active not only within their own 
boundary and community but also often cross their boundaries to intervene 
when women actively engage in forum shopping. In this sense, forum shopping 
and shopping forums are not reciprocal but they engage themselves in active 
negotiation and contestation. 
Bargaining with patriarchy 
In the last two sections, I have shown how different actors, particularly women, 
engage in forum shopping and use various alternative forums in order to get a 
divorce or an alternative to divorce and how various forums shop for disputes 
related to divorce or marriage breakups and finally how these two processes 
compete with each other. In this section, I will again concentrate on forum 
shopping and demonstrate how women, while undertaking forum shopping, use 
different forums strategically in order to engage in patriarchal bargaining. 
Women, while engaging with forum shopping, strategically chose different 
actions, such as cutting all forms of contact with the community, living separately 
from their husbands but officially remaining married for their protection from 
scandal, projecting themselves as victims of their husbands’ deeds to the 
community and managing to live with society’s sympathy, and using their class 
positions, particularly their poor socio-economic status, to live outside the radar 
of the church. Below I elaborate upon each of these groups. 
Leaving the community 
The first group of women took drastic measures, such as leaving the community, 
by avoiding and discontinuing any community contacts except for a few selected 
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ones. These women could take such measures because of their financial 
independence. Moreover, their workplaces are located outside the community 
and church boundaries, which also helped them to avoid contacts with the 
community members. For example, Angela Halder used such a strategy in order 
to obtain her divorce. Although she took the legal path and divorced her husband 
under the Divorce Act, 1869, she thinks that she succeeded because she 
completely avoided the church and the community in the process. However, 
Angela is a financially established woman with a promising career and she works 
outside the Christian community. So, in a way, her own financial positions and 
wider social network helped her to achieve her goals.    
Among Christians in Bangladesh, divorce is seen as directly linked not only to 
religion but also to family honour and shame. Gatwiri and Mumbi (2016) explain 
that when women demand a divorce, they (those women) are often seen as a 
direct threat to the honour of their family and community. Linking divorce with 
honour and shame results in increased control over women’s mobility and 
sexuality due to the perceived threats towards their group cohesion (Gatwiri and 
Mumbi 2016, Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1997, Moghissi 1999). In Angela’s case, by 
discontinuing every form of contact with her relatives, friends, and other 
members of the church and community, she managed to be out of sight of them, 
which helped her to be seen as outside of such perceived threats. Her absence 
from the community for an extended period helped her to loosen the 
community’s monitoring and control over her.   
Using marital status as a shield 
The second group of women who obtained alternative divorce still use their once 
‘married’ status to protect themselves from social judgments and shame as a 
divorced woman. Both Marline and Moly used this strategy for a number of 
reasons. Both of them thought, similar to many other women and men, that 
being divorced is a matter of shame to their family. Guru (2009) argues that,  
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A respectable woman is one who avoids eye contact with unrelated men, is 
modest in her attire and does not flaunt her ‘dangerous’ sexuality. Her 
honour, prestige, and reputation (izzat and sharam) are closely tied to the 
representation of her body and to the male protection that she finds. 
Women without the defense of men can be left extremely vulnerable and 
easy sexual targets. (Guru 2009, 293) 
By identifying as ‘married’ in their national ID and other official documents, both 
Marline and Moly hoped to have some kind of shield that would protect them 
from judgemental comments and from being easy sexual targets of other men. 
Marline was also concerned about her daughter’s marriage in the future since 
divorced and single mothers are often stigmatised, which impacts on their 
daughters’ marriages. Choudhary (1996) reports similar findings in her study in 
Pakistan. According to her, when a woman leaves her husband, even if he is 
violent, she is seen as someone who has dishonoured her family and community 
and this dishonour transfers from mothers to their children, particularly to their 
daughters, that may jeopardise their chances of marriage (Choudhary 1996). So 
Marline, being separated and not specifically divorced, strategised her 
subjectivity for her daughter’s chance of securing a ‘good’ marriage.    
Using the image of victimization to gaining social sympathy 
Divorce is a matter of stigmatisation and shame among Bangladeshi Christians, 
as it is with other religious groups. Scholars such as Sakraida (2005) and Sandfield 
(2006) show that divorce results in both material loss, as well as relationship loss 
(spouse and other associated relationships), that often leads to extended periods 
of grief or mourning and many women,  experience depression, loss of self-
esteem,  and loss of confidence. Bangladeshi and other South Asian societies hold 
a similar image of divorced women. Therefore, Bangladeshi society also expects 
to see women suffering after experiencing a divorce. The community wants to see 
a ‘victim’ in a woman in such a situation. It is uncommon that, in Bangladesh, 
women, after their divorce, they will portray themselves as having a lifetime 
prospect to revive and rediscover themselves, which is shown as one of the 
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positive impacts of divorce by scholars such as Baum, Rahav, and Sharon (2005). 
However, usually, Bangladeshi society does not expect to see something similar 
to this in a divorced woman.   Marline, when I interviewed her, told me that,  
Being a separated woman from my husband, when I went to the priests 
and community leaders, they did not help me to overcome my situation. I 
think that the society was not happy with me because I wanted to survive 
by myself, without their help. They want to see a divorced or a single 
woman dependent on them, living by their mercy. When they cannot do 
that, they begin to talk bad stuff about you. 
But not all women, such as Marline, live independently on their own. Some 
women, such as Bani, who are partially or fully dependent on their husbands or 
families, use a different strategy to reach their goals. For example, Bani 
consciously did not initiate her divorce, although she wanted it as badly as her 
husband. Instead, she waited for him to initiate the divorce process and then she 
demanded compensation. Bani became successful in two senses, first, she 
received a handsome amount of money that has secured her future life, and 
second, by not initiating a divorce, she was portrayed by her family and the 
community as a ‘victim’ of this divorce and that helped her to gain society’s 
sympathy. If she had initiated the divorce, there was a fair chance that she might 
not achieve any of the above. Moreover, later she and her family submitted an 
application to the church stating what happened to her life, entirely blaming her 
husband and, more importantly, without mentioning that a huge amount of 
money was transacted in the process. The church became very sympathetic 
towards her and punished her ex-husband by suspending his church membership 
for the next year.  
By presenting herself as the victim of her husband’s actions, Bani managed to 
gain society’s sympathy. In fact, after her divorce through an affidavit, Bani 
remarried socially in the church. Her remarriage was only possible because 
Bangladeshi society perceived her as a ‘victim’ as opposed to an independent 
being. Referring to Gatwiri and Mumbi’s (2016) work, where women show silence 
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as power, it is interesting to see how Bani first used silence and then her voice 
alternatively to negotiate when her husband initiated a divorce. Here, the timing 
of silence is used very strategically and, as a result, she could gain the 
community’s sympathy, which was very important for her to live in the 
community. Women’s silence and their voice co-exist and are used as a strategy 
for patriarchal bargaining. 
Using women’s class position 
The final group of women is those who use their poor class positions in their 
strategies of bargaining with patriarchy. In my fieldwork, both in urban and rural 
areas, I found that divorce (mostly alternative divorce) and remarriage are more 
common among women from the poor socio-economic backgrounds than from 
women from middle-class or upper-middle-class backgrounds. Grover (2011) also 
observes a similar finding among the urban poor in India, which is not that 
common among the middle-class. Grover (2011) argues that these divorces and 
remarriages have a “functional, purposeful, and agential role in the lives of low-
caste women” (Grover 2011, 74). However, the strategy that these poor women use 
is “having been left with no choice but to remarry” in a way to justify their 
multiple divorces and remarriages “[a]s a survival mechanism women actively 
exercise their agency to initiate new marriages” (Grover 2011, 75).  
Gender ideology plays a significant role here. A woman should not be alone as 
she is vulnerable and must have a male figure to protect and provide for her; 
ideologies similar to this are embedded in the social fabric. However, for 
Bangladeshi Christians, these ideologies are prevalent among the poor as well. 
Therefore, whereas middle-class urban Christians tend to strictly keep 
themselves within the ideology of marriage as a sacrament and strongly believe 
that a woman must remain to her conjugal life, many poor women cross the 
boundary of divorce and remarriage. For example, Shukla Baroi in the previous 
section is someone who had divorced and remarried. I also met a Catholic poor 
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woman, Shilpi Rozario, from Gazipur during my fieldwork, who also divorced two 
times and married three times. These women are not visible in the church and in 
a way they remain below the church’s radar. Women’s invisibility from the 
church helps them to be ‘free beings’. By taking this path, many of these women 
use their class position to receive a remedy of divorce or its alternatives and to 
remarry.  
Conclusion 
Although the Bangladeshi Christian community actively prohibits and 
discourages divorce, people, particularly women, use alternative processes to 
receive a remedy of divorce or alternative divorce. In this chapter, I have 
examined the laws, social and gender ideologies and practices around the 
dissolution of marriage. Women become actively engaged in forum shopping by 
choosing a specific path of divorce or its alternatives. However, not only do 
women forum shop in this particular context, the church and its associated 
functionaries also become shopping forums to attract disputes towards them. In 
this process, while forum shopping, women make strategic choices to choose a 
specific path based on their own individual intersectional subjectivity and 
situations. Therefore, through the processes of forum shopping and shopping 
forums, women engage in patriarchal bargaining to reach their objectives. 
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Chapter Eight 
Good laws, bad outcomes: Women’s inheritance  
rights and practices1 
Introduction 
Land rights is one of the critical entry points for women’s empowerment in South 
Asia. Women’s struggle for their rights to inheritance and landed property are 
critical gender issues in this region as property mediates relationships not only 
between men and women but also between women (Agarwal 1994). However, the 
land rights of women is a complex topic affecting women’s (and men’s) material 
lives, social relationships and symbolic identities and, therefore, needs to be 
understood in a holistic manner (Rao 2008). In this chapter, I consider women’s 
land inheritance rights and practices in the Christian community in Bangladesh. I 
show a wide range of complexities that Christian women face in accessing land as 
inheritable property. I examine only the issue of land inheritance in this thesis as 
land, as a productive resource, has more value and significance than other forms 
of property, especially movable ones. As Goody (1962) points out, land has a 
completely different set of interests than that of movable properties and people 
are more anchored with landed property than any other forms of property in 
general.  
As a productive resource, land is more contested and disputed than any other 
resource. Many of these disputes are gendered in nature. According to Agarwal 
(1994, 12), to understand the links between gender subordination and land, it is 
important to analyse both who owns the land and who controls it. In other 
                                                 
1 Part of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (Das 
2016). For details, see: Das, J. (2016). Good laws, bad outcomes: land rights and inheritance 
practices for Christian women in Bangladesh. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
48(2), 159-185. 
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words, gender equality in land rights that law permits does not necessarily 
guarantee gender equality in actual ownership. In the same manner, gender 
equality in ownership does not guarantee gender equality in control. Therefore, 
there is a vast gendered difference between rights, ownership, and control of 
productive resources such as land. 
Across South Asia, the actualisation of women’s land inheritance rights from law 
into practice is still elusive. Under the Succession Act, 1925, applicable to 
Bangladeshi Christians, a woman possesses significant rights to her deceased 
husband’s estate as well as rights to her deceased parents’ property equal to their 
brother(s), in contrast to Hindu and Muslim inheritance practices.2 The law 
specifies that one-third of the deceased man’s property should go to his widow, 
and equal shares of the remainder (two-thirds) to his daughters and sons 
(Succession Act 1925, Section 33). 
Unlike Hindu and Muslim women, who are legally provisioned to inherit a lot 
less than men in their respective communities, Bangladeshi Christian women 
enjoy equal inheritance rights as Christian men on the surface. But the actual 
practices of such rights are far from what the personal law permits. A large gap 
between the formal law that is embedded in the Christian personal law — the 
Succession Act, 1925 — and the inheritance practices in the community exist. 
Although the Christian personal law provides women with substantial 
inheritance rights, in practice most women do not succeed in exercising these 
rights. The issue of women’s disinheritance in South Asia is not uncommon. Not 
only within the Christian community but also among other religious groups, 
women continue to be disinherited. Many scholars catalogue the reasons behind 
such divergence and show that one of the reasons is that many women give up 
their share of inheritance in favour of their brothers voluntarily as part of cultural 
practice (Agarwal 1994, Goody 1962, 1990, Basu 1999).  But if women’s 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of Muslim and Hindu inheritance laws, see Chapter Three.  
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disinheritance is pervasive in most communities in South Asia, then the question 
is: What makes this practice among the Bangladeshi Christians different from 
others? In this chapter, I address this question by linking women’s inheritance 
rights and practices with social ideologies and minority community’s identity 
creation and protection.  
To understand women’s inheritance rights and practices, it is not only important 
to understand what ‘property’ means in that particular society but also what 
ideological, legal, and actual relationships are associated with the property in that 
context. Understanding property in such a broad way is important because, in a 
particular society, the concept of property is not an isolated phenomenon, but it 
is heavily loaded with politics as well as ideologies (Hann 1998). While 
introducing their edited volume titled Changing Properties of Property that 
challenges the concept of property by providing an anthropological analysis, von 
Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber (2006, 15) argue, 
“Empirically, property finds expression in a wide variety of social phenomena, in 
cultural ideals and ideologies, in legal institutions, in actual social relationships 
and in social practices”. Through the different “layers of social organisation,” the 
authors identified specific terms of property, where the layers are interrelated 
with each other in multiple ways: through legal-institutions, social relationships, 
and ideologies (von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006, 
15).  
Based on the notion of the ‘layers of social organisation’ (von Benda-Beckmann, 
von Benda-Beckmann, and Wiber 2006), in this chapter, I analyse women’s 
inheritance rights and practices by considering three particular phenomena: the 
social ideologies, legal framework, and actual practices. I take this concept 
forward by linking the ideological and legal phenomena and actual practices with 
minority identity creation and protection. I argue that in addition to the 
ideological factors that hold women back from claiming their rights, for 
Bangladeshi Christians, women’s land rights are critically linked with the creation 
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and protection of community identity. I also link women’s land rights with the 
notion of the ‘good woman’, an ideological concept introduced by Rao (2008) in 
her rich ethnographic work on Santal women’s struggle to claim their land rights 
in India. According to Rao (2008), a ‘good woman’ is one who accepts 
subordination at the hands of her father, husband, brother or son in different 
stages of her life; she is strictly monogamous and possesses a strict sexual 
morality. In the case of the Bangladeshi Christian community, both the processes 
of creation and protection of community identity and the ‘good woman’ image 
impose significant influence on and struggle over women’s land rights. Further, 
the land inheritance struggle and women’s disinheritance among Bangladeshi 
Christians generates inter-generational consequences, which I show before 
ending this chapter.  
The chapter has four major sections. In the first section, I analyse the social 
gendered ideological assumptions responsible for the disjuncture between 
women’s inheritance rights and practices. In this section, I show how these 
ideologies deprive women of their inheritance rights that law permits and how 
women often themselves voluntarily accept their disinheritance and justify it 
through these ideologies. The second section analyses personal laws governing 
inheritance among Christians and shows the contrast between law and the actual 
practices within the community. In the third section, I focus on the actual 
inheritance practices. In this section, I bring in Rao’s (2008) notion of ‘good 
woman’ and show how women in the Christian community balance between 
maintaining a ‘good woman’ image and asserting their inheritance rights. I also 
show here how their individual subjectivity and class position influence this 
process. Finally, in the fourth and last section, I link women’s inheritance with 
the community’s identity creation and protection processes and show the inter-
generational consequences of women’s disinheritance as a normative practice 
that the community is currently facing. 
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Social ideology of women’s land disinheritance 
Social ideologies have significant roles in the distribution of resources, 
particularly the landed property, within the communities in South Asia. In most 
cases, the social ideological assumptions lead women to be disinherited land in 
the region. Scholars, such as Goody (1962), Agarwal (1994), Basu (1999), and Rao 
(2008), have catalogued these ideologies that cause women not to inherit their 
parental or spousal property. These scholars have found that social practices such 
as women’s disinheritance revolve around the familial relations and gender 
ideology within Bangladeshi society. One of the causes of women’s 
disinheritance, commonly noted, is women giving up inheritance rights 
voluntarily in favour of their brothers.  Goody (1962), Agarwal (1994), and Basu 
(1999) explored similar issues relating to the cooperation and conflict between 
siblings with regard to property relations. They found that women believe that if 
they claim their parental land, it would damage their relationship with their 
brothers. For example, some women in Rajasthan told Agarwal (1994, 261, 263) 
that “a sister gives up her claim in order to keep the passage to her natal village 
open. If a woman stakes her claim, her brother’s wife will refuse to invite her 
home or speak to her … [A]fter the parents’ deaths, a brother’s home becomes 
woman’s natal home”.  
Similarly, by focusing on women's "profound desires to stay connected with and 
feel loved by their natal families" among the middle-class and poor Hindu women 
in Delhi, India, Basu (1999, 225) finds that women often refuse their share of 
parental inheritances so that it does not cause any rift in the relationships with 
their brothers. Earlier, Sharma (1980, 57) had similar findings: “If a brother and 
sister are on good terms then … she will tell her brother that she does not want 
her share of the inheritance. After all, if he eats, then she can eat”. Agarwal (1994) 
analysed rural women’s life-situation and showed why the brothers have been 
such important figures in women’s lives. One of the reasons for the brothers’ 
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importance in women’s lives is women’s early marriages, which are virilocal in 
nature. Gupta (2000) describes virilocal marriages and their implications in the 
following way: 
… [O]nly men constitute and reproduce the social order. The mother 
merely gives birth: it is through the father that a child acquires a social 
identity and is incorporated into the social order. Since only boys remain 
in the lineage, the significant social reproduction is that by the father of 
the son. Men are the fixed points in this social order, and women are the 
moving points because when they marry they leave their home and 
lineage, and are absorbed into their husbands’ lineage. (emphasis in the 
original text)(Gupta 2000, 3-4) 
The virilocal marriage system and its associated implications make women 
economically, socially and physically vulnerable and entirely dependent on their 
husbands and their families.  
During my fieldwork, I found a number of people, including community leaders, 
who regarded this norm as “not always bad”, as expressed by Rev. Jonas Halder, a 
Protestant priest and the CEO of a Protestant national church body.  According 
to him, such norms have enabled Bangladeshi society to operate smoothly. Rev 
Halder said, “If we think deeply, we could see that our norm, where women do 
not claim their inheritance, actually brings good within the society. Yes, the 
rights were not equally realised, but it restored peace within the society”. 
Although the state law provides equal inheritance rights for women, the practice 
of depriving women of their share of inheritance has been developed as part of 
the local normative system. Therefore, besides the discrepancy between law and 
practice, there are also tensions that exist between the state law and a locally 
developed normative system. 
According to Agarwal (1994), in the case of marital issues, domestic violence, 
marriage break-ups or widowhood, brothers, particularly in the absence of their 
parents, become key support figures in these women’s lives. Moreover, she also 
found that visits to the natal home allow women to have a rest from housework, 
childcare, and fieldwork (cultivation) and more freedom than in their in-laws’ 
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home (Agarwal 1994). The behavioural norms are more relaxed for daughters 
than daughters-in-law. So when a woman visits her natal village, she receives a 
greater degree of freedom to dress as she wishes and her mobility increases, 
meaning she can visit anywhere within the village.  
I have similar findings to Agarwal (1994) in my fieldwork. The difference in the 
behavioural norms between the daughters, while visiting their natal families, and 
daughters-in-law in the same families, was vivid in both of my rural field sites. 
For example, both in Barisal and Gazipur, the married daughters could wear 
salwar kameez (which is mostly worn by younger unmarried women) when they 
were visiting their natal home, but the daughters-in-law in the same families 
always dressed in sarees. Moreover, the married daughters visiting their natal 
homes could go anywhere in the village whereas the daughters-in-law had 
comparatively restricted movements. Additionally, the daughters-in-law were 
expected to do all the household chores and when the daughter came to visit her 
natal family, she did no household work. In Gazipur, my host, Teresa Gomes, told 
me with pride that she never ‘allows’ her daughter-in-law to walk in the village 
without a ghomta (covering her head with her saree), whereas I have seen when 
both her daughters visited them, as soon as they entered the house they changed 
their sarees and wore salwar kameez and went to every house in that village 
dressed like that. Therefore, married (or unmarried) daughters exercise more 
freedom in their respective natal home compared to daughters-in-law. 
In Bengali culture, brother sisters love is often romanticised. A number of local 
Bengali songs, poems, and folklores describes the sweet and affectionate bond 
between brothers and sisters. Brothers and sisters grow up together playing, 
fighting and so on and when the sisters leave their natal family after marriage, 
living apart creates strong emotions for both. The following Bengali folk song 
depicts similar emotion of a sister towards her brother: 
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Ke jaas re bhaaty gang baiya 
Amar bhai dhon re koiyo naiyor nito boila 
Tora ke jaas, ke jaas. 
 
Bochor khani ghuira gaalo gaalo re 
Bhaiyer dekha pailam na pailam na 
Koilja amar puira gaalo gaalo re 
Bhaiyer dekha pailam na pailam na 
Chhilam re kotoi asha loiya 
Bhai na aailo gelo gelo rother mela choila 
Tora ke jaas, ke jaas. 
 
Pran kande kande  
Pran kande kande pran kande re pran kande 
Noyon jhore jhore noyon jhore re noyon jhore 
Pora monre bujhaile bojhena  
Pran kande kande pran kande  
Shujon majhi re bhaire koiyo giya 
Na aasile swaponete dekha dito boila. 
 
[Who is going there with his boat in an ebb tide? 
Please tell my beloved brother to take me naior. 
Who is going there? Who is going? 
 
The year has passed by 
But I did not see my brother 
My heart has saddened 
But I did not see my brother 
I was waiting with great hope 
But my brother did not come 
Who is going there? Who is going? 
 
My heart cries, cries, cries; 
My tears drop, drop, drop 
I cannot make my heart understand, 
My heart cries, cries, cries 
O dear boatman, please go and tell my brother 
To come in my dreams if he cannot come in real 
Who is going there? Who is going?]3 
 
                                                 
3 Translated by the author. 
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In Bangladesh, a woman’s access to her ancestral home, known as naior, is seen 
as her right (Alamgir 1977, Jahan 1975, Sobhan 1978). Women often exchange 
their inheritance rights in lieu of their right of naior. Such practices are not 
uncommon in South Asia and many places in Africa as well (Philips 2003). For 
example, as noted by Yalman (1967), women’s similar right is seen on their 
brothers’ home among the Kandyan Sinhalese in Sri Lanka when inheritance is 
not claimed by women. 
Not only between brother and sister, the bond and relationship are often 
extended between the mama (uncle – mother’s brother) and vagna (nephew – 
sister’s son). In most cases, this relationship becomes the sweetest. Visiting 
mamabari (uncle’s house) becomes fond memories from childhood. Therefore, 
women also trade their inheritance rights so that their children have access to 
their uncles’ house and they can have this special relationship and memories with 
their uncles’ families. A popular children’s rhyme goes on like this: 
Tai tai tai mama bari jai 
Mama dilo dudh vaat pet bhorey khai 
Mami elo lathi niye, palai palai 
 
[Clap Clap Clap, we are going to mamabari 
Mama gives us rice with milk, we eat until we are full 
But mami (mama’s wife) comes with a stick, and we all flee, flee, flee.]4 
Apart from the bonding between brother(s) and sister(s), the relationships 
between women is also important with regard to women’s land rights. The 
relationships between nonod/nonash (nonod, husband’s younger sister; nonash, 
husband’s elder sister) and boudi/bhai-er-bou (boudi (or bhabi), elder brother’s 
wife; bhai-er-bou, younger brother’s wife) is often seen as opposite to the 
relationships between brother(s) and sister(s). The popular media, both in 
Bangladesh and India have enormous movies and TV shows and serials that 
depict the complicated relationships between nonod-boudi.  
                                                 
4 Translated by the author. 
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The above rhyme depicts a similar story, where the mother teaches her children 
that their mami comes with a stick to beat them up, while their mama provides 
them with good food. So it is commonly assumed by people that the boudis have 
a negative role sanctioning their nonods to claim their inheritance rights. In my 
view, such negative role of the boudis with respect to inheritance rights of their 
nonods is not as straightforward as it seems. The boudis are often deprived by 
their own brothers and their wives from their inheritance rights on her parental 
properties. So she plays a similar role in the case of her nonods and the boudis 
often treat the nonods in a similar way as they have been treated by their natal 
family members, thus creating a chain effect. I found women in my fieldwork 
who were not willing to let their nonods receive their share of inheritance as they 
(boudis) did not receive their share of inheritance from her natal family. So these 
women do not think that it is justified to let their nonods to claim their shares.  
Because of the close bond between brothers and sisters, in many cases, a ‘moral 
dilemma’ is created among women. As a result, they have “to choose between 
gender equality and kinship obligations, because of [the] ideological burden of 
preserving the moral requisites of family unity rests heavily, if not solely, on the 
shoulders of women” (Philips 2003, 249). Often such an ideological burden 
blends normatively and becomes invisible by becoming a common sense and is 
naturalised under the hegemony of gender roles expectation and kinship norms 
(Comaroff 1994). According to Philips (2003), this “moral dilemma … is a 
manifestation of the tension between the hegemony of traditional cultural norms 
and religious laws, on the one hand, and the counter-hegemony generated by 
secular laws, awareness of legal rights and the discourse around gender equality, 
on the other” (Philips 2003, 261). Therefore, this ‘moral dilemma’ that is created 
among the sisters is an indicator of patriarchal domination. 
Such tradition of ‘brother-sister love’ is not apolitical. Instead, I argue that this 
relationship is based on mutual benefits. The sister keeps the door of her natal 
home open where she and her family receives a good and respectful treatment 
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during their visits and, moreover, she receives financial and moral support from 
her brother when in need. All these take place in lieu of her share of inheritance. 
On the other hand, the brothers can possess all of their sisters’ shares of their 
parental property and all they need to do is treat their sisters and their families 
well once a year during their visits and provide some support when they are in 
need.  
Chowdhry (2008) problematises this ‘brother-sister love’ and argues that such 
love only lasts if the sister gives up her rights and does not claim her share of 
inheritance. Philips (2003, 249) describes this relationship as “kinship mutuality”, 
which becomes “a critical determinant of women’s responses in property 
situations”. However, as Rao (2008, 37) suggests, “We see the rural woman not 
claiming her right to land as a sign of subordination alone. This may be the case, 
but it is simultaneously a conscious act, an investment being made by her 
towards a different future”. Therefore, for sisters, in order to ensure financial and 
social security for their future lives, giving up their share of inheritance in favour 
of their brothers becomes a conscious and strategic investment.  
Monica Adhikary, whom I met during my fieldwork, has made such strategic 
investment to have good relationships with her brothers by giving up her 
inheritance rights. Monica is a Protestant woman from Barisal, currently working 
in an NGO as a fieldworker. She told me that usually, the daughters do not 
demand their father’s property; instead, all of it goes to the brothers. When her 
deceased shoshur’s (father-in-law) property was distributed, none of her nonods 
claimed any of it. Monica also did not claim her father’s property when he died. 
In her words:  
After my parents died, I have my brothers as my only family. Whenever I 
go to their house, they take good care of me. They also love my children a 
lot. It is a pleasure for us to visit them from time to time. But if I had 
claimed my father’s property, I surely would not get such care and love 
from them. I would not be able to go to them if I need any help from 
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them. If I had taken my share of my father’s property, their door would 
have been closed for me by now. 
Monica added that if someday her brothers do not treat her as well as they do 
now, then she would demand her share of her deceased father’s property. In this 
way, women are investing in their future security and create a ‘contingent capital’ 
by not claiming their share of inheritance.  For these women, land is important 
but land alone is not sufficient to protect her in a bad situation. They need the 
support of a male figure. So these women believe that the trade-off is worth it for 
them. 
However, in practice, the notion of ‘contingent capital’ does not work in a simple 
manner as when the sister(s) returns to their brothers’ home or are in need of 
financial help, many times the brothers and their families become reluctant to 
help them. In many cases “the returning sister is viewed as an economic burden” 
(Agarwal 1994, 267) and she is perceived as a potential threat to the brothers and 
their wives in claiming their share of inheritance. So, sacrificing inheritance 
rights, in reality, does not always ensure women’s future welfare during adverse 
situations.  
However, not all women sacrifice their share of inheritance in favour of their 
brothers in order to secure their future; but at the same time, many brothers also 
deprive their sisters by using different strategies or tactics. Patrick Ribeiro, a land 
surveyor in Gazipur, told me some of the tactics that brothers deploy to deprive 
their sisters of land inheritance. For example, he said that if their sisters are living 
far away in another village after their marriage, the brothers record the entire 
land officially (both their and their sisters’ shares) in their own names, leaving 
out the sisters. He said that it can easily be done by spending some money to 
bribe the local Union Parishad (the lowest unit of local government) Chairman to 
get a false warishan (heir) certificate, listing only the brothers’ names as warish 
(heirs), leaving out the sisters’ names. This warishan certificate can then be used 
in the land office to record the land in their names. Many brothers sell the land 
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by using a false warishan certificate even before the sisters become aware of such 
action on the part of their brothers.  
Patrick further told me that the false warishan certificate can be challenged by 
the sisters in the court by filing a case stating that their share of the property has 
been wrongly recorded in another name. However, to recover their records it 
takes more than a year and many sisters cannot spend such large amount of time 
and money for court cases and often give up the attempt to recover their share. 
Another tactic followed by the brothers is that they allocate their sisters’ share of 
land from different plots in small pieces. Thus it becomes practically impossible 
to use or cultivate or even sell these small pieces of land from different places and 
locations. As a result, the sisters are left with no other choice but to sell the land 
to their brothers at a lower price than the market.  
Another reason for women’s land disinheritance is paying a dowry of ‘gift’ on 
their wedding by their natal families, which is often seen as ‘pre-mortem’ 
inheritance. The idea of women receiving a marriage settlement from her natal 
family in the form of streedhanam (as it is known in India), or kanyadan (gift of a 
maiden in marriage) or dowry is long-established (Caplan 1984). Most 
Bangladeshi Christians assert that they do not have such practices, but in reality, 
such ‘gift-giving’ are commonly practised and women continue to bring in to her 
husband’s family as much ‘gift’ as her natal family can provide. A number of 
women, while telling me their stories, mentioned what the ‘gifts’ were that their 
parents gave them during their wedding, mostly in the form of jewellery, 
furniture, and other household items. Dowry or ‘gift’ giving at marriage from the 
bride’s family has often been seen as a form of inheritance (Goody 1990). 
However, the norm of ‘gift’-giving at marriage has also been used as a tool to 
ensure women’s disinheritance of landed property (Kishwar 1986, Philips 2003, 
Chowdhry 2008).  
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But can a dowry or ‘gift’ in the form of cash or kind be considered equivalent to 
land inheritance?  Some scholars, such as Sharma (1980) and Hershman and 
Standing (1981), have dismissed the idea that substitutes land inheritance with a 
dowry or ‘gift’ that is mostly provided in the form of cash or in material forms 
such as gold jewellery, furniture, and household items, or motor cycles or 
vehicles. They argue that whatever comes as dowry, cash or kind, does not 
generate income in the same way that land can. Moreover, the dowry 
transactions are usually held between the bride’s and the groom’s parents or 
guardians, where the bride, in most cases, does not have any access to it.  
Apart from the sisters, who often are deprived of their parental inherited 
property, the elderly mothers also do not receive their shares of their deceased 
husbands’ property in many instances, particularly when they have a son(s). 
Instead, their share of inheritance from their deceased husband’s side goes 
straight to the sons. I met Jharna Rozario in Gazipur during my fieldwork, who 
explained that usually, if a man dies, instead of a third of his property going to his 
widow, it directly goes to his son(s) and sometimes to his daughter(s) too. She 
told me, “Usually the widow lives with her sons. So what would she do with her 
share? Isn’t it rather logical to go to her sons as they are the one who looks after 
her? So it is seen unnecessary to separate the property and allocate to the 
widow”. Allocating resources, especially land, to men and women separately in a 
family is seen as a potential threat leading to the breakup of the family. In order 
to stabilise the family as an institution, sustaining unequal resource positions 
between men and women is necessary. 
Christian inheritance law and its (non-)implementation 
Significant differences exist between the ideologies around women’s land 
inheritance and the provisions of the state law governing inheritance among the 
Christian population. The Succession Act, 1925, which is applicable for Christians 
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in Bangladesh, is egalitarian in nature.5 The law does not differentiate between 
sons and daughters, living and deceased children (if any child died before their 
parents, their heirs/heiresses will inherit their share), and full-blood and half-
blood children. Moreover, it recognises the rights of widows substantially, as 
equal to that of a widower. The law provides priority to the widow/widower of 
the deceased person in the inheritance of their shares. The Christian inheritance 
law specifies that after the widow/widower gets their share (one-third), the rest 
of the property (two-thirds) is divided between the children equally. Even if a 
family member converts to another religion, the law does not deprive that person 
of their share of inheritance. No time limit is provisioned to claim one’s 
inheritance. According to the law, every warish will get their share up to the 
degree they are traceable. Moreover, the law does not differentiate between 
movable and immovable property. 
The Christian inheritance law is highly regarded in the Bangladeshi legal 
community. A Christian lawyer, practising in the Supreme Court, told me during 
my fieldwork that he had seen in his law school and later in his career that 
mainstream lawyers always praise the inheritance law for Bangladeshi Christians 
as it provides equal rights for men and women. However, although a gender-
equal law has been in place since the time of British colonisation, in reality, the 
provisions of the law are rarely implemented in practice. In fact, the social 
practices and attitudes of passing property down through the male line have 
remained dominant within the Bangladeshi Christian community, ignoring law 
(Cossman and Kapur 1996). Legal feminist scholars have argued that law is a male 
discourse, particularly when it comes to practice and therefore there is an 
obvious disjuncture seen between law and the realities that women experience 
(Griffiths 1997, MacKinnon 1989, Smith 1993). However, in the early 1980s in 
Bangladesh, a number of researchers found that many women from the majority 
                                                 
5 See Chapter Three and the Introduction to this chapter for the provisions of the Succession Act 
1925. 
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Muslim groups were claiming or at least planning to claim their inheritance 
entitlements (Abdullah and Zeidenstein 1982, Aziz and Aziz 1979, Jansen 1983, 
Nath 1984, Taniguchi 1987). But among minority communities, particularly in the 
Christian community, the tendency of women to claim their inheritance is still 
very low. I found only a few Christian women in my fieldwork who have claimed 
and/or received their share of inherited property.   
Table 8.1: Inheritance practices of parental properties  
among Christians in Bangladesh  
 
  Catholic Protestant  Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Total no of respondents whose father 
passed away 
17 
 
19 
 
36 
 
Father's property has been  
distributed/registered 
7 41 6 32 13 36 
Father's property has not been 
distributed/registered 
10 59 13 68 23 64 
Brother(s) and sister(s) got equal shares 2 12 1 5 3 8 
Only brother(s) received all shares of 
parental property 
2 12 3 16 5 14 
Sister(s) received less than brother(s) 3 18 1 5 4 11 
During my fieldwork, I interviewed 36 women (17 Catholic and 19 Protestant) 
whose fathers had passed away, to find their inheritance practices. Table 8.1 
depicts the findings relating to the inheritance practices among these 36 women. 
I found only three (8%) among them, had actually received an equal portion of 
land compared to their brothers. One of these three women reported that she 
was the only one of her sisters who received some land because of her low 
economic status, and it was less than half of each of her brother’s share.  
The practice of equal distribution among all siblings is slightly more common 
among Catholics (12%) than among Protestants (5%). There were also some cases 
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(11%) in which the sister(s) received some land but significantly less than the land 
that their brother(s) received. Moreover, the tendency not to distribute or 
register the land among the heirs after the father’s or husband’s death is also very 
common among Christians (Desa 2012, Baroi 2011). According to my findings, in 
23 cases (64%), the deceased father’s property was not distributed and registered 
among the heirs/heiresses. In many instances, land was still registered in the 
name of a deceased grandfather.  This implies that in most of those cases, the 
land is occupied and used by the son(s) alone as, due to the virilocal marriage 
system, the daughter(s) had left their natal home after marriage to live with their 
husband’s family, usually in another village. 
Apart from the reasons for women’s land disinheritance described in the previous 
section, such as women giving up land voluntarily in favour of their brothers to 
ensure future financial and social security, there are some other reasons specific 
to the Christian community in Bangladesh. D'Costa (2011) describes a number of 
reasons for such discrepancies between laws and practice among Bangladeshi 
Christians.  One factor is that the lack of awareness of the laws results in many 
women being deprived of their inheritance rights (D'Costa 2011). Another is that 
spreading false information or propaganda, mostly orally, served to create further 
assumptions and misconceptions with regards to the Succession Act, 1925, among 
the Christian population. One example of such false information is the assertion 
that, due to Christian inheritance law, a woman inherits both from her father and 
husband. So women are getting property from two parties, meaning women are 
getting more than men, which is unbalancing the property distribution within 
the community. But when people talk about the propaganda, they often omit the 
fact that the same law is also applicable to men as well. When a man’s wife dies, 
he would also receive one-third of his wife’s property and therefore, the law does 
not particularly favour women over men.  
A further example of false information that discourages women’s equal 
inheritance is that, if a married woman does not claim her inheritance rights 
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from her deceased father within 12 years of his death, then she completely loses 
her inheritance rights and cannot claim them anymore. Misleading information 
such as this contributes to creating false assumptions and misconceptions among 
Christian people. Many of them, particularly those who are not aware of the 
inheritance law, believe them and act accordingly, which adds to the 
disconnection between laws and practice. 
Keeping the ‘good woman’ image and asserting inheritance rights 
Across South Asia, including Bangladesh, a ‘good woman’ image has taken an 
important place in every community, majority or minority. The notion of ‘good 
woman’ plays a vital role in power, ideology, and culture (Rao 2008). But who are 
these ‘good women’? According to Rao (2008), a ‘good woman’ is one who 
conforms to the norms of patriarchal subordination and possesses a strict sexual 
morality. As opposed to the ‘good woman’ image, there is the notion of ‘dain’ (or 
witch), where women would be more assertive, with a free sexuality, not a good 
mother or wife, and is seen as a threat to both production and reproduction (Rao 
2008).   
The image of the ‘good woman’ becomes even more complex when women’s 
identity cuts across the notion of property and resources. Society provides 
women with an identity based on their gender roles as home-makers, mothers, 
daughters, carers, and more recently as working women or working mothers. For 
Christian women in Bangladesh, the notion of a ‘good woman’ is added to the 
notion of a ‘good Christian woman’. In Christianity, women’s sexuality plays an 
important role and hence a ‘good woman’ is always associated with strict 
monogamy and being sexually abstinent before marriage. Christian values, 
particularly for Catholics, bring in the concept of one marriage. However, among 
Protestants, the concept of remarriage is not alien, but people, usually women, 
prefer not to remarry because of various social ideologies. The concept of ‘one 
marriage’ has partly originated from Hindu cultural practices and since most 
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Christians or their ancestors converted from Hinduism, there are some cultural 
practices from the previous practices still in place. So even when Christian 
women become divorced or widowed, most did not remarry unless the 
remarriage was initiated by their families. Therefore, control of women’s sexuality 
is an important condition for being a ‘good Christian woman’.  
During my fieldwork Bangladesh, I consistently observed that the image of a 
‘good Christian woman’ is highly valued by both men and women. In addition to 
the above-mentioned qualities based on gender roles and subordination, a ‘good 
Christian woman’ has some socio-religious ‘duties’. For example, she is a regular 
church-goer and is actively involved in most church activities for women. During 
my stay in Bangladesh for fieldwork, I attended many church services of various 
denominations and observed that without any exception the majority of church 
attendees, up to two-thirds, were women. An important role of women in the 
church as seen by the community is praying. In most churches, there are 
women’s groups that routinely pay visits to hospitals and the houses of the sick 
members to pray for them. In a Protestant community in Dhaka, with which I 
was closely associated, there are a few elderly women who are well-known for 
their special prayers. Many people believe that if these women pray, those prayers 
will be answered. They were always shown as ‘role models’ for women and many 
other women within the church community followed their paths.  
Motherhood is also commonly associated with the image of a ‘good Christian 
woman’. In fact, I observed that women were often referred to as mothers from 
the church pulpit or in the women’s fellowship meetings. I also found that in 
many instances, the terms ‘women’ and ‘motherhood’ were used synonymously. 
In other words, a ‘good Christian woman’ was also equivalent to a ‘good mother’. 
During my stay in Barisal, I attended a three-day women’s camp in a Protestant 
church, where about three hundred women came from all over the Barisal area. 
One of the speakers in the camp was speaking about how important it is to be 
patient as a woman. She said, “As mothers, we need a lot of patience. Without 
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patience, everything will be destroyed in our lives”. To her, reading the Bible and 
praying can help women to gain more patience. Another speaker in the camp 
discussed how the situation of faith in the church is fading among Christians 
these days and how the church politics is taking its place, particularly in the 
Protestant churches. In such a situation, he thinks that it is the mothers’ 
responsibility to raise their children ‘properly’ so that faith is restored in the 
church. Restoring the church faith is also put on the shoulders of a ‘good 
Christian woman’.  
Moreover, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘suffering’ are two other terms that are closely associated 
with the notion of a ‘good Christian woman’. According to Kapur and Cossman 
(1996, 97), the ‘familial ideology’ constructs women as “self-sacrificing mothers, 
loyal and chaste wives, [and] dutiful and virginal daughters …. Women who live 
up to the ideals of motherhood and womanhood are given some protection: 
Those who fail to measure up are penalized”.  
The more a woman can endure, the more she falls in the category of a ‘good 
Christian woman’. A number of my informants had to endure continuous 
physical and mental abuse from their husbands, but they never thought of 
leaving them although they wanted to leave. When I asked them why, they told 
me consistently that if they leave their husbands, they will lose their image as a 
‘good woman’ in the eyes of the people in the community, which they do not 
want no matter how much they have to suffer otherwise. So for them, it is better 
to be in an abusive relationship than to fall from the category of ‘good Christian 
woman’. 
When it comes to women’s inheritance, another effect of keeping the ‘good 
woman’ image is that many women and their husbands tend to think that it is 
not a matter of honour to claim their parental property. They perceive it as a 
‘shameful’ act to claim women’s shares (Westergaard 1983). Moreover, socially, it 
is seen as shameful for the husbands if their wives claim their parental property, 
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especially among the educated middle-class Christians. During my fieldwork, I 
saw a number of middle-class Christian women proudly saying that their 
husbands told them that they should never claim their father’s property. The 
reasons for this assertion are that in most cases women claiming an inheritance is 
seen as lowering the ‘prestige of the family’ (Chowdhry 2008). Chowdhry (2008, 
XXV) found similar findings in his studies: “The college-going women firmly 
asserted that ‘… they would neither claim their respective shares in their parents’ 
property nor would they accept such shares even if their parents decide to offer 
them’”.  Moreover, women claiming inheritance are seen as challenging their 
husbands’ masculinity as a breadwinner. For all these reasons, women not 
claiming their share of inheritance is often considered the Christian idea of 
sacrifice that is noble and indicates a higher status. 
But how do women keep the balance between keeping the image of a ‘good 
Christian woman’ and asserting their land rights simultaneously? It is not easy for 
women to challenge the image that has been constructed by Bangladeshi society 
based on social and gender ideologies and claim their land rights. Women I 
found in my fieldwork asserted their land rights often had to challenge their 
‘good woman’ image. However, I also found that both the conformation to the 
‘good woman’ image and assertion of land rights varies depending on their class 
position within the community. In order to explain this, let me introduce 
Mridula, Margaret, and Parul, three Bangladeshi Christian women who asserted 
their land rights according to their class and social status. 
Mridula Baroi is a single mother from a lower middle-class family from Kathira 
village in Barisal. She is a Protestant woman in her 40s and has a 10-year old 
school-aged daughter, named Mishti. Since Mridula’s husband deserted her, both 
she and Mishti live with her parents’ family, with her two brothers and their 
families. Mridula completed her Bachelor degree and teacher’s training and now 
works as a school teacher at a Christian school in the next village. Before moving 
into her parents’ house, Mridula had a good relationship with her brothers and 
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their wives. But as soon as they came to know that her husband had deserted her, 
problems began to arise. Both her brothers and their wives perceived her as a 
threat when Mridula declared that she would claim her share of her father’s 
property as per law after his death. But her brothers expected that similar to most 
other women, Mridula would never claim her father’s property. As this issue 
heated up, Mridula’s father allocated her a portion of his bhita, the homestead 
land, and attempted to resolve these issues among his children while he was still 
alive. Accordingly, he gave her a small piece of his homestead land (about 61 
square metre) at the back of the main house and told her to build a house and 
move in there.  
When I met her in Barisal during my fieldwork, Mridula already began to fill the 
land with earth to raise it in order to build the house and was planning to 
proceed with it as soon as she could save some money. I asked her: What if she 
was still with her husband, would she receive the land from her father? Mridula 
does not think she would have received anything from her father’s property if she 
was with her husband. Her physical presence in her father’s home was vital to 
receiving some land, although not equal to what she would inherit otherwise 
according to the state law. Her presence in her father’s home did not ensure her 
rights to land automatically until she asserted her rights and demanded them. 
Her assertion of rights damaged her image as a ‘good woman’. But considering 
her vulnerable situation, she thought, unless she asserted her rights while her 
father was still alive, she would not have received any of her share of inheritance 
once her father dies. Mridula used her circumstances in order to claim her rights. 
However, Margaret Gomes experienced asserting her land rights differently than 
did Mridula. Margaret is an educated Catholic woman in her early 50s, who 
belongs to a middle-class family from the Gazipur area. In her natal family, 
Margaret is the sixth child among her five brothers and three sisters. When her 
father died about five years ago, he left a huge amount of land in Gazipur. She 
told me that she did not know exactly how much land her father had. Margaret 
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said, “My brothers know everything about my father’s land, but they did not let 
the sisters know how much total land our father left us”. A couple of years before 
I met her in my fieldwork, her siblings had a meeting on distributing their 
inherited property. In the meeting her brothers asked the sisters if they wanted to 
take their share and if so how much they wanted. Her eldest brother told them 
that each sister is legally entitled to inherit 0.63 acres of land. Then he further 
asked them that since culturally sisters do not claim their share of inheritance, 
whether they would claim theirs or whether they would let their brothers have 
them.  
Margaret said, “None of my sisters spoke out when he asked us this. It was only I 
who said to hand over all my land and then I said I will decide what I would do 
with it”. Her brothers became angry with her as none of her sisters demanded 
anything but her. Then her brothers finally decided that the sisters should receive 
Tk. 25 lacs (USD 31,000) each plus their share of a particular piece of land (0.22 
acre each) which had a high market price at that moment. However, this amount 
is significantly less than their actual share of their father’s property:  
After that meeting, all of my brothers and their wives have stopped talking 
to me. They became very upset with me as I claimed all of my land. My 
brothers told me that I was the greediest among all my sisters. They told 
me that how I could demand all of it where my other sisters were happy 
with whatever they were offered. I just kept quiet, did not bargain more.  
Margaret’s story also shows how she asserted her rights by challenging the 
norms. She was perceived as ‘greedy’ by her brothers and their families as she was 
the only sister who claimed her legal rights.     
Unlike Mridula and Margaret, Parul Rozario’s land inheritance experience brings 
in another dimension of women’s struggle to balance between their image of the 
‘good Christian woman’ and the assertion of land rights. Parul is a Catholic 
woman in her 40s, from Gazipur. Parul lives with her 70-year old mother and two 
teen-aged sons in poverty. I had to take about an hour’s walk from the village 
bazaar to reach her house as there were no means of transportation to go to her 
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house. Upon reaching it, I saw a very old, decayed hut, made of mud and with a 
tin-roof. The roof looked very rusty and slanted. It felt as if the hut would fall 
down any moment. I tried to look inside, but it was very dark and there was 
hardly any furniture in the house.  
Parul came out from the hut to receive me with a bright welcoming smile on her 
face. Next, to their hut, there is a large piece of land that belongs to Parul’s 
mother. Parul told me that her mother, who became a widow very early, looked 
after her grandparents in their old age and therefore her grandfather gave her 
(Parul’s mother) some part of his land and her grandmother gave her entire 
portion of land to her mother before they both died. Inheriting this land meant 
that Parul’s mother owned more land than her mamas (Parul’s uncles). Since 
then, Parul’s mamas were not content with Parul and her mother and did not 
maintain good relations with her mother, thinking that they were deprived of 
their inheritance rights, and often used to threaten her mother and Parul with 
their lives. A number of court cases are still going on this dispute.  
Being the only child, Parul farms a part of her mother’s land by herself. She told 
me that they are so poor that they cannot hire agricultural labourers to cultivate 
the land. Also, they intentionally do not give their land to others to cultivate 
because of the land disputes that are going on with her mamas and that have 
been continuing for years. Parul’s mother had to send her to a boarding school in 
Dhaka city just to keep her safe from her mamas. After a few years, Parul married 
a Catholic man and became the mother of a son. But her marriage did not work 
out and hence she left her husband and came back to her mother’s house, along 
with the son. Later she remarried, but she did not leave her mother’s house this 
time. Her husband visited her from time to time. Gradually, she gave birth to 
another son. But unfortunately, her second marriage did not work out either. She 
said, “Like my first husband, my second husband also wanted me to sell my 
mother’s land. He wanted me to dispose of everything and leave this place and 
settle in his village. I didn’t do it”.  
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In the meantime, the dispute with her mamas had begun affecting her sons. They 
threaten her sons with their lives. After a few years’ time, she remarried for the 
third time, now to a policeman. She said, “I had to marry this policeman just to 
protect our land”. She continued, “But even this time I will not leave my mother’s 
place at any cost. If I leave, all of my mother’s property will be taken away by 
other people”. Parul’s incidence shows her extreme vulnerability. At the same 
time, it shows how she is asserting her land rights by protecting her mother’s 
land by marrying multiple times, which is completely against laws as well as 
against social norms and ideologies. Parul directly asserted her land rights 
without conforming to the ‘good woman’ image.      
In order to claim their land rights, all three women, Mridula, Margaret, and Parul 
decided not to keep the image of a ‘good Christian woman’ that the society had 
imposed on them. Rao (2008) also made similar findings:  
[A]sserting one’s identity becomes possible only when we learn to say ‘No’, 
something that women … often dream of doing but do not find the 
courage to do ... Land becomes a means of asserting one’s identity as a full 
member of the community. In this process of assertion, social norms and 
customs are challenged. (Rao 2008, 2-3, 16-17)  
Mridula continuously fought and negotiated with her brothers and their wives to 
gain the land from her father. Margaret had to say ‘no’ to her brothers who 
expected that all of her land will become theirs. And Parul had to break many 
gender norms to hold on to and secure her future inheritance. All of them, in 
different ways, reclaimed their identity not as a ‘good Christian woman’, but as an 
individual human being, as a person.  
However, reclaiming identity through asserting land rights involves a continuous 
struggle for women to have a balance between keeping themselves within the 
‘good woman’ criteria and asserting their rights and identity. Most women, such 
as Mridula and Margaret, continue to claim their rights by keeping themselves 
within the framework of the ‘good woman’. Mridula, for instance, fought for her 
land rights with her brothers, but she consciously kept herself within the 
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framework of a ‘good woman’. As Rao (2008) argued, most women want to 
possess the ‘good woman’ title fearing that otherwise they might be excluded 
from the community. In any adverse scenario where their ‘good woman’ 
character is challenged, they tend to take their natal family’s (or other villagers’) 
support and help and return to their natal family to avoid such accusations. 
Mridula wanted to remarry, but she feared that she would lose whatever 
possession she gained of her father’s property and most importantly she fears to 
lose her natal family’s support. Moreover, Mridula works in a church-based 
school. She goes to the church, along with her daughter regularly. Her daughter 
attends the Sunday School in the church. Working in a church environment also 
puts extra pressure on her to maintain her image of a ‘good woman’. She told me 
once that she does not speak to any of her male colleagues in the street so that 
people cannot comment negatively about her life. She chose to fight with her 
brothers for the land by keeping herself within a limit as she thought that if she 
had fought excessively with her brothers over the land, she would lose their 
shelter. So for Mridula, control of her sexuality was essential but not sufficient. 
She had to prove continuously that she was a ‘good Christian woman’.  
On the other hand, in Margaret’s case, even after challenging her brothers to 
hand over all of her inherited land, Margaret stepped back from further 
bargaining with her brothers to protect her ‘good woman’ character. When 
Margaret found that her ‘good woman’ profile was challenged, as she was seen as 
greedy, non-sacrificing, selfish by her brothers and their wives, she stopped her 
negotiation with them and finally agreed with what everyone decided for her.  So 
Rao’s (2008) binary of ‘good woman’ and ‘dain’ becomes more fluid for these 
women and they continuously struggle to strike a balance so that they do not fall 
under the category of ‘good woman’ but still strive to realise their rights. 
However, although most women negotiate for their rights by being within the 
‘good woman’ category, some women do not. One of the factors contributing 
towards such non-conformity is women’s class position. Parul is clearly one of 
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them. She did not conform to the ‘good woman’ category in either way. Parul 
married thrice and each time she discontinued her relationship with her husband 
when she felt that her mother’s property, of which she was the sole heiress, was 
at stake. She did not leave her mother’s house in order to protect her future 
inheritance.  
What made Parul take a different path from the others? Why did she not 
conform the ‘good woman’ criteria? I argue that Parul’s socio-economic situation 
did not allow her to conform to maintain her image as a ‘good woman’. She was 
brought up by a single mother and had struggled her entire life with extreme 
poverty. She had to fear for her life all along because of the land dispute with her 
mamas. Because of her poverty, her previous husbands also wanted her to control 
her mother’s land. She hardly has any relationship with the church. Neither she 
nor her children or her mother go to church or to any other community’s 
activities. So in a way she is below the community’s radar. Therefore, her low 
socio-economic class position enabled her to remain under the community’s 
radar, which allowed her to break many gender norms and completely deny the 
‘good Christian woman’ image that society imposed on her. 
Community identity defined by women’s land inheritance 
The issue of women’s land inheritance is linked with the community’s identity 
and the history of this identity creation. During the 18th century, a number of 
Portuguese Catholic priests became zamidars.6 The Portuguese Mission Estates 
had zamidari rights on Nagori, Hashnabad, and Padrishibpur. Until the middle of 
the 20th century, Nagori Estate constituted 25,000 acres of land (Goedert 1958). 
With the beginning of missionary zamidari in these areas, a huge Christian 
population was baptised by these missionaries and settled. Among the villages, 
                                                 
6 A landowner, especially one who leases his land to tenant farmers; in British India, a landlord 
required to pay a land tax to the government.  
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some, including Tiria, Seitan, and Nagari, became entirely Christian villages, 
whereas other villages included a Hindu and Muslim population. According to 
Father Edmud Goedert (1958), the zamidari of Christian missionaries constituted 
a protection for Christians in Nagari. However, all zamidari in Bengal were 
abolished by the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950, also 
known as East Pakistan Estate Acquisition Act 1950.                                                                                                                                                                                    
Because of zamidari, the governed villages became exclusively Christian villages 
and the land was known as the Christian land. Ownership of this land 
contributed to the creation of a Bangladeshi Christian identity. According to von 
Benda-Beckmann et al (2006), the property is an important element that 
constitutes individual and group identity. In other words, land has defined, to 
some extent, what Bangladeshi Christians are. Most of the Christian population 
was and still is poor, which made them began to sell parts of the large plots 
received from the zamidari in the case of shortage of cash. Land was mostly sold 
to the majority Muslim community as they had enough money to buy land at a 
market price. In this way, many Muslims have gradually entered these Christian 
villages, which had threatened the identity of the Christian community as a 
whole.  
During my fieldwork, I spoke with many Christians who have a feeling of losing 
their identity and existence through losing their land. In Gazipur, one elderly 
villager told me, “Before we had so much land. Village after village you could only 
find Christians. But now we have lost a lot of land and we are nothing without 
this land. If you do not own land, how can you exist in today’s world? Land gives 
us power, strength, and confidence”. I have seen that among Christians, as a 
minority group, a siege mentality has occupied their minds, with a shared feeling 
of victimization and defensiveness. This siege mentality has been exacerbated by 
losing a good deal of land. However, it was almost impossible to protect the land 
from going to Muslim majority. Many Christians were still selling land to 
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Muslims who had the financial means to pay a better price than Christians 
themselves.  
As I mentioned before, there is a strong link between women’s land inheritance 
and marriage practices. This issue has been addressed by many scholars, 
including Goody (1973, 1976, 1990). On the one hand, marriage between close kin 
is not allowed in Christianity, usually, rural women will be married far from their 
own natal village. On the other hand, land is seen as the most important form of 
property in agrarian economies, and the inheritance practices ensure that land 
never flows out of the kin group. Therefore, one way to ensure the latter is to 
make the land only flow along the male line, excluding women heiresses. 
According to Goody (1976), if a daughter’s land inheritance right is strictly subject 
to the physical proximity of her residence, meaning her residence in the natal 
home, then she loses her rights if she resides elsewhere. A number of Christian 
leaders in Bangladesh told me that, since women live in their in-laws’ village, 
which is usually far away from their parents’ village, women are unable to make 
good use of their inherited land. As a result, when women receive their inherited 
property, they often sell it to Muslims to obtain a higher price. In order to stop 
this outflow of land, the norm that was developed was to let the brothers have all 
the land so that they could make their efficient use. Because of this notion, when 
the Succession Act, 1925, was introduced by the British Raj to Christians, the 
community completely ignored the law and continued to keep land within male 
lines. 
A feeling of indirect threat of losing group identity and existence through losing 
land was a common observance during my fieldwork both in the Catholic and the 
Protestant communities. During the 1990s, a prominent Protestant national 
church body reviewed their land-selling policy in order to protect land. Before 
this policy review, the church body allocated and sold the Mission land among 
the respective church members at a minimum price, less than half of the market 
price. But the church body have found that many of their members who received 
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land in this way began to sell them to Muslims. In this way, many Muslims 
occupied the Mission’s land. Later, this particular church body stopped selling 
land to their members and instead, they began to lease it to them for 99 years, 
with a condition that if they want to sell it, they must have permission from the 
church body and, in any case, they will not be able to sell it to anyone but 
Christians. Through this measure, the church body managed to keep the church 
land within the Christian community. But such control was not applicable to 
private land, which people own individually.  
In order to stop land from passing into the hands of Muslims, many fathers in 
Gazipur area registered their entire land to their sons, while they were still alive. 
Teresa Gomes, my host during my fieldwork, confirmed this. She said that her 
father registered all of his property to his sons while he was still alive so that 
none of his daughters could receive any land after he died. She said: 
My pishi [aunt, father’s sister] inherited some land and when my baba 
[father] and kakas [uncles] wanted to keep the land, she demanded Tk.40 
lacs [USD 51,000]. So my baba and kakas had to pay her Tk.40 lacs for her 
land, otherwise, she would have sold her share to Muslims for a better 
price. In my baba’s village many women sold their land to Muslim people 
and due to this, our village has become chaotic and not as peaceful as it 
used to be. It has now almost transformed to a Muslim village. This is why 
my baba decided this from the very beginning. 
A local Christian leader from the same village stated that he completely supports 
Teresa’s father’s act as at least his land is still owned by Christians and has not 
gone to Muslim people. He said, “This is how we need to protect our land from 
Muslims”. He blamed women for selling their land to Muslims. In his opinion, 
women in the Christian community have excessively favourable inheritance 
rights. He also said that community organisations such as the church parish, 
Christian credit union amongst other organisations sometimes buy back some of 
the land that had been sold to Muslims at a higher price than the current market 
price to protect the land that originally belonged to Christians. A tendency was 
seen among these people to make women’s inheritance rights solely responsible 
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for such chaos and the instability occurring in the community. They tend to 
avoid the fact that many Christian men also sell their land to Muslim people.  
In this way, women’s disinheritance in respect to land became a custom although 
personal laws allow women to inherit equally with men. This custom has become 
a marker of the community’s identity. Women’s disinheritance of land has 
become a key dimension of the processes of community identity creation, re-
creation, and protection. When the collective community identity has been 
defined by women’s land inheritance, how and where are women within these 
communities situated or positioned? In responding to this question, Rajan (2003) 
argues that women are neither excluded nor marginalised; rather they take centre 
stage in identity politics. In this process, the personal law acts as the symbol of 
community identity. Based on Rajan’s (2003) argument, I argue that it is true that 
the creation of personal law contributes to the strengthening of community 
identity. However, it is also true that violating or breaking those laws creates or 
recreates or, in other words, protects, community identity. Although we have 
seen here that women’s disinheritance is an act of breaking the state law, it has 
been consistently done in order to protect community identity and existence. But 
such an act does not come without a price. There are indeed consequences of 
women’s disinheritance, which I discuss next. 
Coming back from the dead and claiming land 
Here I examine the consequences of inequalities in land inheritance practices 
between men and women in the Bangladeshi Christian community. In order to 
protect community identity, Christians in Bangladesh not only deprive women of 
their share of inheritance but also women’s rights have been instrumentalised for 
other people’s gain. All of these factors have cumulative consequences, which 
pass down from one generation to another and exacerbate conflicts within intra- 
and inter-communal relations. Below I provide some examples of 
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instrumentalisation of women’s land rights and the inter-generational 
consequences associated with it. 
Kabita D’Cruze was a Catholic woman from the Gazipur area. She died in 1999 
when she was 71 years old. Kabita was married to a man from another village, also 
from the Gazipur area. Her husband died seven years before her death. She left 
five children, two daughters and three sons and four sons- and daughters-in-law, 
seven grandchildren and two great-grandchildren. Kabita had four brothers and 
two sisters. She and all her sisters married when they were about 15 years old. 
After marriage, they began living in their respective in-laws’ places. After Kabita’s 
father died, her brothers took all of her father’s property and the sisters did not 
receive anything. “As far as I have heard, in fact, they did not claim any of their 
shares”, says Peter Gomes, Kabita’s brother’s grandson. When I met Peter during 
my fieldwork, he told me that as part of their custom those days, women did not 
receive their share of inheritance. But this transaction occurred in verbal terms. 
Kabita and her sisters, similar to many other women, verbally gave their brothers 
their share of inheritance. The land that was supposed to be Kabita’s and her 
sisters’ remained theirs legally and the land was still registered in their father’s 
name. So legally Kabita and her sisters remained the legal owners of that land.  
In 2013, 14 years after Kabita’s death, Peter’s father (Kabita’s nephew) heard from 
local leaders that Kabita’s grandchildren wanted to retrieve Kabita’s share of land 
and had given power of attorney to a local land agent in that area. Peter told me 
that the land agent was a very influential person from the Muslim community 
and also politically active. “He has a very close liaison with local political leaders 
and even with the MP [Member of Parliament]”, said Peter. Listening to Kabita’s 
grandchildren’s intention, Peter’s father became very scared: “My grandaunt 
(Kabita) died long before, and now they have come to claim her land! My 
grandaunt never wanted her land, and now her grandchildren want it!” Peter 
sounded astonished.  
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Peter’s father negotiated with the land agent and offered him cash instead of 
land. Peter said, “My ancestors have been ploughing this land for decades and all 
of a sudden how can they belong to some Muslims? So my father paid cash 
instead of the land”. Finally, it was settled for Tk. 4 lacs (USD 5,000) and was 
registered to Peter’s father’s name. But later they heard that out of these Tk. 4 
lacs (USD 5,000), the original owner (Kabita’s grandchildren) received only Tk. 
50,000 (USD 600) and the rest were taken away by the land agent himself.  
Recently, in the Gazipur area incidents such as those Peter experienced became 
notably common. Peter’s relatives used their deceased mother’s inheritance 
rights and claimed her share of land. But the complexity had risen when they 
involved people from outside of the community. Immediately, Peter’s father felt 
insecure and settled the issue for cash.   
I also met Gilbert in my fieldwork, who told me the story of Juliet Dores, his 
shashuri (mother-in-law). Juliet died in 2005 at the age of 47, leaving two sons 
and one daughter. Juliet’s natal village was in Gazipur, but after her marriage, she 
moved in to her husband’s house in Dhaka city and lived there for the rest of her 
life. Similar to most women, Juliet did not claim her father’s property after his 
death and her two brothers owned the entire inheritance. Juliet’s mother also did 
not receive an inheritance when she became a widow as she was living with one 
of her brothers and died several years after her husband’s (Juliet’s father) death. 
However, neither she nor her mother registered their share of inheritance in their 
brothers’ names. So, similar to Kabita, Juliet and her mother remained legal 
owners of that land. In 2014, Juliet’s three children sought to claim their mother’s 
share of land and gave the power of attorney to a local land surveyor, who also 
works as an agent of land sale in that area. This land surveyor was from the 
Muslim community. “When we gave this man the power of attorney, he went to 
my mother-in-law’s brother and showed the paper”, said Gilbert. He said, 
Look, do you have any idea how much the land in Gazipur area costs? In 
the last ten years, the land price in that area has increased how many 
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times God knows. Who doesn’t want to make fortune out of it? Go and 
find yourself, now whoever has any inheritance links they are going and 
claiming it. If you have one bigha7 of land, you can get Tk. 1-2 crores [USD 
127,000] easily.  
I asked him: Why did they provide the power of attorney to the agent? Why did 
they not just go to their relatives and claim the land? He said, “Who is going to 
give away land that is so precious now? So my shashuri’s family was not ready to 
let us have the land. It is easy if someone ‘professional’ is involved. They can 
easily rescue the land”. By ‘professional’ he meant someone who has local 
influence. 
Inter-generational consequences of women’s land 
(dis)inheritance 
The stories of Kabita and Juliet show us a reverse process of inheritance. 
According to Cole (1932), the process of inheritance enables the living persons 
into the dead persons’ property. However, in both Kabita and Juliet’s cases, the 
inheritance process has taken the opposite route. In my opinion, this reverse 
inheritance process is a consequence of the violation of law by the society, which 
has an inter-generational implication. 
In the last decade, there has been a sudden increase in land prices in the areas 
near the capital city, Dhaka. Of particular note is the Government’s Purbachal 
New Town Project, the biggest township in the country, comprising about 6150 
acres land located between the Shitalakhya and the Balu River at Rupgonj thana 
in the Narayangonj district and at Kaligonj Thana in the Gazipur district, on the 
north-eastern side of Dhaka. The project implementation period was from 1995 to 
2015. According to RAJUK, Capital Development Authority of Bangladesh, the 
township will be linked with an eight-lane-wide express way from the Airport 
Road-Progati swarani crossing. There will be provision for about 26,000 
                                                 
7 Local measure of land (one-third of acre) 
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residential plots of different sizes, 62,000 apartments with all necessary 
infrastructure, and urban facilities. Kaligonj, a Catholic-dominated area, is in the 
Gazipur area and it, along with other places in the Gazipur area, has experienced 
a huge increase in land price. Patrick Rebeiro, the land surveyor that I 
interviewed in Gazipur, provided me with an idea of the change in land price 
before and after Purbachal Project. According to him, in the Gazipur area before 
Purbachal, the price of a bigha was Tk. 2-3 lacs (USD 2,500-3,800). But after the 
Purbachal Project, the same land now costs Tk. 2-3 crore (USD 255,000-383,000). 
Immediately it made sense why these people were rushing and claiming dead 
people’s share of inheritance.  
It has become increasingly common in the Gazipur area to claim land by using 
the inheritance rights of one’s deceased ancestors, mostly women. The 
Succession Act, 1925, does not have any time limit to claim the inheritance and 
the inheritance can flow up to the degree of heirs or heiresses who can be 
tracked. By using this clause, many Christians are obtaining their ancestors’ land. 
In most cases women’s rights are being used and have been instrumentalised by 
their descendants. Some people, including lawyers I interviewed, argue that this 
can be considered a post-mortem realisation of women’s land rights. However, in 
my view, their rights have been used as an instrument to fulfil the descendants’ 
goals. If the descendants did not have anything to gain, would they fight equally 
to realise their dead ancestor’s rights? The most credible answer would be ‘No’. 
So these descendants fight for their own gain, not for the realisation of their dead 
relative’s rights. Therefore, it is a clear case of instrumentalisation of women’s 
rights that is used for other peoples’ gain.  
When the children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren of deceased 
Christians return and claim women’s land, in most cases, they are involving land 
agents and other influential people from the majority Muslim community. Both 
Kabita and Juliet’s children and grandchildren used land agents from the Muslim 
community. The land surveyor, Patrick, stated that usually, Christians will not 
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fear other Christian people. But they fear Muslim people. This fear of the majority 
group let most people involving Muslims. This involvement from the majority 
group has provided access to them to become involved in the land issues of the 
minority group. Such practice has become increasingly common these days, 
which has created a feeling of insecurity among minority Christian people.  
Property-centred conflicts and struggles between majority-minority groups are 
prevalent throughout the history of South Asia. As von Benda-Beckmann et al 
(2006) argue, property-focused struggles exist not only at the family and 
community levels but also at the class, religion, and state levels. Since Partition of 
India and the creation of East and West Pakistan, land has taken centre stage in 
majority-minority issues in this part of the world. Hindu land has been 
particularly contested and often taken by influential Muslims (Datta 2004, 
Mohsin 2004, Feldman and Geisler 2012, Chowdhury 2010). However, Hindus are 
not the only minority group that has been the subject of land grabs. Indigenous 
groups and, the focus of this research, Christians, have also been affected. 
Perhaps the least discussed group as the subject of land-grabs has been the 
Christian population.  
One of my informants from the Muslim community told me a story from his area. 
A few years back a group of Hindu men came to an influential politician of their 
area who happened to be an MP from the ruling party. They told him that some 
of their Muslim neighbours have been taking portions of their land every now 
and then. They came to this political leader for protection as they feared that 
soon all of their land would be taken. When the politician heard about their 
situation, he told those men from the Hindu community to select one specific 
area to which all of them could move and he promised them that he would 
provide protection so that no one else could take their land. But the area where 
they had to move to was much smaller than the total amount of land they had 
originally. The politician said, “I will make sure that no one disturbs you”. 
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However, my informant somehow came to know that the rest of their land had 
been taken by the same politician as soon as they moved to this new place.  
A local Matobbor (village leader) in Gazipur area, who is also a member of the 
local parish council, said,  
Presently, there are syndicates in these villages, led by Muslims. Some 
Christian people also joined them. We call them vumidosshu [land 
bandits]. These people collect old land documents from the local Land 
Office and find out which warish [heirs] have not claimed their inherited 
land. They find their descendants and offer a huge amount of money to 
sell that land by using their ancestors’ inheritance rights. In many time 
these descendants had no prior idea that their ancestors had left the 
unclaimed land, which they can get on their behalves. So the descendants 
easily get convinced to sell it. These vumidosshus prepare the documents 
secretly in the middle of the night, usually after mid-night. Once the 
documents are done, they go for dokhol [possession]. We also have heard 
that our local MP patronises these syndicates. 
The priest of the local parish church also told me that within the community, 
there is a feeling of insecurity, particularly in relation to land related matters. 
This insecurity arises due to the tension with the majority Muslim group who are 
increasingly buying Christians’ land. “The local administration and even the state 
is in their favour and they are the majority group and we are just a minority. 
Unfortunately, many Christians have joined them into such land-grabbing 
business,” the local priest continued.  
The feeling of insecurity is also seen among the villagers. In the village in 
Gazipur, where I lived for my fieldwork, many told me that there had been no 
Muslims living in that village not even a few decades earlier. But now it is almost 
being converted to a Muslim village. Right at the entrance of the village, now 
there is a large mosque that you cannot miss, which has been newly constructed 
in the last couple of years. One of the villagers told me, “Before you could never 
see someone with a borqua [veil], but now if you come out from your house, you 
could see them everywhere”. 
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There were also some responses to this issue from the Catholic community, 
particularly from the church, in the last few years. Through the Justice and Peace 
Commission, working on various issues of the Catholic community, including 
land disputes, which has its unit in each parish church, the Catholic Church has 
taken a number of initiatives so that women receive recognition of their 
inheritance rights through alternative dispute resolution (ADR), without going to 
court or to people from the Muslim community. The Commission advocates and 
promotes that each daughter should receive their share of inheritance before she 
dies in order to avoid the situation which has arisen in Gazipur. A priest told me, 
“In order to stop such chaos, a counter advocacy was developed from the Catholic 
Church that promoted various means of alternative dispute resolution. The 
Catholic Church became very active to engage people to realise their rights 
through other means, without going to the court”. However, Patrick, the land 
surveyor, confirmed that although the Justice and Peace Commission promotes 
women’s inheritance rights and encourages women to take their share of 
inheritance, many women still do not take their share of inheritance; instead, 
they give their share to their brothers either for free or for a minimum price, but 
the difference is that now they register the land in their brothers’ names instead 
of giving it to them verbally in order to avoid possible future conflict with the 
future descendants. Patrick said, “Now that the Commission is initiating women’s 
recognition of their inheritance rights, most women are happy just to be 
recognised and then they give away their land to their brothers. But the 
realisation of equal right is yet to be achieved”. The Justice and Peace 
Commission is now encouraging the community that after a parent’s death their 
land must be distributed among the children and if the daughters do not take 
their share they should register the land in their brothers’ names. Some fear that 
this might be the practice for the future and might become a new norm and 
women will never get equal rights equal to their brothers’.  
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The local matobbor I interviewed told me a story. A Christian man in their village 
remarried a Muslim woman after he divorced his wife8. When he married the 
Muslim woman, he registered all of his properties in her name. The man refused 
to pass any of his properties to his son from his first marriage. Then the Justice 
and Peace Commission used the man’s pishi’s (aunt, father’s sister) inheritance 
rights (where his pishi did not claim her share in her lifetime) and gave her share 
to the man’s son. So, women’s land inheritance rights are being used in various 
ways to achieve different people’s goals, instead of their own benefits.   
 Conclusion 
Women’s land inheritance rights is a critical issue within the gender debates in 
Bangladesh, as well as in other countries of South Asia. The gaps between the 
inheritance law and local practices of land inheritance and transactions are huge. 
Such a gap between law and practice is directly linked with social ideologies and 
the creation and protection of community identity. Women’s land rights become 
the price paid for both keeping a ‘good woman’ image and minority identity 
creation and protection.  
In this chapter, I have revealed the complexities that Bangladeshi Christian 
women experience in realising their inheritance rights, which have been 
provisioned in the formal law equally between men and women. Many times the 
emotional and moral pressure felt by women to maintain amicable relations with 
their brother(s) override the assertions to claim the land equally. This moral 
pressure fundamentally translates to women voluntarily giving up such rights in 
favour of their brothers who they assume will eventually reciprocate by providing 
the necessary emotional and financial support in times of trouble or otherwise. 
Some other times, women still face the dilemma of choosing an identity either of 
that of a ‘submissive sacrificing good Christian woman’ or of an ‘assertive, 
                                                 
8 It was not a legal divorce. See Chapter Seven for detail discussion on divorce. 
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individualistic, self-centred, bad woman’. In this process, women’s choice of 
either of these categories is not straightforward. Their sexuality, class position, 
and social image influence the choice that they make and moreover, women have 
to keep a fine balance between the two extremes in most cases. 
A minority community’s identity creation instrumentalises women’s rights, 
particularly in landed property. The instrumentalisation of women’s land rights 
has an inter-generational consequence, as well as a complicated outcome 
creating intra- and inter-religious conflicts. Bangladeshi Christians feel a threat to 
their existence when they see that land, previously belonging to Christians, is 
often transferred to members of the Muslim community. In most cases, women’s 
land inheritance is made solely responsible for such transfers of land to other 
communities. Therefore, in order to protect the land of Christians, women’s 
disinheritance with respect to land has been made a custom although the 
personal law allows women to inherit equally to men. So, women’s disinheritance 
regarding land has become the instrument for community identity creation and 
protection.  
The custom of women’s land disinheritance has a cumulative consequence, 
generation after generation. Although many women have verbally provided land 
user rights to their brothers, they have not transferred formal rights. Thus, 
legally, women continue to be entitled to land that they do not till or use. 
Difficulties arise when the female owners’ children and/or grandchildren claim 
the land. Because of the virilocal marriage system, the progeny is most likely to 
live in a different village and may sell it to people from the dominant Muslim 
community in the village where the land is located. Such sales tend to exacerbate 
inter- and intra-religious conflicts and tensions.
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
This thesis has painted a picture of multiple complexities that arise when religious 
minority women’s identities intersect with multiple laws and patriarchy in a 
postcolonial setting, in a situation of legal pluralism. I asked two questions at the 
beginning of this thesis: In a postcolonial context, how do laws interact with 
patriarchy to define minority women’s positions in the state, society, and the 
community?  How do religious minority women in this context selectively seek, apply, 
and subvert the plurality of laws available to them to achieve their own objectives? 
This thesis has addressed these questions by taking the case of a single religious 
minority community, that is, the Christian community, in Bangladesh.   
Rebecca Sarker, the protagonist of my story and whom I had introduced at the 
beginning of this thesis, took an alternative path to exit her marriage. She bypassed 
the state as well as church laws by signing an affidavit along with her husband 
declaring themselves to be divorced. Rebecca’s alternative divorce was not a ‘legal’ 
remedy in the eyes of either the state or the church as the path that she took did not 
comply with the state or the church laws. Although Rebecca was aware of the 
difficulties and disadvantages of the process she followed, it did not stop her from 
taking the alternative path. She said, “I had reached a point, where I just needed some 
sort of document, which somehow falls within the legal framework, and that states my 
marital status as ‘divorced’. I just needed to come out of that relationship and this 
option seemed the best among what I had”. For Rebecca, the perceptions of the state 
and the church were less important than her own need to get away from her previous 
husband.  
I have foregrounded Bangladeshi Christian women’s experiences of law and patriarchy 
by underlining that although the state and the church wield significant power and 
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influence, women’s agency and subversion cannot be forgotten. The complexities that 
arise from a situation of legal pluralism can only be understood through the eyes of 
religious minority women such as Rebecca and traced stories of their subversion of law 
and patriarchy within the boundaries of specific socio-legal contexts. 
The practices of marriage, divorce, and inheritance among Bangladeshi Christians 
must also be placed within the complex socio-political context and the historical 
legacy of British colonisation. Together, they have created an impasse, where true 
gender equality remains a distant dream for religious minority women. Situating 
Rebecca in the complex intersectional interstices of minorityness, multiple laws, 
gender, and patriarchy, we receive a snapshot of how women like her experience and 
subvert ruthless oppression of patriarchy at different levels and aspects of life. How 
these women make strategic choices to subvert the constraints created by both law 
and patriarchy by taking alternative paths has been a crucial task. I have shown 
minority women’s experience of law and patriarchy and their subversion through the 
feminist theory of legal pluralism by adding a legal pluralism angle to the rich and 
vibrant debates on feminist theory and gender and development. 
The need is to link the plurality of laws with manifestations of patriarchy and show 
their impacts on minority women in a particular context. In order to establish this 
link, I have examined how patriarchy plays its role in the contestation and negotiation 
of the state and the community around the issue of governing the family. This thesis 
extends the arguments made by Rajan (2003), Manchanda (2009), and Solanki (2011) 
on the dynamic and contested relationships between the state and the community by 
showing the role of patriarchy in this struggle.  
The multi-layered approach allowed me to unpack the role of multiple laws and 
patriarchy first at the state level, then at the community level, and finally, at the 
individual level.  The focus on a religious minority community, its creation and 
identity construction through the Christianisation and law-making processes during 
the colonial period show the wider processes at play. The effects of the interaction of 
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law with patriarchy are felt on women’s everyday lives and at various sites, such as 
their homes, workplaces, community, churches, and elsewhere. At the microscopic 
scale, women’s gendered experiences of marriage, divorce, and inheritance practices 
show their agency.  
First, this thesis has examined how laws and patriarchy operate within the state 
mechanisms. At this level, it has shown that when the state laws interact with non-
state laws and other forms of normative orders, the situation of women takes a 
complex shape. In fact, the complexities arise with the conflicts between the state and 
non-state laws and various forums available to women. By adopting a historical route, 
this thesis has also shown how patriarchy was reproduced and reinforced in the 
processes of identity creation through colonisation, Christianisation, and the state’s 
law-creation processes. The Bengali Christians were ‘intimately colonised’, because the 
identity of ‘native’ Christians was a product of negotiations between the colonial state 
and the local Christian community in order to protect patriarchal practices. In these 
processes, women became the subjects of further and possibly more intimate 
colonisation simultaneously by the two groups: the colonial rulers and by men in their 
own community.  
Second, this thesis has described the encounters between the state, the community, 
and patriarchy in a postcolonial setting by unpacking the Christian community’s 
group identities, autonomy, and governmentality. By situating the community within 
broader Bangladeshi society, this thesis has also shown how gender intersects with 
community power, politics, and dynamics. I have situated the Christian community at 
the present time and analysed how the community’s governmentality contributed in 
creating their minorityness. Moreover, the position of the community as a minority 
group within the broader society in relation to the majority groups, demonstrates how 
minorityness blends with patriarchy to create a specific type, the ‘mission-compound 
patriarchy’.   
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Finally, this thesis has examined, compared, and contrasted gender dimensions, 
treatment, and experiences of multiple laws and normative orders with respect to 
three specific issues: marriage, divorce, and inheritance. By examining the cases of 
oshomo jowal or mixed or inter-religious marriages between a Christian and a non-
Christian party, this thesis has shown how the Bangladeshi Christian community 
actively creates and defines boundaries, particularly for women, while simultaneously 
creating mutuality in order to accommodate differences. Although the state law for 
Christian marriage does not prohibit inter-religious marriages, this type of marriages 
are often highly discouraged and create a moral panic within the community that is 
often linked with the community’s minority identity. In order to overcome this panic, 
the mutuality creation processes sometimes take a violent form, which remains a 
blindspot in the community and that is most cases unseen and unrecognised by the 
members of the community. 
The state and the community struggle around the governance of the family. This 
struggle is seen around the issue of Christian divorce; while the community actively 
prohibits and discourages divorce within the Christian community, its members, 
particularly women, take alternative paths to get a divorce or its alternatives and exit 
marriages. While taking these paths to divorce alternatives, women make strategic 
choices depending on their respective individual intersectional subjectivity and 
situations. Minority women engage in patriarchal bargaining through their strategic 
choices while simultaneously conducting forum shopping by taking the most suitable 
alternative paths in order to receive a remedy of divorce, bypassing the state as well as 
community laws, according to their individual subjectivity.   
Women’s land inheritance rights and practices within the Christian community 
exemplify another aspect of the state and the community struggle over governing 
women’s lives. Although the state personal law provides women with equal rights to 
their male counterparts to inherit land, in order to protect the community identity, 
women have been deprived of their land rights systematically by the community. 
While the personal law allows women to inherit equally to men, the community uses 
  
265 
 
gendered and ideological assumptions in order to make women’s land disinheritance a 
custom, which the community considers as a marker of their group identity. In this 
way, women’s disinheritance of land became a key instrument of community identity 
creation, re-creation, and protection.  
By combining two disciplinary lenses of feminism and legal pluralism, this thesis 
contributes to both the theories through the development of a feminist theory of legal 
pluralism. Three distinct but interrelated aspects of a feminist theory of legal 
pluralism have been presented in this thesis. First, a feminist theory of legal pluralism 
suggests a shift from the legal centralism to legal pluralism paradigm. This shift is 
important in order to capture women’s full experiences of law. The shift from legal 
centralism to pluralism expands the horizon of law and instead of seeing the state as 
the sole source of law, it also considers other social sources of laws, such as customs, 
norms, rules, amongst others.  
Second, a feminist theory of legal pluralism not only makes a shift from legal 
centralism to pluralism but also pursues a second shift that involves the centre of 
analysis — from law to women. Instead of analysing how laws affect the lives of 
women, a feminist theory of legal pluralism puts women at the centre of its analysis 
and examines how women experience and navigate the plurality of law. The shift from 
legal centralism to pluralism, and shifting the centre of analysis from law to women, is 
evident in the analysis of marriage, divorce, and inheritance in this thesis. By using a 
feminist theory of legal pluralism, this thesis has not only captured how women 
experience and use plural laws but also how they subvert them. Neither a legal 
centralism paradigm nor placing law at the centre of analysis could explain the various 
alternative paths that women take to apply and/or subvert law and patriarchy. Third 
and finally, a feminist theory of legal pluralism explores women’s experiences of law by 
contextualising women in their respective intersectional subjective positions that cut 
across race, caste, class, religion, gender, sexuality, amongst other factors of 
discrimination.  
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All three aspects of a feminist theory of legal pluralism — a shift from legal centralism 
to pluralism, a second shift of the centre of analysis from law to women, and women’s 
intersectional subjectivity — have been deployed in this thesis while examining 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance practices of the Bangladeshi Christian community. 
In all three cases, by keeping Christian women at the centre of analysis, this thesis has 
captured women’s experiences of the plurality of laws, including the state and non-
state laws and other forms of normative orders. Women have also been situated into 
their respective intersectional subjective positions while applying a feminist theory of 
legal pluralism.  
The recognition of intersectionality among Bangladeshi Christian women not only 
built the feminist theory of legal pluralism but also has challenged the 
homogenisation of minority women, or more specifically, Christian women. This 
thesis has demonstrated the heterogeneity that exists even within a small population 
of the country, which cuts across denomination (Catholic or Protestant), location 
(rural-urban), education (educated-literate), socio-economic status, and age, amongst 
other things. Moreover, addressing the intersectionality of women in this thesis has 
also challenged the homogeneous notion of ‘average third world women’ that 
commonly presents women as victims of violence, universally dependent, and 
powerless. Instead, this thesis has engaged with the positionality of these women and 
revealed their agency and subversion.   
A homogenisation of the category of the religious minority communities has been 
taking place in South Asia. Although issues of minorities have been an area of interest 
for many scholars, Hindus in Bangladesh and Muslims in India are being 
overrepresented in the scholarly studies of religious minority communities in these 
two countries. The Christian community becomes invisible in the politics of minority 
in the region. This thesis has also challenged such focus on the homogeneity of 
religious minority groups by focusing on the Christian community of Bangladesh. In 
other words, this thesis has problematised the dichotomous definition of the religious 
minority community in the region only as Hindus of Bangladesh and Muslims of India.  
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Bangladeshi Christian minority women are not only barely present in the scholarly 
work on minority issues in Bangladesh or the rest of the South Asian region but also 
invisible to the state and its mechanisms and human rights and legal aid 
organisations. This thesis has revealed this invisibility of Christian women to both the 
state and these human rights and legal aid organisations. One of the reasons for this 
invisibility is the minorityness of the Christian community and the other is mission-
compound patriarchy that restricts women from reaching the state apparatuses. 
Particularly, the absence of Christian women became vivid in the analysis of Christian 
women seeking a remedy of divorce. Instead of going to the court, most Christian 
women seeking divorce take alternative paths of divorce to bypass state legal systems. 
As a result, these women not only remain obscure to the state apparatus but also to 
the mainstream human rights and legal aid organisations.  
An implicit understanding of marriage exists within the community, which makes 
women (and men) think that marriage cannot be broken. Since the inception of 
Bangladesh as a nation, not a single Christian divorce case has attracted the attention 
of the judicial community or human rights activists for debate or discussion. 
Moreover, Christian women’s issues were virtually absent in the agenda of the legal 
and human rights activist and feminist communities. As a result of all of these factors, 
Christian women’s issues and Christian personal law reform is nowhere to be found on 
the mainstream agenda, which makes Christian women almost invisible from the 
state.   
The ways in which women from religious minority communities subvert laws and 
undermine (and even challenge) patriarchy are intimate and occur at a personal scale. 
Women are tired of oppression and subjugation, caught in frustrating and unhappy 
marriages or had been disinherited by their own families, constantly being told what 
they should do in order to be a decent, ideal woman who presents the best face of 
Christians to rest of the world. They choose not to partake in public demonstrations, 
waving flags of independence. A Christian woman in Bangladesh resist male 
domination and oppressive social control by the church and the family, charting their 
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own paths, sometimes using local cultural customs or sometimes bargaining with 
those who represent patriarchal dominance, and express their agency in the very 
personal and intimate spheres, in areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In all 
three areas, there are conflicts between state laws and non-state laws, including 
church laws and community norms. For example, in the area of marriage, the state law 
for Christian marriage allows inter-religious marriages, whereas the church and 
community prohibit such unions. Similarly, although the state law provides the 
Christian population the right to divorce, the community prohibits divorce. 
Inheritance is another area where a conflict between the state law and community law 
exists. While the state law for Christian inheritance allows women to inherit equal to 
their male counterparts, actual inheritance practices do not enable women to inherit 
equally.  
The experience of conflicting plural laws in the areas of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance, how women apply these conflicting state and community laws that are 
often shaped by patriarchal ideologies, and how they subvert these laws in order to 
fulfil their objectives show agency. In the area of divorce, how women undertake 
forum shopping by choosing one out of a number of alternative paths available to 
them in order get a divorce (or an alternative to divorce) and how they engage in 
patriarchal bargaining in this process is critical in this regard. Women’s subversion of 
law and patriarchy is inheritance occurs by striking a balance between the ‘good 
woman’ image that the community imposes on their shoulders and by asserting of 
their inheritance rights, as they make strategic choices between claiming and not 
claiming their rightful share of an inheritance.  
This research converses with the vast and vibrant literature of three distinct but 
interrelated scholarships: legal pluralism, feminism, and gender and development. By 
engaging extensively with the feminist legal theories and legal pluralism theories, this 
thesis argues for a feminist theory of legal pluralism that facilitates both legal 
pluralism and legal feminism to collaborate and to strengthen the dialogue between 
the two scholarships, which was not adequately present until now. Such dialogue is 
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useful for both areas of scholarship. By engaging with legal feminism, legal pluralism 
will be able to incorporate a feminist angle. Likewise, legal feminism scholarship will 
benefit from legal pluralism scholarship by expanding the horizon of law. The research 
has also engaged significantly with the intersectionality and minority theories of 
gender and development scholarship that have enriched the scholarship by bringing 
intersectionality and minority theories into the feminist theory of legal pluralism. 
Moreover, the case of Bangladeshi Christian community has also contributed to South 
Asian minority studies.    
However, although this thesis advocates for a feminist theory of legal pluralism, it has 
only examined this theory in the single case of Bangladeshi Christians. No other case 
in comparison has been presented to explore the applicability of this theory in a 
different context, with or without a colonial legacy. Future research can address this 
gap by applying the feminist theory of legal pluralism in other contexts. For example, 
an area of future research would be to draw a comparison between two former British 
colonies, such as India and South Africa, by applying a feminist theory of legal 
pluralism. Another area of future research would be to explore the notion of 
minorityness for Christians as well as other minority communities. Particularly, such 
research could explore the minorityness of Bangladeshi Christians in the diaspora. 
Conducting historical research on Baptists and/or Catholics amongst other 
denominations also could be conducted to flesh out the social and legal issues relating 
to the early formation and location of the Christian communities, in Bangladesh as 
well as in other countries of South Asia. 
I end this thesis with a personal note. This research has marked as much an emotional 
journey as an intellectual one. Through this thesis, I have seen my own community in 
a new and different light, and my own experiences have been that tiny little drop of 
water through which one can see the ocean of experiences of many others like me.  
Decades ago, feminists rallied around the cry that ‘the personal is political’. Today, as 
we march ahead in a different day and different context, I cannot deny how true this 
statement remains for many women like me. 
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Appendix 
Appendix – A 
Relevant sections of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh 
Article 1 
Bangladesh is a unitary, independent, sovereign Republic to be known as the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh. 
Article 2A 
The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but the State shall ensure equal status and 
equal right in the practice of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other religions. 
Article 3 
The state language of the Republic is Bangla. 
Article 6(2) 
The people of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangalees as a nation and the citizens of 
Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshies. 
Article 9 
The unity and solidarity of the Bangalee nation, which, deriving its identity from its 
language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a 
united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of 
Bangalee nationalism.  
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Article 28 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex or place of birth. 
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the State and of public life. 
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth be 
subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to 
any place of public entertainment or resort, or admission to any educational 
institution. 
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making special provision in favour 
of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens. 
Article 29  
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect of employment or 
office in the service of the Republic. 
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, be 
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office in the 
service of the Republic.  
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from – 
a. making special provision in favour of any backward section of citizens for the 
purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service of the 
Republic;  
b. giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving appointments 
relating to any religious or denominational institution to persons of that 
religion or denomination;  
c. reserving for members of one sex any class of employment or office on the 
ground that it is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members of the 
opposite sex. 
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Appendix – B  
The structure of the state judiciary system of Bangladesh 
  
Source: Panday & Hossain Mollah, (2011)  
The Supreme Court 
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Appellate Division
High Court Diviision
Court of District 
Judge
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District Judge
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District Judge
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Chief Metropolitan 
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Appendix – C  
List of personal laws for three religious groups of Bangladesh 
For Muslims 
 The Muslim Personal Laws (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (Act no. XXVI of 1937) 
 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (Act no. VIII of 1939) 
 The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance no. VIII of 1961) 
 The Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Act, 1974 (Act no. LII of 1974) 
 The Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration) Rules, 1975. 
For Hindus 
 The Hindu Widow’s Re-Marriage Act, 1856 (Act no. XV of 1856) 
 The Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916 (Act no. XV of 1916) 
 The Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act, 1928 (Act no. XII of 1928) 
 The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act no. II of 1929) 
 The Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act no. XVIII of 1937) 
 The Hindu Marriage Disabilities Removal Act, 1946 (Act no. XXVIII of 1946) 
 The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946 
(Act no. XIX of 1946) 
 The Hindu Marriage (Registration) Act, 2012 (Act no. XL of 2012) 
For Christians 
 The Divorce Act, 1869 (Act no. IV of 1869) 
 The Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (Act no. XV of 1872) 
 The Married Women’s Property Act, 1874 (Act no. III of 1874) 
 The Succession Act, 1925 (Act no. XXXIX of 1925) 
 The Catholic community is also governed by the Code of Canon Law, which are not 
state law.  
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Appendix – D  
List of uniform state laws for protecting women in Bangladesh 
 The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act no. VIII of 1890) 
 The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1980 (Act no. XXXV of 1980) 
 The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance, 1983 (Ordinance no. LX of 
1983) 
 The Family Courts Ordinance (Ordinance no. XVIII of 1985) 
 The Family Courts Rules, 1985 
 The Nari-o-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain, 2000 (Law on the Suppression of Violence 
against Women and Children, 2000) (Act no. VIII of 2000) 
 Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, 2010 (Act no. LVIII of 2010) 
  
 300 
 
Appendix – E  
Relevant sections of the Divorce Act, 1869 
Section 10 
When husband may petition for dissolution 
Any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court Division, 
praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the 
solemnization thereof, been guilty of adultery. 
When wife may petition for dissolution 
Any wife may present a petition to the District court or to the High Court Division, 
praying that her marriage may be dissolved on the ground that, since the solemnization 
thereof, her husband has exchanged his profession of Christianity for the profession of 
some other religion, and gone through a form of marriage with another woman; 
or has been guilty of incestuous adultery, 
or of bigamy with adultery, 
or of marriage with another woman with adultery, 
or of rape, sodomy or bestiality, 
or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to 
a divorce mensa et toro, 
or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reasonable excuse, for two years or 
upwards. 
Section 11 
Upon any such petition presented by a husband, the petitioner shall make the 
alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the said petition, unless he is excused from so 
doing on one of the following grounds, to be allowed by the Court:-  
(1) that the respondent is leading the life of a prostitute, and that the petitioner 
knows of no person with whom the adultery has been committed;  
(2) that the name of the alleged adulterer is unknown to the petitioner although he 
has made due efforts to discover it;  
(3) that the alleged adulterer is dead. 
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Section 34 
Any husband may, either in a petition for dissolution of marriage or for judicial 
separation, or in a petition to the District Court or the High Court Division limited 
to such object only, claim damages from any person on the ground of his having 
committed adultery with the wife of such petitioner.  
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Appendix F  
Year wise Divorce Suits filed at the High Court1 
Sl. Year No. of Suits 
1 2001 2 
2 2002 Nil 
3 2003 3 
4 2004 3 
5 2005 3 
6 2006 3 
7 2007 1 
8 2008 2 
9 2009 7 
10 2010 1 
11 2011 3 
12 2012 5 
13 2013 6 
14 2014 3 
15 2015 1 
16 2016 5 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Divorce Suit Register at the Supreme Court, High Court Division 
 
